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Major Academic Unit: Department of Risk Management and Insurance
This dissertation thesis consists of four chapters to address how aggregate shocks aﬀect in-
surance ﬁrms’ risk management and asset investment decisions as well as the impact of these
decisions on insurance prices and regulation. The ﬁrst chapter focuses on the transfer of
aggregate risk by insurance ﬁrms. Speciﬁcally, this chapter develops a signaling model to ex-
amine how insurance ﬁrms choose among retention, reinsurance and securitization especially
for catastrophe risks. The second chapter examines the determination of insurance prices in
an integrated equilibrium framework where insurance ﬁrms’ assets may be subject to both
idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. The third chapter presents an empirical analysis of the
hypothesized impacts of internal capital and asset risk on insurance prices as predicted by
the results of the second chapter. The last chapter investigates the optimal design of insur-
ance regulation to achieve the Pareto optimal asset and liquidity management by insurers
as well as risk sharing between insurers and insurees.
Chapter 1 provides a novel explanation for the predominance of retention and reinsurance
relative to securitization in catastrophe risk transfer using a signaling model. An insurer’s
risk transfer choice trades oﬀ the lower signaling costs of reinsurance against the additional
costs of reinsurance stemming from sources such as their market power, higher cost of capi-
tal relative to capital markets, and compensation for their monitoring costs. In equilibrium,
the lowest risk insurers choose reinsurance, while intermediate and high risk insurers choose
partial and full securitization, respectively. An increase in the loss size increases the aver-
age risk of insurers who choose securitization. Consequently, catastrophe risks, which are
characterized by low frequency-high severity losses, are only securitized by very high risk
insurers. Chapter 2 develops a uniﬁed equilibrium model of competitive insurance markets
where insurers’ assets may be exposed to idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. We endoge-
nize the asset and liability sides of insurance ﬁrms’ balance sheets. We obtain new insights
into the relationship between insurance prices and insurers’ internal capital that potentially
reconcile the conﬂicting predictions of previous theories that investigate the relation using
partial equilibrium frameworks. Equilibrium eﬀects lead to a non-monotonic U-shaped re-
lation between insurance price and internal capital. Speciﬁcally, the equilibrium insurance
price ﬁrst decreases with a positive shock to the internal capital when it is below certain
threshold level, and then increases with a positive shock to the internal capital when it
is above the threshold level. Further, we also derive another testable implication that an
increase in the asset default risk increases the insurance price and decrease the insurance
coverage. Chapter 3 studies the property and casualty insurance industry in periods from
1992 to 2012 based on the aggregate level of NAIC data. We show that the insurance price
decreases with an increase in the surplus of insurance ﬁrms at the end of the previous year
when the surplus is lower than 8.5 billion, and then increase when the surplus is higher than
8.5 billion. Our results provide support for the hypothesis of a U-shaped relationship be-
tween internal capital and insurance price. Our results also provide evidence for the positive
relationship between asset portfolio risk and insurance price. Chapter 4 studies the eﬀects
of aggregate risk on the Pareto optimal asset and liquidity management by insurers as well
as risk-sharing between insurers and insuees. When aggregate risk is low, both insurees and
insures hold no liquidity reserves, insurees are fully insured, and insurers bear all aggregate
risk. When aggregate risk takes intermediate values, both insurees and insurers still hold no
liquidity reserves, but insurees partially share aggregate risk with insurers. When aggregate
risk is high, however, it is optimal to hold nonzero liquidity reserves, and insurees partially
share aggregate risk with insurers. The eﬃcient asset and liquidity management policies as
well as the aggregate risk allocation can be implemented through a regulatory intervention
policy that combines a minimum liquidity requirement when aggregate risk is high, “ex post”
contingent on the aggregate state, comprehensive insurance policies, and reinsurance.
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Chapter 1
Catastrophe Risk Transfer
1.1 Introduction
Insurers with limited capital to completely cover the risks in their portfolios often exploit
external risk transfer mechanisms such as reinsurance and securitization. Although these
risk-sharing mechanisms are used for all types of insurable risks, they are especially important
in the case of catastrophe risks because of the large magnitudes of the potential losses
involved. A strand of literature argues that securitization has a signiﬁcant advantage over
reinsurance because of the substantially higher available capital and risk-bearing capacity
of capital markets (Durbin 2001). Nevertheless, an enduring puzzle is that reinsurance is
still the dominant risk transfer mechanism for catastrophe risks. By the end of 2011, the
outstanding risk capital of asset-backed-security catastrophe (CAT) bonds amounted to $12
billion, while the reinsurance capacity was $470 billion. CAT bonds are often issued to
provide “high layers of protection” that are not covered by reinsurance. It is often argued
that CAT bonds are too expensive even though CAT risks are uncorrelated with market
risks suggesting that they are somehow “mispriced” relative to their payoﬀs. Further, many
CAT bonds receive ratings that are below investment grade (see Cummins (2008, 2012)).
We provide a novel explanation for the above stylized facts using a signaling model to
analyze an insurer’s risk transfer choice. When an insurer with private information about its
portfolio faces a choice between reinsurance and securitization, its choice represents a signal
of the nature of risks in its portfolio. The insurer’s choice trades oﬀ the lower adverse selection
or information costs associated with reinsurance (because of the superior monitoring abilities
of reinsurers) against the higher costs of reinsurance arising from various sources such as
reinsurers’ market power, higher cost of capital relative to capital markets, and compensation
for their costs of monitoring (Froot (2001)). We show that Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE)
of the signaling game have a partition form where an insurer chooses reinsurance if its risk is
below a low threshold, partial securitization if its risk lies in an intermediate interval, and full
securitization if its risk is above a high threshold. The threshold risk level above which the
insurer chooses securitization increases with the magnitude of potential losses in its portfolio.
Given that catastrophe risks are usually characterized by “low frequency–high severity”
losses, our results imply that an insurer is more likely to choose retention or reinsurance
to transfer catastrophe risk. Further, because an insurer only opts for securitization if its
risk of potential losses is high, securitization typically provides high layers of protection,
catastrophe bonds have high premia (relative to the ex ante expected losses) and often have
ratings below investment grade.1 Importantly, our results suggest that the high costs of
catastrophe securities reﬂect the rational incorporation of their inherent risks by capital
markets based on the information they glean from insurers’ risk transfer choices.
In our signaling model, a representative insurer with a limited amount of capital holds
a portfolio of insurable risks. The insurer incurs signiﬁcant bankruptcy costs if it is unable
to meet its liabilities, which provides incentives for it to transfer its risks. The insurer can
choose to retain its risks or transfer them either partially or wholly through reinsurance or
securitization. The insurer has private information about its risks so that there is adverse
selection regarding its “type.” Reinsurers have a signiﬁcant information advantage over cap-
ital markets because they possess the resources to more eﬀectively monitor insurers. For
simplicity, we assume that reinsurers know an insurer’s risk type and, therefore, do not face
any adverse selection. (Our results are robust to allowing for adverse selection in reinsurance
as long as its degree is less than that in securitization.) On the ﬂip side, however, reinsurers
1Because CAT bonds are fully collateralized, CAT bond ratings are determined by the probability that the bond
principal will be hit by a triggering event. Thus, the bond ratings indicate the layer of catastrophic-risk coverage
that is provided by the bonds.
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charge a markup over the actuarially fair premium that could arise through various chan-
nels. Consistent with Froot (2001), reinsurers have signiﬁcant market power that allows
them to extract additional rents relative to competitive capital markets. (The market power
of reinsurers is analogous to the market power of informed lenders in Rajan (1992).) The
reinsurance markup could also arise as compensation for reinsurers’ monitoring costs and the
higher cost of capital of reinsurers relative to capital markets that have higher risk-bearing
capacity. The insurer’s choice among retention, reinsurance and securitization reﬂects the
tradeoﬀ between the lower adverse selection costs associated with reinsurance and the costs
stemming from the reinsurance markup.
For robustness, we analyze two versions of framework. In the ﬁrst version, the insurer
incurs ﬁxed bankruptcy costs if it is unable to meet its liabilities. In the second version,
it incurs variable bankruptcy costs that are proportional to the magnitude of its losses. In
both versions, the insurer’s “risk” is determined by its probability of incurring a loss that
exceeds its capital level so that it is unable to meet its liabilities.
In the model with ﬁxed bankruptcy costs, we show that Perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE)
of the signaling game (under stability restrictions on oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs along the lines
of the D1 reﬁnement) have a “partition form” that is characterized by two thresholds. The
insurer chooses reinsurance if its risk is below the low threshold, self-insurance if its risk lies
between the thresholds, and securitization if its risk is above the high threshold. The intuition
for the equilibria is as follows. With ﬁxed bankruptcy costs, the costs the insurer incurs are
independent of the magnitude of its shortfall in meeting its liabilities. Consequently, it
is never optimal for the insurer to partially retain its risks, that is, it either chooses to
retain all its risks or completely transfer them. Because of the reinsurance markup, the cost
of reinsurance is increasing and convex in the insurer’s risk, while the cost of retention is
increasing and linear. The costs of securitization, which stem from the cross-subsidization
of higher risk types are, however, decreasing and convex in the insurer’s risk. Consequently,
if the insurer’s risk is below a low threshold, it prefers reinsurance to retention as well
as securitization. If the insurer’s risk lies in an intermediate interval, it prefers retention
to reinsurance because the increasing and convex costs of reinsurance dominate those of
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retention for intermediate risks. If the insurer’s risk is above a high threshold, the fact that
the cost of securitization is decreasing in the insurer’s risk type implies that securitization
dominates retention and reinsurance.
An increase in the size of potential losses increases the marginal cost of subsidizing higher
risk insurers, thereby increasing the trigger risk level above which insurers choose securitiza-
tion. In the context of catastrophe risk, which is characterized by low frequencies and large
magnitudes of potential losses, our results imply that an insurer chooses securitization if and
only if its risk of potential losses is high, that is, reinsurance is more likely to be chosen as
a risk transfer mechanism. Further, the prediction that only very high-risk insurers choose
securitization explains why catastrophe bonds have high premia relative to their expected
losses, and ratings of catastrophe-linked securities are often below investment grade.
In the model with proportional bankruptcy costs, an insurer’s bankruptcy costs vary with
the magnitude of its shortfall in meeting its liabilities. Consequently, it is always optimal for
the insurer to transfer at least some portion of its risk either through reinsurance or secu-
ritization by choosing a retention level. The PBE of the risk transfer signaling game again
have a partition structure, which depends on the reinsurance markup. If the reinsurance
markup is below a threshold, then the lowest risk insurers choose full reinsurance, the in-
termediate risk insurers choose separating securitization contracts with retention levels that
decrease with their risk, while the highest risk insurers choose full pooling securitization. If
the reinsurance markup is above the threshold, however, the equilibria are characterized by
two intervals where the lower risk insurers choose separating partial securitization contracts,
while the high risk insurers choose full securitization.
When the reinsurance markup is suﬃciently low, the costs of reinsurance are lower than
the signaling costs associated with (partial or full) securitization. To avoid the costs associ-
ated with the reinsurance markup, and the costs of subsidizing high-risk insurers, interme-
diate risk insurers signal their types by choosing separating securitization contracts that are
characterized by retention levels that decline with their risk. For high-risk insurers, the costs
of signaling are too high so that they choose to pool by oﬀering full securitization contracts.
When the reinsurance markup is high, however, the lowest risk insurers too prefer separating
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partial securitization to reinsurance.
The implication that only high risks are securitized is consistent with a noticeable increase
in catastrophe securitization after Hurricane Katrina. Anecdotal evidence suggests that
actuaries signiﬁcantly increased their estimates of catastrophe risks following Katrina (see
Ahrens et al. (2009)). The spike in securitization transactions is, therefore, consistent with
the higher perceived levels of risk. In recent years, more sophisticated investors such as
dedicated hedge funds have entered the catastrophe securization market and this has been
followed by an increase in the volume of securitization. This observation is also consistent
with our basic story. The entry of more sophisticated investors has likely reduced the level
of adverse selection in securitization markets, thereby lowering securitization costs.
To highlight our results as crisply as possible, we assume that an insurer chooses one of
three possible risk transfer mechanisms, namely, retention, reinsurance, and securitization.
Our results can, however, be naturally extended to the scenario in which an insurer is exposed
to multiple risks. In this context, our analysis suggests that the lowest risks are reinsured,
the intermediate risks are either retained or partially securitized, and the highest risks are
fully securitized. Consequently, our results are also consistent with the observation that
insurers often choose both reinsurance and securitization to transfer their portfolios of risks.
In particular, the results comport with evidence that catastrophe bonds are typically issued
to provide high layers of protection that are not reinsured.
Our study relates to two branches of the literature that investigate insurers’ choice be-
tween reinsurance and securitization, especially in the context of catastrophe risk transfer.
The ﬁrst branch examines the factors that aﬀect the demand for insurance-linked securities
such as ambiguity and loss aversion (Bantwal and Kunreuther (2000)) as well as aversion
to downside risk and parameter uncertainty (Barrieu and Louberge (2009)). The second
branch examines the factors that aﬀect the supply of insurance-linked securities. Cummins
and Trainar (2009) argue that the beneﬁts of securitization relative to reinsurance increase
when the magnitude of potential losses and the correlation of risks increase. Finken and
Laux (2009) argue that, given low basis risk, catastrophe bonds with parametric triggers are
insensitive to adverse selection, and can serve as an alternative risk transfer mechanism that
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is more attractive to low risk insurers who suﬀer from adverse selection with reinsurance
contracts. Lakdawalla and Zanjani (2012) argue that catastrophe bonds can improve the
welfare of insureds when reinsurers face contracting constraints on the distribution of assets
in bankruptcy, and when they must insure a heterogeneous group of risks. Gibson et al.
(2014) analyze the tradeoﬀ between the costs and beneﬁts of loss information aggregation
procedures to determine the prevalent risk transfer form. They argue that traders in capi-
tal markets may produce too much information, thereby making securitization prohibitively
costly. Hagendorﬀ et al. (2014) empirically show that reinsurance dominates securitization
when loss volatility is above a threshold. We complement the above literature by providing
a novel explanation based on signaling considerations for the dominance of retention and
reinsurance in the market for catastrophe risk transfer. Insurers’ risk transfer choice reﬂects
the tradeoﬀ between the lower adverse selection costs associated with reinsurance and the
additional costs stemming from reinsurance markup.
It is often argued that a signiﬁcant deterrent to the growth in the market for insurance-
linked securities is the presence of basis risk, which is present when securities have parametric
triggers where payouts are based on an index not directly tied to the sponsoring insurer’s
losses. It is, however, unclear what the quantitative impact of basis risk is on the securitiza-
tion decision given that insurers can choose the volume of securities to issue to hedge their
exposure to the catastrophe underlying the index. Indeed, Cummins, Lalonde and Phillips
(2004) empirically show that insurers, except perhaps for the smallest ones, can hedge their
exposures almost as eﬀectively using contracts with index triggers as they can using contracts
that settle on their own losses. Further, basis risk can be often be reduced substantially by
appropriately deﬁning the location where the event severity is measured (Cummins (2008)).
Moreover, a substantial percentage of CAT bonds also have indemnity-based triggers that
are tied to the insurer’s losses, and CAT bonds with indemnity triggers have signiﬁcantly
larger issue volumes than those with parametric triggers (Braun (2014)).
Another related argument that is proﬀered for the low volume of securitization is the
presence of capital market transaction costs. A major component of these costs are en-
dogenous costs due to adverse selection that play a central role in our analysis. Further,
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CAT bond issuers annualize the ﬁxed costs over multiple periods, thereby reducing annual
transaction costs. In addition, the favorable tax treatment of CAT bonds allow insurers to
reduce tax costs associated with equity ﬁnancing (Niehaus (2002), Harrington and Niehaus
(2003)). Moreover, CAT bond interest paid oﬀshore is also deducted for tax purposes in the
same way as reinsurance premia (see Cummins (2008)). Consequently, it is not clear that
transaction costs associated with securitization, apart from adverse selection costs that we
already incorporate, are high enough to signiﬁcantly deter securitization. Further, even if
transaction costs were signiﬁcant, it is not clear whether they explain why securitization is
typically used to provide high layers of protection.
Although we focus on catastrophe risks for concreteness, our framework and results can
be more broadly applied to analyze the sharing of all insurable risks, and the transfer of other
types of risk such as credit risk by ﬁrms (e.g., see Gorton and Pennacchi (1995), Duﬀee and
Zhou (2001), Parlour and Plantin (2008), Parlour and Winton (2013), Thompson (2014)). In
the context of credit risk transfer, our results suggest that only high credit risks are optimally
securitized that oﬀers a potential explanation for why securities such as credit default swaps
were actually very risky and triggered huge losses during the ﬁnancial crisis. Indeed, Drucker
and Puri (2009) examine the secondary market for loan sales and ﬁnd that sold loans are
riskier than average.
More broadly, our paper ﬁts into the literature on the analysis of information revela-
tion through the choice of the risk sharing arrangement (e.g., see Leland and Pyle (1977),
Nachman and Noe (1994), DeMarzo and Duﬃe (1999)). We contribute to this literature
by comparing information generation channels associated with diﬀering risk transfer mech-
anisms. We examine two channels through which information is revealed: one is through
costly monitoring performed by informed counterparties, and the other one is through sig-
naling to competitive counterparties. Our results imply that information about low risk
types is monitored by the risk bearer, information about intermediate risk types is signaled
by the risk transferrers, and no information about high risk types is revealed in equilibrium.
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1.2 The Model
The economy consists of a continuum of insurers. The representative insurer has a limited
amount of capital W and a risky portfolio of insurable risks. The insurer is faced with
the choice between retaining the risk (that is, self-insuring) or transferring the risk through
reinsurance or securitization. The insurer’s portfolio has two possible realizations. In the
“good” state, which occurs with probability 1 − p, the portfolio suﬀers no loss and the
insurer earns the premium A. However in the “bad” state, which occurs with probability p,
the portfolio suﬀers a loss and the insurer has to make the net payment B (total indemnity
net of the premium). We assume that W −B < 0 so that the insurer’s capital is not enough
to cover the net loss payment in the bad state.
The insurer has private information about the probability p so that there is adverse
selection regarding the type p of the insurer. The loss probability p is drawn from the
cumulative distribution F with support in [0, 1]. The insurer incurs an additional deadweight
bankruptcy cost C in the bad state if it is unable to fully cover the loss. Note that the
bankruptcy cost is in addition to the loss B −W. The bankruptcy cost could comprise of
non-pecuniary as well as pecuniary costs that arise from a loss of reputation, the loss of
future business opportunities, etc.
We assume a ﬁxed bankruptcy cost C in this section. In Section 1.3, we alter the model to
consider variable bankruptcy costs that increase with the magnitude of the insurer’s shortfall
in meeting its liabilities. Hoerger et al.(1990) show that the demand for reinsurance might
be created by the existence of bankruptcy costs even if the insurer is risk neutral. If the
magnitude of underwriting losses and the correlations of risks are large, the risk warehousing
function of insurers may collapse. The presence of bankruptcy costs could motivate the
insurer to hedge its underwriting losses through reinsurance or securitization.
Given its linear objective function, it is optimal for the insurer to choose either reinsurance
or securitization for its entire portfolio provided it chooses to transfer its risk. As we discuss
later, however, our results extend naturally to the scenario in which an insurer is exposed to
diﬀering risks and chooses diﬀerent risk transfer mechanisms for diﬀerent types of risks. We
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ﬁrst derive the reinsurance and securitization contracts separately assuming that insurers
only have access to one of the two risk transfer mechanisms. We then analyze the insurer’s
choice among retention, reinsurance and securitization.
1.2.1 Reinsurance
Reinsurers have an information advantage over investors in capital markets due to their spe-
cialized expertise and ability to monitor/screen insurers (e.g. Jean-Baptise et al.(2000)). To
simplify matters, and to focus attention on the information advantage of reinsurers relative
to capital markets, we assume that reinsurers have the monitoring technology to know the
risk type of the insurer perfectly so that they do not face any adverse selection. (Our results
are robust to allowing for adverse selection in reinsurance as long as its degree is less than
that in securitization.)
On the ﬂip side, reinsurers charge a proportional markup δ > 0 over the actuarially fair
insurance premium that could arise from multiple sources.
First, as argued by Froot (2001), reinsurers have signiﬁcant market power relative to
competitive capital market investors. The presence of market power for reinsurers is analo-
gous to the market power of informed lenders in Rajan (1992). As in Rajan (1992), we can
endogenize reinsurers’ market power stemming from their informational advantage by incor-
porating competition between informed reinsurers and uninformed capital market investors.
Adapting his results to our setting, reinsurers’ excess rents increase with the expected loss
payment (under full information), which is the actuarially fair insurance premium. Apart
from (or in addition to) arising from reinsurers’ bargaining power, the markup could also
emerge through various other channels.
Second, as argued by the literature, capital markets have higher risk-bearing capacity
than reinsurers (see Cummins (2008, 2012)). In this context, the markup arises from the
higher cost of capital of reinsurers relative to capital markets. More speciﬁcally, if L is the
total payment made by a reinsurer to the insurer if the latter incurs a loss with probability
p, then the present value of this payment from the reinsurer’s standpoint is pL
1+β
, where β is
the reinsurer’s cost of capital. Consequently, the reinsurance premium is (1 + β) times the
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actuarially fair premium, pL.
Third, reinsurers’ monitoring technology is costly and the markup compensates them
for their monitoring costs. It is straightforward to endogenize reinsurers’ incentives for
monitoring and the resulting markup stemming from compensation for monitoring costs. For
example, we can formalize the arguments as follows. If the reinsurer monitors the insurer,
it learns the insurer’s type, but its monitoring costs are κpL, that is, the monitoring costs
are a proportion κ of the expected indemnity. If the reinsurer does not monitor, it remains
uninformed about the insurer’s type as with other competitive capital market investors.
Competition among investors in capital markets then ensures that the reinsurer receive
zero expected rents from its contract with the insurer. The reinsurer, therefore, chooses to
monitor the insurer if the reinsurance premium is at least (1 + κ)pL, that is, the premium
compensates the reinsurer for its expected payment to the insurer if the latter incurs a loss
and its monitoring costs. If we incorporate competition among informed reinsurers and
uninformed capital market investors, then the reinsurance premium is exactly (1 + κ)pL,
that is, reinsurers are indiﬀerent between between monitoring (and becoming informed) and
not monitoring (and remaining uninformed).
In reality, of course, all these forces—market power, costs of capital and monitoring
costs—are simultaneously present so the reinsurance markup in the model represents their
cumulative eﬀect. We, therefore, remain agnostic about the speciﬁc channel through which
the markup arises and simply refer to it as the reinsurance markup throughout the paper.
For simplicity, we assume that reinsurers have suﬃcient capital to fully insure the insur-
ance company so that they do not face default risk.2 Reinsurers usually have better diversiﬁ-
cation opportunities that may lower their default risks (e.g. Jean-Baptise et al.(2000)). The
main objective of our study is to compare the trade-oﬀ between the information advantage
of reinsurers against the lower costs of risk-sharing with capital markets. Consequently, we
avoid further complicating the analysis and the intuition for our results by also introducing
default risk for reinsurers.
2According to the Guy Carpenter report, the total losses of the global property/casualty sector in 2011 exceeded $
100 billion, but shareholder funds exceeded $ 160 billion. Consequently, the reinsurance sector continued to function
normally despite the heavy losses in 2011.
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Because reinsurance companies know the insurer’s type, they oﬀer distinguishing con-
tracts (Ar(p), Br(p)) that are contingent on the insurer’s type, where Ar(p) is the reinsurance
premium and Br(p) is the net payment—the indemnities less the premium—to the insurer in
the bad state. The optimal contract for each insurer type, p, maximizes its expected utility
subject to the reinsurance premium being at least a proportion δ above the actuarially fair
premium. Given the ﬁxed bankruptcy cost C, it is easy to show that no insurer type chooses
reinsurance if δ ≥ C
B˜
because it is too expensive. Consequently, we consider the case where
δ < C
B˜
. If an insurer chooses reinsurance, the optimal reinsurance contract solves
max
(Ar(p),Br(p))
(W + A− Ar(p))(1− p) + (W −B +Br(p))p− Cp · 1{Br(p)<B−W}
such that
Ar(p) ≥ p(1 + δ)(Br(p) + Ar(p)) (1.1)
0 ≤ Br(p) ≤ B −W
Proposition 1 (Reinsurance Contract) Deﬁne
p˙ =
C − B˜δ
C(1 + δ)
< 1. (1.2)
If p > p˙, the insurer chooses retention. If p < p˙, the insurer chooses reinsurance. The
optimal reinsurance contract, (A∗r(p), B
∗
r (p)), is
A∗r(p) =
B˜p(1 + δ)
1− p(1 + δ) , B
∗
r (p) = B −W = B˜
As one would expect, a higher loss probability raises the reinsurance premium. If the
insurer’s risk is higher than p˙, the expected bankruptcy cost is lower than the cost of rein-
surance so that the insurer retains its risk. Because the bankruptcy cost is ﬁxed, the insurer
chooses full reinsurance if it opts to transfer its risks.
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1.2.2 Securitization
We now examine the case where insurers only have access to capital markets. An insurer’s
cost of transferring its risks is potentially reduced by the fact that capital markets are
competitive. On the ﬂip side, however, capital markets are marred by adverse selection since
they cannot obtain the information about an insurer’s risk type ex ante, that is, before it
issues securities. We model the securitization game as a signaling game whose timing is as
follows. An insurer oﬀers a contract, (As, Bs), where As is the premium received by the
investors if there is no loss, and Bs is the net payment made by investors if a loss occurs.
We restrict consideration to equilibria in pure strategies for the insurer. Investors update
their prior beliefs based on the oﬀered contract and then either accept or reject it. In all
our subsequent results, we employ reasonable stability restrictions on oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs
along the lines of Banks and Sobel’s (1987) D1 reﬁnement for signaling games to address the
potential multiplicity of Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE).
Because the bankruptcy cost is ﬁxed and does not depend on the magnitude of the
insurer’s shortfall in the bad state, it is easy to see that separating securitization contracts
are not incentive compatible. In other words, it is better for an insurer to self-insure rather
than choose a securitization contract with a nonzero retention level that reveals its type
because it incurs the same bankruptcy cost in either case so that its expected payoﬀ is the
same. (Recall that the bankruptcy cost is in addition to the loss payment.)
We conjecture that there exists a trigger level such that insurers with types above the
trigger choose full securitization, while those with types below the trigger choose full re-
tention. Consider a candidate equilibrium deﬁned by a trigger level, p. Let µ(.) denote
the posterior beliefs of capital markets regarding an insurer’s type given that it has cho-
sen securitization. Given that insurers with types above p choose full securitization in the
conjectured equilibrium, investors’ posterior beliefs about the insurer’s type are given by
dµ(p′) =
dF (p′)
1− F (p) (1.3)
The equilibrium is determined by a function, R(.)—the subsidization ratio function—that
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is deﬁned as follows:
R(p) =
∫ 1
p
tdµ(t)− p
1− ∫ 1
p
tdµ(t)
(1.4)
The function, which depends on the distribution of insurers’ risk types and the threshold
level p that deﬁnes the conjectured equilibrium, determines the costs incurred by an insurer
with risk type p from pooling with higher risk insurers and, thereby, subsidizing them. If p is
the equilibrium threshold, then the insurer with risk type p should be indiﬀerent between full
retention and full securitization. In other words, the expected bankruptcy cost associated
with full retention should be the same as the cross-subsidization cost associated with full
pooling securitization for an insurer of type p. We now characterize the equilibrium choice
between retention and securitization and the optimal securitization contracts.
Proposition 2 (Securitization Contract) Suppose there is a unique p¨ satisfying the fol-
lowing equation:
Cp¨ = B˜R(p¨). (1.5)
In the unique PBE of the securitization game (under the D1 reﬁnement), insurers with types
p in the interval [p¨, 1] fully transfer their risks and oﬀer the same contract (A∗s, B
∗
s ), where
B∗s = B˜, A
∗
s =
B˜
∫ 1
p¨
tdµ(t)
1− ∫ 1
p¨
tdµ(t)
.
Insurers with types p below p¨ choose full self-insurance.
The threshold, p¨, is the point of indiﬀerence between the cross-subsidization costs from
pooling with higher types and the expected bankruptcy costs from retaining risk. Consider
a candidate equilibrium where insurers with types greater than or equal to p oﬀer pooling
securitization contracts, while those with types less than p retain their risk. By the deﬁnition
of the subsidization ratio function, the subsidization costs incurred by the insurer with type p
from pooling with higher types are given by B˜R(p). The expected bankruptcy cost incurred
by the insurer of type p if it retains its risks is given by Cp. Consequently, the indiﬀerence
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point, p¨, is determined by (1.5).
In general, (1.5) could have multiple solutions so that there could be multiple PBEs each
determined by the threshold risk type that is indiﬀerent between retention and pooling secu-
ritization. As is common in the signaling literature, we add a “single crossing” assumption,
which ensures that the above equation has a unique solution, that is, the curves Cp and
R(p) intersect at exactly one point p¨. A suﬃcient condition that ensures this is
R′(p) <
C
B˜
3 (1.6)
Because the subsidization costs incurred by insurer types greater than p¨ decline with
the type, it is optimal for all such insurers to pool by oﬀering full securitization contracts.
Given that p¨ satisﬁes (1.5), the expected bankruptcy cost incurred by an insurer with type
less than p¨ is less than the subsidization costs incurred by choosing securitization so that p¨
determines the unique equilibrium.
1.2.3 Risk Transfer Equilibria
Figure 1.1: Conjecture of “Partition” Form
We now show that the PBE of the risk transfer game have the conjectured “partition”
form as shown in Figure 1.1.
Proposition 3 (Partition Equilibria) Suppose that condition (1.6) holds.
3Let the function g(p) = Cp − B˜R(p). Since g(0) = −B˜R(0) < 0, and g(1) = C > 0 It is easy to show that
g(p) = 0 has a unique solution p¨ as long as g(p) is increasing over the interval [0, 1]; that is,R′(p) < C
B˜
.
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Figure 1.2: The cost of diﬀerent risk transfer mechanisms
1. If C < B˜δ, there exists a unique PBE (under the D1 reﬁnement) with two partitions
determined by the threshold p¨ that solves (1.5). Insurers with risk type below p¨ choose
full retention, while those with risk type above p¨ choose full pooling securitization.
2. If B˜δ < C ≤ B˜δ
1−p¨(1+δ) , the unique equilibrium (under the D1 reﬁnement) is characterized
as follows. Insurers with types in the interval [0, p˙] choose full reinsurance, insurers
with types in the interval [p˙, p¨] choose full self-insurance, and insurers with types in
the interval [p¨, 1] choose full pooling securitization where p˙ is deﬁned by (1.2) and p¨ is
deﬁned by (1.5).
3. If C > B˜δ
1−p¨(1+δ) and R
′(p) < δ
(1−p(1+δ))2 , there exists a unique trigger p
∗
3 that solves
δp∗3
1− p∗3(1 + δ)
= R(p∗3) (1.7)
such that insurers with types in the interval [0, p∗3] choose full reinsurance, while insurers
with types in the interval [p∗3, 1] choose full pooling securitization.
Figure 1.2 shows the cost function of each risk transfer choice faced by insurers. For
all types, the chosen form of risk transfer is the one that has the lowest expected cost. As
illustrated in the ﬁgure, the expected bankruptcy cost is increasing and linear in an insurer’s
type, the expected cost of reinsurance is increasing and convex in an insurer’s type, and the
expected cost of securitization decreases with an insurer’s type. Consequently, in general,
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the equilibrium takes a partition form with three subintervals of insurer types. Insurers with
suﬃciently low risk in the interval [0, p˙] choose full reinsurance, intermediate-risk insurers
with types in interval [p˙, p¨] choose full retention, and high-risk insurers with types in the
interval [p¨, 1] choose full securitization. The thresholds that determine the various subinter-
vals are the “indiﬀerence” points. Depending on the relative magnitudes of the bankruptcy
cost C, the reinsurance markup δ and the loss payment B, however, one of the subintervals
may be empty so that the partition equilibrium is characterized by two subintervals.
Part 1 of the above proposition shows that reinsurance is dominated by retention if
the ﬁxed bankruptcy cost is lower than the threshold B˜δ so that all insurer types choose
between retention and securitization. The lower risk insurers choose retention by avoiding
the subsidization cost due to information asymmetry in capital markets, while higher risk
insurers choose securitization due to the relatively lower cost of risk sharing. When the
ﬁxed bankruptcy cost is between the thresholds B˜δ and B˜δ
1−p¨(1+δ) , the risk transfer choices of
intermediate insurer types reﬂect the tradeoﬀ between the additional costs stemming from
reinsurance markup and the ﬁxed bankruptcy cost. Consequently, as described by part 2
of the proposition, the equilibrium has a partition form with three subintervals. When the
ﬁxed bankruptcy cost is high enough, retention is dominated by either full reinsurance or full
securitization. Consequently, the equilibrium has a partition form with only two subintervals
as described by part 3 of the proposition.
From (1.5) and the implicit function theorem, we get
dp¨
dB
=
R(p¨)
C − B˜R′(p¨) (1.8)
The numerator of (1.8) is positive. Because p¨ is the unique solution of (1.5), we can show
that the denominator of the R.H.S. of (1.8) is positive. Thus dp¨/dB > 0. In other words,
p¨ is an increasing function of B. When the bankruptcy cost C ≤ B˜δ
1−p¨(1+δ) , it follows from
parts 1 and 2 of the proposition that p¨ is the threshold risk level above which insurers choose
securitization. If C > B˜δ
1−p¨(1+δ) , it follows from condition (1.7) that the trigger level above
which insurers choose securitization does not depend on the loss payment B. Taken together,
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the above discussion shows that an increase in the magnitude of the insurer’s aggregate losses
weakly increases the threshold risk level above which insurers choose securitization so that
the securitization subinterval shrinks.
Corollary 1 (Eﬀects of Loss Size) An increase in the size of the net loss payments B
reduces the size of the subinterval of insurer risk types that choose securitization.
The intuition for the eﬀect of the loss size is that an increase in the loss size increases the
marginal cost borne by an insurer of subsidizing higher risk types through securitization.
Consequently, as the loss size increases, the marginal insurer who is indiﬀerent between
retention and securitization has higher risk.
Catastrophe risks are characterized by low probabilities and large magnitudes of potential
losses. The fact that an increase in the magnitude of potential losses increases the trigger risk
level above which securitization is chosen suggests that catastrophe risks are more likely to
be retained by insurers or reinsured rather than securitized. Further, because only high-risk
insurers choose securitization, they pay high premia in securities markets (relative to the
ex ante expected loss determined by the average probability
1∫
0
pdF (p)), which could also
explain why catastrophe-linked securities are usually expensive and credit ratings of many
catastrophe bonds are below investment grade. As discussed at the end of Section 1.1,
our results are also directly applicable to the more general scenario in which insurers hold
portfolios of risks. In this context, our results explain why catastrophe bonds are typically
issued to provide high layers of protection, that is, they cover high risks (Cummins (2008)).
We can also investigate the eﬀects of changes in the distribution of insurer losses on risk
transfer equilibria. A “ﬁrst order stochastic dominance” shift in the distribution of insurer
types F (.) pushes up the subsidization cost function R(.), thereby causing the securitization
subinterval in the PBE to shrink. We, therefore, have the following corollary.
Corollary 2 (Eﬀects of FOSD Shift in Loss Distribution) A “ﬁrst order stochastic
dominance”shift in the distribution of insurer types F (.) increases the threshold risk level
above which insurers choose securitization.
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Figure 1.3: Loss payment shift or FOSD shift of the insurer types
Figure 1.3 illustrates the eﬀects of an increase in the amount of net loss payment and a
“ﬁrst order stochastic dominance” shift in the distribution of insurer types F (p). As discussed
above, both shift up the expected cost of securitization since the cross-subsidization on
securitization market is more severe. Consequently, the upper threshold level of risk that
determines the level at which insurers choose securitization increases since the relatively
lower risk insurers ﬁnd retention or reinsurance less costly relative to securitization.
Although we focus on insurance risks for concreteness, our framework is also applicable to
the transfer of other types of risk such as credit risk. In the context of credit risk transfer, our
results suggest that only high credit risks are optimally transferred through securitization.
Our analysis, therefore, oﬀers a potential explanation for why securities such as credit default
swaps were actually very risky and triggered huge losses for providers of default protection.
Consistent with our prediction that only high credit risks are securitized, Drucker and Puri
(2009) examine the secondary market for loan sales and ﬁnd that sold loans are riskier that
average.
1.3 Variable Bankruptcy Costs
We now modify the model to allow for variable bankruptcy costs that are proportional to
the insurer’s shortfall in the bad state. More precisely, if the insurer chooses to transfer
some or all of its risk through reinsurance or securitization, and receives a payment B in the
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bad state, then the bankruptcy cost is c · (B˜ − B), where c is a constant. The maximum
bankruptcy cost, which occurs when the insurer retains all its risk, is c ·B˜. We set cB˜ = C to
compare our results in this section with those in the previous sections. All other assumptions
in the previous section remain the same. As we alluded to in the previous sections, in the
presence of variable bankruptcy costs, separating partial securitization contracts may be the
optimal choice for some insurer types in the equilibrium since they beneﬁt from sharing risk
with investors in capital markets at the cost of retaining some risk to signal their type.
1.3.1 Reinsurance
We ﬁrst consider the case where insurers only have access to reinsurance. Because of the
presence of the reinsurance markup, it is easy to see that it is either optimal for an insurer
to choose full reinsurance or no reinsurance at all. Consequently, the insurer’s optimal
choice between retention and reinsurance, and the optimal reinsurance contract if it chooses
reinsurance, are given by Proposition 1. The risk transfer choice and the reinsurance contract
are, therefore, the same as in the model with ﬁxed bankruptcy costs.
1.3.2 Securitization
Suppose now that insurers only have access to capital markets. The proportional bankruptcy
cost provides low risk insurers the room to bear some risk by choosing partial securitization.
The insurer’s choice of risk retention level serves as a signal of its type and, thereby, reduces
the adverse selection cost due to information asymmetry. An insurer’s optimal choice of
securitization coverage reﬂects the tradeoﬀ between the adverse selection/cross-subsidization
cost and the expected bankruptcy cost.
We conjecture that a candidate PBE is characterized by a threshold risk type p such that
insurers with risk types below the threshold partially transfer their risk through separating
contracts, while insurers with risk types above the threshold fully transfer their risk through
pooling contracts. Insurers who partially transfer their risk through separating securitization
contracts reveal their types and, therefore, incur no adverse selection costs, but nonzero
expected bankruptcy costs arising from partial retention. In contrast, the high risk insurers
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who fully transfer their risks through the pooling securitization contract incurs zero expected
bankruptcy costs, but nonzero cross-subsidization costs. The equilibrium threshold p∗ is
determined by three conditions.
First, for insurers with risk types below the threshold, each type chooses an incentive
compatible risk retention level. The incentive compatibility condition implies that the loss
amount transferred through separating securitization satisﬁes the following ordinary diﬀer-
ential equation (please see the Appendix for the proof)
dBseps (p)
dp
=
Bseps (p)
cp(1− p) (1.9)
The general solution to the above ODE is
Bseps (p) = exp(λ)
(
p
1− p
) 1
c
(1.10)
where the constant λ is determined endogenously along with the equilibrium threshold p∗.
Second, an insurer with the threshold risk, p∗, is indiﬀerent between the pooling and
separating securitization contracts. It incurs nonzero expected bankruptcy costs associated
with the retention level if it chooses to signal its type, while it bears subsidization costs
associated with the full risk transfer if it pools with higher risk insurers. The equilibrium
threshold, p∗, should therefore satisfy the following condition:
c
(
B˜ −Bseps (p∗)
)
p∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected bankruptcy costs from separating contracts
= B˜R(p∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸,
subsidization costs from pooling contracts
(1.11)
where R(.) is the subsidization ratio function deﬁned in (1.4). Rearranging the above equa-
tion and using (1.10), we obtain
exp(λ) = B˜
(
1− R(p
∗)
cp∗
)(
1− p∗
p∗
) 1
c
(1.12)
Third, for p∗ to be the equilibrium threshold, it should be sub-optimal for the insurers
in the two subintervals to deviate from their securitization choices. For insurers with risk
20
types below p∗, the marginal subsidization costs must exceed the marginal bankruptcy costs,
thereby motivating the insurers to signal their types by retaining some risk. On the other
hand, for insurers with risk types above p∗, the expected bankruptcy costs must exceed the
cross-subsidization costs. As we show in the Appendix, the equilibrium trigger, p∗, satisﬁes
the following condition:
c−
(
c+
1
1− p∗
)(
1− R(p
∗)
cp∗
)
+
1
1− ∫ 1
p∗ tdµ(t)
≥ 0 (1.13)
In general, there is a continuum of threshold levels, p∗, satisfying the above inequality.
For each such p∗, there exists a corresponding λ satisfying (1.12) so that each p∗ determines
a PBE of the securitization game. More formally, we deﬁne the set P satisfying (1.13), that
is,
P = {p∗ : c−
(
c+
1
1− p∗
)(
1− R(p
∗)
cp∗
)
+
1
1− ∫ 1
p∗ tdµ(t)
≥ 0}. (1.14)
The following proposition characterizes the multiple PBEs of the securitization game.
Proposition 4 (Securitization Contracts)Deﬁne the set P as in (1.14). For any p∗ ∈ P,
the optimal securitization contract, (A∗s(p), B
∗
s (p)) ,is characterized as follows.
• For an insurer of type p < p∗
B∗s (p) =B˜
(
1− R(p
∗)
cp∗
)(
1− p∗
p∗
) 1
c
(
p
1− p
) 1
c
,
A∗s(p) =B˜
(
1− R(p
∗)
cp∗
)(
1− p∗
p∗
) 1
c
(
p
1− p
) 1
c
+1
• For an insurer of type p > p∗
B∗s (p) = B
∗
s = B˜, A
∗
s(p) = A
∗
s =
B˜
∫ 1
p∗ tdµ(t)
1− ∫ 1
p∗ tdµ(t)
where
µ(p) =
F (p)− F (p∗)
1− F (p∗)
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Among the set of PBEs described in the proposition, the most eﬃcient one minimizes the
expected deadweight bankruptcy costs incurred by insurers. Consequently, the most eﬃcient
PBE is the one deﬁned by the threshold p where
p = argmin
p∈P
∫ p
0
c(B˜ −Bseps (t, p))tf(t)dt
1.3.3 Risk Transfer Equilibria
We now consider the scenario where insurers have access to both reinsurance and securitiza-
tion. In this general scenario, there exist a variety of candidates for PBEs. The reinsurance
markup plays a key role in determining the properties of the PBEs. Intuitively, when the
reinsurance markup is below a low threshold, reinsurance dominates (partial or full) secu-
ritization for low and intermediate risk insurers because the costs due to the reinsurance
markup for such insurers are low relative to the expected bankruptcy costs from partial
securitization or the cross-subsidization from full pooling securitization. High risk insurers
choose full pooling securitization. If the reinsurance markup is in an intermediate region,
partial securitization becomes attractive to intermediate risk insurers, while low risk insurers
choose reinsurance and high risk insurers choose full pooling securitization. If the reinsur-
ance markup exceeds a high threshold, partial securitization dominates reinsurance even for
low risk insurers.
To formalize the above intuition, we begin by noting that the expected cost of an insurer
with risk type p if it chooses full reinsurance is B˜δp
1−p(1+δ) . The expected cost from choosing a
separating partial securitization contract with retention level B˜−Bseps (p) is pc
(
B˜ −Bseps (p)
)
.
By the arguments used to derive (1.10), incentive compatibility of the securitization contracts
implies that
Bseps (p) = exp(λ)
(
p
1− p
) 1
c
. (1.15)
In the above, the constant λ is endogenously determined along with the trigger p1 rep-
resenting the point of indiﬀerence between full reinsurance and partial securitization, and
the trigger p2 representing the point of indiﬀerence between partial securitization and full
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securitization. The trigger, p1, must therefore satisfy
B˜δp1
1− p1(1 + δ) = c(B˜ −B
sep
s (p1))p1
= c(B˜ − exp(λ)
(
p1
1− p1
) 1
c
)p1
Rearranging the above equation, we have
exp(λ) = B˜
(
1− δ
(1− p1(1 + δ)) c
)(
1− p1
p1
) 1
c
(1.16)
For any p1 satisfying p1 < c−δc(1+δ) , a corresponding λ exists satisfying the above equation so
that any such p1 is a candidate indiﬀerence point between reinsurance and partial securiti-
zation. Accordingly, we deﬁne the set U as
U = {p1 : p1 < c− δ
c(1 + δ)
} (1.17)
Given any p1 ∈ U , the threshold, p2, which represents the point of indiﬀerence between
partial and full securitization, must satisfy
c(B˜ −Bseps (p2))p2 = B˜R(p2). (1.18)
By (1.16),
Bseps (p2) = B˜
(
1− δ
(1− p1(1 + δ)) c
)(
1− p1
p1
) 1
c
(
p2
1− p2
) 1
c
.
Accordingly, we deﬁne the set L that consists of the possible equilibrium indiﬀerence
thresholds, p2, as follows.
L = {p2 : 1−
(
1− δ
(1− p1(1 + δ)) c
)(
1− p1
p1
) 1
c
(
p2
1− p2
) 1
c
=
R(p2)
cp2
;∀p1 ∈ U} (1.19)
If p1 < p2, there is a nontrivial intermediate interval of insurer types who choose partial
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securitization. If p1 > p2, however, insurers who choose securitization choose full pooling
securitization. Accordingly, the set of candidate equilibrium triggers, p1 and p2, can be
divided into two subsets.
For p2 to be an equilibrium threshold, however, it must be sub-optimal for insurers
choosing partial or full securitization to deviate from their respective choices. As we show
in the Appendix, p2 must satisfy the following inequality for any given p1 ∈ U
c−
(
c+
1
1− p2
)(
1− δ
c(1− p1(1 + δ))
)(
(1− p1)p2
p1(1− p2)
) 1
c
+
1
1− ∫ 1
p2
tdµ(t)
≥ 0. (1.20)
Accordingly, we ﬁrst deﬁne the set G as
G = {p1, p2 : p1 < p2,
c−
(
c+
1
1− p2
)(
1− δ
c(1− p1(1 + δ))
)(
(1− p1)p2
p1(1− p2)
) 1
c
+
1
1− ∫ 1
p2
tdµ(t)
≥ 0,
∀p1 ∈ U , p2 ∈ L}.
Next, we deﬁne the set F as
F = {p1, p2 : p2 < p1,∀p1 ∈ U , p2 ∈ L}
We now have the requisite deﬁnitions in place to characterize the risk transfer equilibria.
Proposition 5 (Partition Equilibrium)
1. Suppose δ < c. Risk transfer equilibria are characterized as follows.
a. For all pairs of p∗1, p
∗
2 such that {p∗1, p∗2} ∈ G, insurers with types in the interval
[0, p∗1] choose full reinsurance, insurers with types in the interval [p
∗
1, p
∗
2] choose
separating partial securitization, and insurers with types in the interval [p∗2, 1]
choose pooling full securitization.
b. For all pairs of p∗1, p
∗
2 such that {p∗1, p∗2} ∈ F , there exists p∗3 ∈ [0, 1] with 0 <
p∗2 ≤ p∗3 ≤ p∗1 < 1 such that insurers with types in the interval [0, p∗3] choose
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full reinsurance and insurers with types in the interval [p∗3, 1] choose pooling full
securitization if condition R′(p) < δ
(1−p(1+δ))2 holds, where
δp∗3
1−p∗3(1+δ) = R(p
∗
3).
2. Suppose δ > c. Equilibria are characterized by two subintervals as in Proposition 4.
The above proposition suggests that full reinsurance dominates partial risk sharing for
low risk insurers if the reinsurance markup is lower than the bankruptcy coeﬃcient c. In-
termediate risk insurers choose partial securitization provided the proportional bankruptcy
cost is below a threshold. If the bankruptcy cost exceeds the threshold, however, partial
securitization is sub-optimal for all insurers, that is, high risk insurers chooses full securi-
tization, while low risk insurers choose full reinsurance. When the reinsurance markup is
above the bankruptcy cost coeﬃcient, however, insurers choose partial or full securitization.
1.4 Discussion and Conclusions
When an insurer has private information about its portfolio of risks, its risk transfer choice
serves as a signal of the quality of risks in its portfolio. The insurer’s choice reﬂects the
tradeoﬀ between the lower adverse selection costs associated with reinsurance against the
additional costs of reinsurance stemming from a number of sources such as reinsurers’ market
power relative to that of competitive capital market investors, compensation for reinsurers’
costly monitoring, and the higher cost of capital of reinsurers relative to capital markets.
PBE of the signaling game have a partition form where the lowest risk insurers choose reinsur-
ance, intermediate risk insurers choose partial securitization, and highest risk insurers choose
full securitization. An increase in the magnitude of potential losses in the portfolio increases
the threshold level of risk above which insurers choose securitization. Consequently, catas-
trophe risk, which is characterized by “low frequency–high severity” losses is only securitized
by very high risk insurers. Further, because only the highest risk insurers choose securitiza-
tion, they pay high premia in securities markets, which could explain why catastrophe-linked
securities are usually expensive, and why catastrophe securities often receive “below invest-
ment grade” ratings. Our results, therefore, provide an novel alternate explanation for the
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relative predominance of reinsurance in the market for catastrophe risk transfer and the high
cost of catastrophe bonds.
The prediction that only risks above a threshold are securitized is also consistent with the
observed spike in securitization transactions following major catastrophes such as Hurricane
Katrina following which actuaries’ assessments of future catastrophic events were revised
upward. Our story also suggests that, as more sophisticated investors such as hedge funds
enter the market for catastrophe-linked securities, the adverse selection costs associated with
securitization would be expected to decline, thereby encouraging securitization transactions.
An increase in the degree of competitiveness of reinsurance markets would also provide a
ﬁllip to securitization by lowering reinsurers’ market power relative to capital markets.
Our framework can be used to analyze the transfer of all types of risks, and not just
insurance risks. If our model were adapted to analyze credit risk transfer in the context
of the recent ﬁnancial crisis, our results suggest that only high credit risks are optimally
transferred through securitization, thereby suggesting that instruments such as credit default
swaps were, indeed, very risky as was borne out by the large losses suﬀered by providers of
default protection. Indeed, consistent with this prediction, Drucker and Puri (2009) examine
the secondary market for loan sales and ﬁnd that sold loans are riskier that average. Our
model could also be potentially adapted to the study of ﬁrms’ choices between alternate
modes of ﬁnancing such as private versus public ﬁnancing, and “informed ” versus “arms
length ”ﬁnancing (e.g., see Rajan (1992) , Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994), Winton and
Yerramilli (2008). We leave the analysis of these extensions to future research.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Suppose δ < C
B˜
.
Given the presence of ﬁxed bankruptcy costs, it is easy to see that it is sub-optimal for
an insurer to choose partial reinsurance, that is, if an insurer chooses reinsurance, it chooses
full reinsurance. Consequently, the second constraint in (1.1) must be binding for an insurer
of type p that chooses reinsurance. Hence, the net reinsurance payment B∗r (p) for it in the
bad state is B∗r (p) = B − W = B˜. The insurer’s maximization problem is equivalent to
minimizing Ar(p)(1−p)−Brp which implies that the ﬁrst constraint in (1.1) is also binding.
Hence, the premium is given by A∗r(p) =
B˜p(1+δ)
1−p(1+δ) .
The expected payoﬀ of reinsurance for the insurer with type p is EUr(p) = W +
(
A(1−
p)−Bp)− B˜δp
1−p(1+δ) . The expected payoﬀ of full self-insurance for the insurer with type p is
EUself (p) = W +
(
A(1− p)− Bp)− Cp. Thus, EUr(p) > EUself (p) for all p < C−B˜δC(1+δ) = p˙,
where p˙ is deﬁned in (1.2). Accordingly, reinsurance is sub-optimal for insurers with types
p > p˙, but optimal for insurers with types p < p˙.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Consider ﬁrst a candidate fully separating equilibrium (A∗s(p), B
∗
s (p)), where
(A∗s(p), B
∗
s (p)) is the securitization contract oﬀered by the insurer with type p. The cap-
ital market investors break even, thereby leading the investors’ participation condition to
be binding. Hence, the premium is A∗s(p) =
pB∗s (p)
1−p . However, (A
∗
s(p), B
∗
s (p)) is not incentive
compatible because the higher risk insurers are strictly better oﬀ by deviating and oﬀering the
lower risk insurers’ contract. Consequently, we cannot have a fully separating equilibrium.
Hence, any equilibrium must necessarily involve some pooling.
Next, we observe that there cannot be an equilibrium in which there exists a quadruple,
{p1, p2, p3, p4} with p1 ≤ p2 < p3 ≤ p4 such that insurers with types in [p1, p2] pool to-
gether and choose a single full securitization contract, and insurers with types in [p3, p4] pool
together and choose a single full securitization contract, but the two intervals of insurers
choose diﬀerent contracts. This assertion follows easily from the observation that insurers
with types in [p3, p4] would prefer the contract oﬀered by the insurers with types in [p1, p2].
It follows from the above arguments that it suﬃces to consider candidate equilibria in
which insurers with types below a threshold choose self-insurance, while insurers with types
above the threshold choose full pooling securitization. Accordingly, consider a candidate
equilibrium deﬁned by a trigger level p. We now examine the conditions for p to be an
equilibrium threshold. An insurers with type k ≥ p chooses full pooling securitization,
B∗s (k) = B
∗ = B˜. The break-even condition of investors requires that the premium be given
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by
A∗s(k) = A
∗ = B˜
∫ 1
p
tdµ(t)
1− ∫ 1
p
tdµ(t)
,
where µ(p) is the investors’ posterior beliefs about insurer’s types. Therefore, the insurer’s
expected payoﬀ from securitization is
EUpoolings (k) = W +
(
A(1− k)−Bk)− B˜ ∫ 1p tdµ(t)− k
1− ∫ 1
p
tdµ(t)
. (1.21)
The insurer, whose type k is less than or equal to p, chooses full retention. Its expected
payoﬀ is, therefore,
EUself (k) = W +
(
A(1− k)−Bk)− Ck.
It is easy to see that, if p = p¨ satisfying (1.5), then EUpoolings (p) = EUself (p). Hence, the
insurer with risk type p¨ is indiﬀerent between pooling with higher types and self-insurance.
Next, we check that p¨ is, indeed, the equilibrium threshold. First, we establish incentive
compatibility of the set of contracts deﬁned by p¨. If an insurer with type k < p¨ deviates to
choose the pooling contract (A∗, B∗), its expected payoﬀ is
EUdeviates (k) = W +
(
A(1− k)−Bk)− B˜ ∫ 1p¨ tdµ(t)− k
1− ∫ 1
p¨
tdµ(t)
.
It is easy to show that, if k < p¨, then
B˜
∫ 1
p¨
tdµ(t)− k
1− ∫ 1
p¨
tdµ(t)
> B˜
∫ 1
p¨
tdµ(t)− p¨
1− ∫ 1
p¨
tdµ(t)
= B˜R(p¨) = Cp¨ > Ck.
Thus, EUself (k) > EUdeviates (k). As a result, the insurer with type k < p¨ will not choose the
pooling contract (A∗, B∗). If an insurer with type k > p¨ deviates to choose full self-insurance,
the expected payoﬀ is
EUdeviateself (k) = W +
(
A(1− k)−Bk)− Ck.
It is easy to see that, if k > p¨, then
B˜
∫ 1
p¨
tdµ(t)− k
1− ∫ 1
p¨
tdµ(t)
< B˜
∫ 1
p¨
tdµ(t)− p¨
1− ∫ 1
p¨
tdµ(t)
= B˜R(p¨) = Cp¨ < Ck.
Thus, EUpoolings (k) > EU
deviate
self (k). Consequently, the insurer whose type is greater than p¨
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will not choose retention.
Now suppose that an insurer with type k > p¨ ﬁnds it proﬁtable to deviate to some other
securitization contract (A′s, B
′
s). Suppose ﬁrst that the contract involves a full transfer of
risk. The deviation is proﬁtable for the insurer iﬀ A′s < A
∗. In this case, however, the
deviation is also proﬁtable for insurers with higher risk types. Consequently, reasonable
oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs of investors must necessarily pool insurers with types greater than or
equal to k, which makes the hypothesized deviation unproﬁtable for insurer k. Alternately,
applying the D1 reﬁnement, the sets of investor beliefs under which a deviation to the full
risk transfer contract (A′s, B
′
s) is proﬁtable increases with the insurer risk type. Iteratively
applying the D1 reﬁnement, therefore, implies that, on observing such a deviation, investors’
beliefs assign probability one that the insurer has the highest risk type, which makes it
unproﬁtable for all lower risk insurers to deviate.
Suppose that the deviating contract (A′s, B
′
s) does not involve a full transfer of risk so that
B′s < B
∗ and the insurer bears the additional bankruptcy cost C in the bad state. Because the
insurer’s expected cost under the pooling contract given by (1.21) is decreasing and linear in
its type k, in this case too, the sets of investor beliefs under which the deviation is proﬁtable
are increasing in the insurer type. Iteratively applying the D1 reﬁnement, investors’ beliefs
assign probability one that the insurer has the highest risk type on observing such a deviation,
thereby making it unproﬁtable for lower risk types.
Similarly, suppose that an insurer with type k < p¨ ﬁnds it proﬁtable to deviate to a
securitization contract (A"s, B
"
s). If the contract involves a full transfer of risk, it must also be
proﬁtable for insurers with types in [k, p¨]. Consequently, reasonable oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs
must pool together such insurers, which makes the hypothesized deviation unproﬁtable.
Alternately, iteratively applying the D1 reﬁnement, oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs following such a
deviation assign probability one that the insurer is of type p¨, thereby making the deviation
unproﬁtable for all lower risk insurers. If the contract does not involve a full transfer of risk,
then the insurer necessarily bears the bankruptcy cost C in the bad state. In this case too,
if such a deviation is proﬁtable for the insurer, it must also be proﬁtable for insurers with
types in [k, p¨]. We can again argue as above that reasonable oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs following
such a deviation make it unproﬁtable for the insurer.
Hence, the threshold p¨ satisfying (1.5) deﬁnes an equilibrium. Moreover, if (1.5) has a
unique solution, then it determines the unique PBE of the risk transfer game.
Proof of Proposition 3.
Proof.
1. If C < B˜δ, it is sub-optimal for an insurer to choose reinsurance. We are, thus, in the
scenario described in Proposition 2.
2. Suppose B˜δ < C < B˜δ
1−p¨(1+δ) .
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It follows from Proposition 1 that insurers with types in the interval [0, p˙] prefer full
reinsurance to full self-insurance. By Proposition 2, insurers with types in the interval [p¨, 1]
prefer full pooling securitization to full self-insurance. By condition (1.6), there is a unique
p¨ satisfying (1.5).
Since C < B˜δ
1−p¨(1+δ) ,
B˜δp˙
1−p¨(1+δ) > Cp˙ =
B˜δp˙
1−p˙−δ . Thus, p˙ < p¨.
It follows from the results of Propositions 1 and 2 that p˙ and p¨ are two indiﬀerence points.
Now check whether they are, indeed, the equilibrium thresholds. If an insurer with type in
the interval [0, p˙], deviates to choose the pooling securitization contract given by Proposition
2, the expected payoﬀ is
EUdeviates (p) = W + (A(1− p)−Bp)− B˜
∫ 1
p¨
tdµ(t)− p
1− ∫ 1
p¨
tdµ(t)
.
It is easy to see that, since
B˜
∫ 1
p¨
tdµ(t)− p
1− ∫ 1
p¨
tdµ(t)
≥ B˜
∫ 1
p¨
tdµ(t)− p¨
1− ∫ 1
p¨
tdµ(t)
= B˜R(p¨) = Cp¨ > Cp˙ > Cp,
it will not deviate to choose full pooling securitization. Consequently, the insurers with types
in the interval [0, p˙] will not deviate to choose full pooling securitization. Under restrictions
on reasonable oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs along the lines of the D1 reﬁnement as in the proof of
Proposition 2, an insurer with type in the interval [0, p˙] will also not deviate to choose any
other securitization contract.
For an insurer with type in the interval [p˙, p¨], Proposition 1 implies that it will not choose
full reinsurance. Proposition 2 implies that it will not choose full pooling securitization or
any other securitization contract. As a result, it is optimal for it to choose full self-insurance.
For an insurer with type in the interval [p¨, 1], Proposition 2 shows that it will not choose
full self-insurance. If it deviates to choose full reinsurance, it pays the additional rents
due to reinsurance markup arising from a variety of sources. Thus, the expected payoﬀ is
EUdeviater (p) = W + (A(1− p)−Bp)− B˜δp1−p(1+δ) . It is easy to show that
B˜δp
1− p(1 + δ) > Cp
since the function C − B˜δ
1−p(1+δ) decreases with p and equals zero at p˙. Also,
Cp > Cp¨ = B˜
∫ 1
p¨
tdµ(t)− p¨
1− ∫ 1
p¨
tdµ(t)
> B˜
∫ 1
p¨
tdµ(t)− p
1− ∫ 1
p¨
tdµ(t)
.
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As a result, EUdeviater (p) < EU
pooling
s (p) if p > p¨. By arguments similar to those used in
the proof of Proposition 2, which plays restrictions on reasonable oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs, it
is also sub-optimal for an insurer with type in the interval [p¨, 1] to deviate to any other
securitization contract. Consequently, it is optimal for insurers with types greater than p¨ to
choose pooling securitization. Further, the conjectured PBE is the unique equilibrium since
the values of p˙ and p¨ are unique under condition (1.6) and B˜δ < C < B˜δ
1−p¨(1+δ) .
3. Suppose C > B˜δ
1−p¨(1+δ) , that is p¨ < p˙. It follows that it is sub-optimal for an insurer
to choose self-insurance, thereby leading the equilibria to have a partition form with two
subintervals.
First solve for the point of indiﬀerence between choosing full reinsurance and pooling with
higher risk insurers through securitization. The optimal reinsurance contracts are given by
Proposition 1, and the corresponding expected payoﬀ is EUr(p) = W + (A(1 − p) − Bp) −
B˜pδ
1−p(1+δ) . The optimal pooling securitization coverage is B
∗
s = B˜. The indiﬀerence point, p3,
between securitization and reinsurance must solve
B˜p3δ
1− p3(1 + δ) = B˜R(p3) (1.22)
Condition R′(p) < δ
(1−p(1+δ))2 ensures that there is a unique solution p
∗
3 to (1.22)
Next, we check whether the unique solution p∗3 is the equilibrium threshold. For insurers
with types in the interval [0, p∗3], the expected payoﬀ of full reinsurance is
EUr(p) = W + (A(1− p)−Bp)− B˜pδ
1− p(1 + δ) ,
while the expected payoﬀ of full pooling securitization is
EUdeviates (p) = W + (A(1− p)−Bp)−
B˜(
∫ 1
p∗3
tdµ(t)− p)
1− ∫ 1
p∗3
tdµ(t)
.
For any p ∈ [0, p∗3],
B˜pδ
1− p(1 + δ) <
B˜p∗3δ
1− p∗3(1 + δ)
=
B˜(
∫ 1
p∗3
tdµ(t)− p∗3)
1− ∫ 1
p∗3
tdµ(t)
<
B˜(
∫ 1
p∗3
tdµ(t)− p)
1− ∫ 1
p∗3
tdµ(t)
Then, EUr(p) > EUdeviates (p). The insurer types in the interval [0, p
∗
3], therefore, will not
deviate to choose full securitization. By arguments similar to those used in the earlier
proofs, an insurer with type in the interval [0, p∗3] will also not deviate to choose any other
securitization contract.
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Similarly, the expected payoﬀ of insurers with types in the interval [p∗3, 1] from choosing
securitization is
EUs(p) = W + (A(1− p)−Bp)−
B˜(
∫ 1
p∗3
tdµ(t)− p)
1− ∫ 1
p∗3
tdµ(t)
,
while the expected payoﬀ of choosing full reinsurance is
EUdeviater (p) = W + (A(1− p)−Bp)−
B˜pδ
1− p(1 + δ) .
For any p ∈ [p∗3, 1], we have
B˜(
∫ 1
p∗3
tdµ(t)− p)
1− ∫ 1
p∗3
tdµ(t)
<
B˜(
∫ 1
p∗3
tdµ(t)− p∗3)
1− ∫ 1
p∗3
tdµ(t)
=
B˜p∗3δ
1− p∗3(1 + δ)
<
B˜pδ
1− p(1 + δ)
Thus, EUs(p) > EUdeviater (p). Therefore,insurers with types in the interval [p
∗
3, 1] will not
deviate to choose reinsurance. By arguments similar to those used in earlier proofs, they
will also not deviate to choose any other securitization contract.
Consequently, the conjectured equilibrium is, indeed, the unique PBE of the signaling
game if condition (1.22) and C > B˜δ
1−p¨(1+δ) hold.
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. We ﬁrst show that PBEs cannot be fully pooling or fully separating.
Consider ﬁrst a candidate pooling equilibrium where all insurers oﬀer the same contract
(A∗s(p), B
∗
s (p)) given by Proposition 2. Because bankruptcy costs now depend on an insurer’s
shortfall in meeting its liabilities, the lower risk insurers have incentives to retain some risk
to signal their types, thereby reducing the subsidization costs from pooling securitization
contracts.
Now consider a candidate fully separating equilibrium where each insurer type chooses
corresponding securitization contracts at fair price since its risk type is perfectly revealed in
the capital markets. Thus, the optimal risk retention level B˜ −Bseps (p) (or the optimal risk
coverage Bseps (p)) solves
max
p˜
W + (A (1− p)−Bp)− (As(p˜) (1− p)−Bseps (p˜)p)− c
(
B˜ −Bseps (p˜)
)
p
such that
As(p˜) (1− p˜)−Bseps (p˜)p˜ ≥ 0 (1.23)
The break-even condition (1.23) for capital markets is binding. The above is, therefore,
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equivalent to
min
p˜
Bseps (p˜− p)
1− p˜ + c
(
B˜ −Bseps (p)
)
p
The ﬁrst order condition is
(Bsep′s (p˜) (p˜− p) +Bseps (p˜)) (1− p˜) +Bseps (p˜) (p˜− p)
(1− p˜)2 − cB
sep′
s (p˜)p = 0.
Setting p˜ = p, we obtain
Bseps (p) =
dBseps (p)
dp
cp(1− p) (1.24)
The general solution of the above ordinary diﬀerential equation is given by (1.9), that is
Bseps (p) = exp(λ)
(
p
1− p
) 1
c
,
where λ is the constant of integration. It is easy to show that, for any λ, there is a p˜ where
0 < p˜ < 1, such that Bseps (p˜) = B˜. It follows that the pure separating equilibrium is also
violated since not all insurers are able to signal their types.
Using arguments similar to those used in the proof of Proposition 2, we can show that it
suﬃces to consider candidate semi pooling equilibria characterized by a threshold risk type
p∗ such that insurers with types below it partially transfer their risks through separating
contracts, while insurers with risk types above it fully transfer their risks through pooling
contracts. Insurers who choose separating contracts reveal their types and, therefore, incur
no adverse selection costs, but nonzero expected bankruptcy costs from the partial retention.
The insurer of type p∗ should be indiﬀerent between a separating and pooling contract.
The expected cost to an insurer of type p from choosing a separating contract that reveals
its type is
Cseps (p)p = c
(
B˜ − exp(λ)
(
p
1− p
) 1
c
)
p
The expected cost to the insurer with type p from choosing a pooling contract is B˜R(p),
where R(p) is deﬁned by equation (1.4).
Thus, an indiﬀerence threshold p∗ is determined by
c
(
B˜ − exp(λ)
(
p∗
1− p∗
) 1
c
)
p∗ = B˜R(p∗).
Any p∗ satisfying the above equation is a candidate for the threshold that supports the
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conjectured semi pooling PBE. The indiﬀerence point p∗ also determines the incentive com-
patible pooling and separating contracts in terms of the value of λ. Rearranging (1.11) and
using (1.10), we obtain (1.12), that is
exp(λ) = B˜
(
1− R(p
∗)
cp∗
)(
1− p∗
p∗
) 1
c
.
Clearly, ∀p∗ ∈ [0, 1], there exists a corresponding λ such that p∗ is the point of indiﬀerence
between pooling and separating contracts.
For the given indiﬀerence point p∗, plugging (1.12) into (1.10), we obtain the correspond-
ing separating contracts for the insurer with type p < p∗.
Bsep∗s (p) =B˜
(
1− R(p
∗)
cp∗
)(
1− p∗
p∗
) 1
c
(
p
1− p
) 1
c
(1.25)
Asep∗s (p) =B˜
(
1− R(p
∗)
cp∗
)(
1− p∗
p∗
) 1
c
(
p
1− p
) 1
c
+1
(1.26)
The break-even condition for capital markets requires the pooling contract premium to be
A∗s =
B˜
∫ 1
p∗ tdµ(t)
1− ∫ 1
p∗ tdµ(t)
We now show that p∗ ∈ [0, 1] is an equilibrium indiﬀerence threshold if it satisﬁes condition
(1.13).
For an insurer with type p ∈ [0, p∗], the expected payoﬀ of choosing partial securitization
is
EU seps (p) = W + (A (1− p)−Bp)− c
(
B˜ −Bseps (p)
)
p
If it deviates to the pooling contract, the expected payoﬀ is
EUdeviatepools (p) = W + (A (1− p)−Bp)− B˜
∫ 1
p∗ tdµ(t)− p
1− ∫ 1
p∗ tdµ(t)
We now show that EUdeviatepools (p) ≤ EU seps (p) if condition (1.13) holds. Deﬁne
G1(p) = cp
(
B˜ −Bseps (p)
)
− B˜
∫ 1
p∗ tdµ(t)− p
1− ∫ 1
p∗ tdµ(t)
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where Bseps (p) is given by (1.25). We have
G′1(p) = c
(
B˜ −Bseps (p)
)
− cpBsep′s (p) +
B˜
1− ∫ 1
p∗ tdµ(t)
= c
(
B˜ −Bseps (p)
)
− B
sep
s (p)
1− p +
B˜
1− ∫ 1
p∗ tdµ(t)
G′′1(p) = −cBsep′s (p)−
Bsep′s (p)(1− p) +Bseps (p)
(1− p)2 ≤ 0.
Thus, G1(p) is a concave function of p. So we have
∂G1(p)
∂p
|p<p∗ ≥ ∂G1(p)
∂p
|p=p∗
Next, note that
∂G1(p)
∂p
|p=p∗ = c
(
B˜ − B˜
(
1− R(p
∗)
cp∗
))
−
B˜
(
1− R(p∗)
cp∗
)
1− p∗ +
B˜
1− ∫ 1
p∗ tdµ(t)
= B˜
(
c−
(
c+
1
1− p∗
)(
1− R(p∗)
cp∗
)
+
1
1− ∫ 1
p∗ tdµ(t)
)
.
Under condition (1.13), ∂G1(p)
∂p
|p<p∗ ≥ 0, that is G1(p) is an increasing function of p for p < p∗
so that G1(p) < G1(p∗) = 0. Consequently,
cp
(
B˜ −Bseps (p)
)
< B˜
∫ 1
p∗ tdµ(t)− p
1− ∫ 1
p∗ tdµ(t)
,
and EU seps (p) > EU
deviatepool
s . Hence, the insurers with risk types below p
∗ will not deviate to
pooling securitization by (1.13). Because the Spence-Mirrlees single-crossing condition holds
(due to the linear objective function of insurers), the “local” incentive compatibility condition
(1.24) ensures that an insurer with risk type p ≤ p∗ will also not deviate to choose the partial
securitization contract of some other type p′ ≤ p∗. Finally, as in the proof of Proposition 2,
we can show that, under reasonable oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs, it is sub-optimal for an insurer
with risk type p ≤ p∗ to deviate to some other arbitrary securitization contract (As, Bs)
that is not chosen by another risk type p′ ≤ p∗. If such a deviation were proﬁtable for the
insurer of type p < p∗, it would also be proﬁtable for types p′ ∈ (p, p∗]. Consequently, on
observing such an oﬀ-equilibrium deviation, the beliefs of capital market investors would pool
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the insurer of type p with the insurers of types p′ ∈ (p, p∗], thereby making the deviation
unproﬁtable. Alternatively, iteratively applying the D1 reﬁnement, investors believe that
the deviating insurer is of the risk type p∗ with probability one, which makes the deviation
unproﬁtable for all lower risk types.
For insurers with types p ∈ [p∗, 1], the expected payoﬀ of choosing full pooling securiti-
zation is
EUpools (p) = W + (A (1− p)−Bp)− B˜
∫ 1
p∗ tdµ(t)− p
1− ∫ 1
p∗ tdµ(t)
The expected payoﬀ of mimicking an arbitrary lower-risk insurer of type pˆ < p∗ is
EUdeviateseps (p) =W + (A (1− p)−Bp)− c
(
B˜ −Bseps (pˆ)
)
p︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected bankruptcy costs of mimicking
−B
sep
s (pˆ)(pˆ− p)
1− pˆ︸ ︷︷ ︸
beneﬁts from mimicking
Deﬁne
G2(p) = c
(
B˜ −Bseps (pˆ)
)
p+
Bseps (pˆ)(pˆ− p)
1− pˆ − B˜
∫ 1
p∗ tdµ(t)− p
1− ∫ 1
p∗ tdµ(t)
The ﬁrst derivative is
G′2(p) = c
(
B˜ −Bseps (pˆ)
)
− B
sep
s (pˆ)
1− pˆ +
B˜
1− ∫ 1
p∗ tdµ(t)
= c
(
B˜ −Bseps (pˆ)
)
+ (
B˜
1− ∫ 1
p∗ tdµ(t)
− B
sep
s (pˆ)
1− pˆ ) > 0
It is obvious that G2(p) is an increasing function of p ∈ [p∗, 1]. Thus, G2(p) ≥ G2(p∗) =
0 ∀p ≥ p∗. That is,
c
(
B˜ −Bseps (pˆ)
)
p+
Bseps (pˆ)(pˆ− p)
1− pˆ > B˜
∫ 1
p∗ tdµ(t)− p
1− ∫ 1
p∗ tdµ(t)
.
Hence, it is easy to show that EUpools (p) > EU
deviate
s (p) ∀p > p∗. As a result, insurers
with risk types greater than p∗ will not deviate to choose separating contracts. As earlier,
we can iteratively apply the D1 reﬁnement to show that an insurer with risk type p > p∗
will also not deviate to choose some other arbitrary securitization contract.
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By the above arguments, each candidate threshold p∗ ∈ P deﬁned in (1.14) deﬁnes a
semi-pooling PBE.
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof.
1. Suppose ﬁrst that
δ < c (1.27)
It then follows from Proposition 1 that the insurer with risk type below a threshold chooses
full reinsurance. By Proposition 4, higher risk insurers prefer pooling securitization, while
lower risk insurers prefer separating securitization. Therefore, we conjecture that there are
two types of PBEs under condition (1.27). The diﬀerences between the two types of PBEs lie
in the intermediate risk insurers’ choice between full reinsurance and partial securitization.
First considers the candidates for a pair of triggers (p1, p2), where p1 is the point of
indiﬀerence between full reinsurance and partial securitization, and p2 is the point of in-
diﬀerence between partial securitization and full securitization. The intermediate interval is
nonempty iﬀ p1 < p2. By our earlier arguments, p1 must satisfy
B˜δp1
1− p1(1 + δ) = c(B˜ − exp(λ)
(
p1
1− p1
) 1
c
)p1 (1.28)
where the constant of integration, λ, is determined by p1 if it is the equilibrium threshold.
Rearranging the above equation, we obtain (1.16), where
exp(λ) = B˜
(
1− δ
(1− p1(1 + δ)) c
)(
1− p1
p1
) 1
c
(1.29)
The trigger, p2, must satisfy equation (1.18), that is, c(B˜−Bseps (p2))p2 = B˜R(p2), where
it follows from (1.16) that
Bseps (p2) = B˜
(
1− δ
(1− p1(1 + δ)) c
)(
1− p1
p1
) 1
c
(
p2
1− p2
) 1
c
The above two equations lead to the following relationship between p1 and p2:
1−
(
1− δ
(1− p1(1 + δ)) c
)(
1− p1
p1
) 1
c
(
p2
1− p2
) 1
c
=
R(p2)
cp2
We deﬁne the set U by (1.17), which comprises of all possible indiﬀerence points p∗1. We
deﬁne the set L by (1.19), which contains all possible indiﬀerence points p∗2.
Suppose that p∗1 < p
∗
2. Conjecture a partition equilibrium where insurers with types
in the range [0, p∗1] choose full reinsurance, insurers with types in the range [p
∗
1, p
∗
2] choose
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separating partial securitization, and insurers with types in the range [p∗2, 1] choose pooling
full securitization. We now show that the pair of indiﬀerence points are, indeed, equilibrium
thresholds.
For insurers with types in the range [0, p∗1], their expected payoﬀ of full reinsurance is
EUr(p) = W + (A (1− p)−Bp)− B˜δp
1− p(1 + δ) .
If they deviate to choose partial securitization by choosing the corresponding coverage,
where
Bseps (p) = B˜
(
1− δ
(1− p∗1(1 + δ))c
)(
1− p∗1
p∗1
) 1
c
(
p
1− p
) 1
c
(1.30)
their expected payoﬀ is
EUdeviatesep(p) = W + (A (1− p)−Bp)− c(B˜ −Bseps (p))p.
If they deviate to choose full pooling securitization, where
B∗s = B˜; A
∗
s =
B˜
∫ 1
p∗2
tdµ(t)
1− ∫ 1
p∗2
tdµ(t)
, (1.31)
the expected payoﬀ is
EUdeviatepool(p) = W + (A (1− p)−Bp)− B˜
∫ 1
p∗2
tdµ(t)− p
1− ∫ 1
p∗2
tdµ(t)
.
Deﬁne
Φ(p) =
B˜δp
1− p(1 + δ) − cp
(
B˜ −Bseps (p)
)
.
It is easy to show that Φ(p) is a convex function. Since Φ(0) = Φ(p∗1) = 0, then, Φ(p) ≤
0∀p ∈ [0, p∗1]. That is
B˜δp
1− p(1 + δ) < c
(
B˜ −Bseps (p)
)
p
Deﬁne
Ψ(p) = cp
(
B˜ −Bseps (p)
)
− B˜
∫ 1
p∗2
tdµ(t)− p
1− ∫ 1
p∗2
tdµ(t)
.
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It is easy to see that function Ψ(p) is a concave function of p. Then ∂Ψ(p)
p
|p<p∗2 > ∂Ψ(p)p |p=p∗2
and
∂Ψ(p)
p
|p=p∗2 = B˜
(
c−
(
c+
1
1− p∗2
)(
1− δ
c(1− p∗1(1 + δ))
)(
(1− p∗1)p∗2
p∗1(1− p∗2)
) 1
c
+
1
1− ∫ 1
p∗2
tdµ(t)
)
.
For any p∗1 ∈ L, it follows that ∂Ψ(p)p > 0 for all p < p2∗ if condition (1.20) holds.
Therefore, Ψ(p) is an increasing function of p. So Ψ(p) ≤ Ψ(p∗2) = 0 for all p < P ∗2 ; that is
cp
(
B˜ −Bseps (p)
)
< B˜
∫ 1
p∗2
tdµ(t)− p
1− ∫ 1
p∗2
tdµ(t)
.
Since
B˜δp
1− p(1 + δ) < c
(
B˜ −Bseps (p)
)
p < B˜
∫ 1
p∗2
tdµ(t)− p
1− ∫ 1
p∗2
tdµ(t)
,
EUr(p) > EUdeviatesep(p), EUr(p) > EUdeviatepool(p)
Therefore, insurers with types in the range [0, p∗1] will not deviate to choose either sep-
arating partial securitization or pooling full securitization. Iteratively applying the D1 re-
ﬁnement, they will also not deviate to choose some other arbitrary securitization contract.
Now consider insurers with types in the range [p∗1, p
∗
2]. If they choose partial securitization
contracts given by (1.30), the expected payoﬀ is EU seps (p) = W + (A (1− p)−Bp)− c(B˜ −
Bseps (p))p.
If they deviate to choose full reinsurance contracts given by Proposition 1 , the expected
payoﬀ is
EUdeviatere(p) = W + (A (1− p)−Bp)− B˜δp
1− p(1 + δ) .
If they deviate to choose pooling securitization given by (1.31), the expected payoﬀ is
EUdeviatepool(p) = W + (A (1− p)−Bp)− B˜
∫ 1
p∗2
tdµ(t)− p
1− ∫ 1
p∗2
tdµ(t)
.
Since Φ(p) is a convex function with Φ(0) = Φ(p∗1) = 0, Φ(p) > 0 for p > p
∗
1, that is,
B˜δp
1−p(1+δ) > cp
(
B˜ −Bseps (p)
)
. Thus EUdeviatere(p) < EU seps (p).
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Also, when p < p∗2, it follows that c(B˜ − Bseps (p))p < B˜
∫ 1
p2
tdµ(t)−p
1−∫ 1p2 tdµ(t) . Hence, EU seps (p) >
EUdeviatepool(p). Therefore, insurers with types in the range [p∗1, p
∗
2] will choose neither full
reinsurance nor full pooling securitization. Because the Spence-Mirrlees single-crossing con-
dition holds, the “local” incentive compatibility condition (1.24) for the partial securitization
contracts ensures that an insurer with risk type p ∈ [p∗1, p∗2] will also not deviate to choose
some other type’s partial securitization contract. Finally, iteratively applying the D1 reﬁne-
ment, they will also not deviate to choose some other arbitrary securitization contract that
is not chosen by another type.
We now consider the insurers with types in the range [p∗2, 1].
If they choose pooling securitization given by (1.31), the expected payoﬀ is
EUpools (p) = W + (A (1− p)−Bp)− B˜
∫ 1
p∗2
tdµ(t)− p
1− ∫ 1
p∗2
tdµ(t)
.
If they deviate to choose full reinsurance, the expected payoﬀ is
EUdeviatere = W + (A (1− p)−Bp)− B˜δp
1− p(1 + δ) .
By the property of the function Φ(p), it is easy to show that, when p > p∗2 > p
∗
1, Φ(p) > 0.
Thus,
B˜δp
1− p(1 + δ) > cp
(
B˜ −Bseps (p)
)
.
By the property of function Ψ(p), it is easy to show that, when p > p∗2 > p
∗
1,
cp
(
B˜ −Bseps (p)
)
> B˜
∫ 1
p∗2
tdµ(t)− p
1− ∫ 1
p∗2
tdµ(t)
.
As a result, EUpoolings (p) > EUdeviatere(p). The insurers, therefore, will not deviate to choose
full reinsurance. It follows from the results of Proposition 4 that the insurers on this inter-
val would not choose partial securitization. There are multiple possible PBEs, where the
thresholds {p∗1, p∗2} ∈ G and p∗1 < p∗2.
Now consider the case where p∗1 > p
∗
2 so that partial securitization is sub-optimal for
insurers. In this case, we conjecture a PBE with two partitions, where insurers with type in
the range [0, p∗3] choose full reinsurance, while insurers with types in the range [p
∗
3, 1] choose
pooling full securitization. We are, therefore, in the scenario as characterized by Part 3 of
Proposition 3.
2. Suppose δ > c. It follows that full reinsurance is the sub-optimal choice for all insurers.
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Consequently, we are in the scenario as characterized by Proposition 4.
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Chapter 2
Capital, Risk and Insurance Prices
2.1 Introduction
Financial institutions such as insurers and banks are usually required to hold suﬃcient equity
capital on the liability side of their balance sheets and liquid reserves on the asset side as a
buﬀer against the risk of insolvency, especially when their loss portfolios are imperfectly di-
versiﬁed and/or returns on their assets shrink dramatically. The ﬁnancial crisis of 2007-2008
was precipitated by the presence of insuﬃcient liquidity buﬀers and excessive debt levels in
the ﬁnancial system that made banks vulnerable to large aggregate negative shocks. In the
context of insurers, the imperfect incorporation of the externality created by aggregate risk
on their investment decisions when markets are incomplete may lead them to hold insuﬃcient
liquidity buﬀers to meet insurance liabilities. The resulting increase in insurer insolvency
risk has an impact on the amount of insurance they can supply to insurees and, therefore,
the degree of risk-sharing in the insurance market. Indeed, empirical evidence shows that,
in response to Risk Based Capital (RBC) requirements, under-capitalized insurers not only
increase their capital holdings to meet minimum capital requirements, but also take more
risks to reach higher returns (Cummins and Sommer, 1996; Shim, 2010; Sager, 2002). Insur-
ers’ propensity to “reach for yield” contributes to their overall insolvency risk.1 Aggregate
risk may, therefore, lead to misallocation of capital and suboptimal risk sharing among in-
surees and insurers when markets are incomplete. To the best of our knowledge, however,
1Cox(1967) describes bank’s tendency to invest in high risk loans with higher returns. Becker and Ivashina (2013))
support insurers’ reaching for yield behavior by examining insurers’ bond investment decisions
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the above arguments have yet to be theoretically formalized in an equilibrium framework
that endogenizes the demand and supply of insurance as well as insurers’ asset and liability
risks. Such a framework could potentially shed light on the optimal regulation of insurance
ﬁrms taking into account both the asset and liability sides of insurers’ balance sheets.
We contribute to the literature by developing an equilibrium model of competitive insur-
ance markets where insurers’ assets may be exposed to idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks.
In the unregulated economy, we show that the equilibrium insurance price varies non-
monotonically in a U-shaped manner with the level of internal capital held by insurers.
In other words, the insurance price decreases with a positive shock to internal capital when
the internal capital is below a threshold, but increases when the internal capital is above the
threshold. We thereby reconcile conﬂicting predictions in previous literature on the relation
between insurance premia and internal capital that are obtained in partial equilibrium frame-
works that focus on either demand-side or supply-side forces. We also obtain the additional
testable implications that an increase in insurers’ asset risk, which raises the default proba-
bility, raises insurance premia and reduces coverage. We then proceed to derive insights into
the solvency regulation of insurers by studying the benchmark “ﬁrst best” economy in which
there is perfect risk-sharing among insurers and insurees (so that they are only exposed to
aggregate risk) and the eﬀects of aggregate risk are fully internalized. We analyze the eﬀects
of aggregate risk on the Pareto optimal allocation of insurer capital to liquidity reserves
and risky assets as well as risk sharing among insurees and insurers. We show that, when
aggregate risk is below a threshold, it is Pareto optimal for insurers and insurees to hold
zero liquidity reserves, insurees are fully insured, and insurers bear all aggregate risk. When
aggregate risk takes intermediate values, both insurees and insurers still hold no liquidity
reserves, but insurees partially share aggregate risk with insurers. When the aggregate risk
is high, however, both insurees and insurers hold nonzero liquidity reserves, and insurees
partially share aggregate risk with insurers. We demonstrate that the eﬃcient allocation
can be implemented through regulatory intervention that comprises of comprehensive in-
surance policies that combine insurance and investment, reinsurance, a minimum liquidity
requirement when aggregate risk is high, and ex post budget-neutral taxation and subsidies
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contingent on the realized aggregate state.
Our model features two types of agents: a continuum of ex ante identical, risk averse
insurees each facing a risk of incurring a loss in their endowment of capital, and a continuum
of ex ante identical risk neutral insurers each endowed with a certain amount of internal
“equity” capital. There is a storage technology/safe asset that provides a constant risk free
return and a continuum of risky assets that generate higher expected returns than the risk
free asset. Although both insurees and insurers can directly invest in the safe asset, only
insurers have access to the risky assets. In addition to their risk-sharing function, insurance
ﬁrms, therefore, also serve as intermediaries to channel individual capital into productive
risky assets. Insuree losses are independently and identically distributed, but insurers’ assets
are exposed to aggregate risk. Speciﬁcally, a certain proportion of insurers is exposed to a
common asset shock, while the remaining insurers’ asset risks are idiosyncratic. A priori,
it is unkown whether a particular insurer is exposed to the common or idiosyncratic shock.
The proportion of insurers who are exposed to the common shock is, therefore, the natural
measure of the aggregate risk in the economy. Insurees invest a portion of their capital in
the risk-free asset and use the remaining capital to purchase insurance. Insurers invest their
internal capital and the external capital raised from selling insurance claims in a portfolio
of risk-free and risky assets.
We ﬁrst derive the market equilibrium of the unregulated economy. In the unregulated
economy, asset markets are incomplete because there are no traded securities contingent on
the asset realizations of individual insurers or the aggregate state. Insurees make their in-
surance purchase decisions rationally anticipating insurers’ investment strategy and default
risk given their observations of insurers’ internal capital, the size of the insurance pool, and
the menu of traded insurance contracts that comprise of the insurance price (the premium
per unit of insurance) and the face value of coverage. Ceteris paribus, an increase in insur-
ers’ internal capital or a decrease in asset risk increases the demand for insurance due to
the lower likelihood of insurer insolvency. An increase in the risk of insuree losses leads to
a decrease in insurance demand because it increases the proportion of insurees who suﬀer
losses and, therefore, decreases the amount that each insuree recovers if he incurs a loss, but
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the insurance company is insolvent. Insurers, in turn, take the menu of traded insurance
contracts as given and choose how many units of each contract to sell. There is free entry
in that any contract that is expected to make positive expected proﬁts for insurers is sup-
plied. Competition among insurers then ensures that, in equilibrium, each insurer earns zero
expected economic proﬁts that incorporate the opportunity costs of internal capital that is
used to make loss payments when insurers are insolvent. An increase in the insurance price,
therefore, lowers the amount of insurance that each insurer sells in equilibrium leading to a
downward sloping “zero economic proﬁt” or “competitive” supply curve for insurance. An
increase in the internal capital or an increase in asset risk, ceteris paribus, increases the
opportunity costs of providing insurance, thereby increasing the amount of insurance that
provides zero economic proﬁts to insurers. An increase in the loss proportion increases the
cost of claims, thereby pushing up the competitive supply level.
In competitive equilibrium, the insurance price is determined by market clearing—the
demand for insurance must equal the supply—and zero economic proﬁts for insurers. The
insurance demand curve and the “zero economic proﬁt” or “competitive” supply curve are
both downward sloping with the demand curve being steeper due to the risk aversion of in-
surees. Consequently, any factor that increases the insurance demand curve, ceteris paribus,
decreases the equilibrium price, while a factor that increases the competitive supply curve has
a positive eﬀect. We analytically characterize the competitive equilibrium of the economy
and explore its comparative statics.
We demonstrate that there is a U-shaped relation between the insurance price and in-
surers’ internal capital. Speciﬁcally, the insurance price decreases with a positive shock to
internal capital when the internal capital is below a threshold, but increases when the inter-
nal capital is above the threshold. The intuition for the non-monotonic U-shaped relation
hinges on the inﬂuence of both demand-side and supply-side factors. An increase in insur-
ers’ internal capital increases the competitive supply of insurance coverage because of the
increased opportunity costs of internal capital. Because insurers are risk-neutral, however,
the change in the competitive supply of insurance coverage is linear in the internal capital.
On the demand side, an increase in insurers’ internal capital increases insurers’ insolvency
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buﬀer, thereby increasing the demand for insurance coverage. An increase in internal capital
also increases the funds available for investment that further has a positive impact on the
demand for insurance. The demand, however, is concave in the internal capital due to in-
surees’ risk aversion. Because the competitive insurance supply varies linearly with capital,
while the insurance demand is concave, there exists a threshold level of capital at which
the demand eﬀect equals the supply eﬀect. Consequently, the demand eﬀect dominates the
supply eﬀect so that the equilibrium insurance price goes down when the internal capital
level is lower than the threshold. When the capital is above the threshold, the supply eﬀect
dominates so that the insurance price increases.
As suggested by the above discussion, equilibrium eﬀects that integrate both demand
side and supply side forces play a central role in driving the U-shaped relation between
the insurance price and insurer capital. Our results, therefore, reconcile and further reﬁne
the opposing predictions for the relation in the literature that stem from a focus on only
demand or only supply eﬀects in partial equilibrium frameworks. Speciﬁcally, the “capacity
constraints” theory, which focuses on the supply of insurance, predicts a negative relationship
between insurance price and capital by assuming that insurers are free of insolvency risk
(Gron, 1994; Winter, 1994). In contrast, the “risky debt” theory incorporates the default
risk of insurers, but predicts a positive relationship between insurance price and capital
(Doherty and Garven, 1986; Cummins, 1988, Cummins and Danzon, 1997). Empirical
evidence on the relationship is also mixed. We make the simple, but fundamental point
that the insurance price reﬂects the eﬀects of capital on both the demand for insurance and
the supply of insurance in equilibrium. We show that the relative dominance of demand-side
and supply-side forces depends on the level of internal capital, thereby generating a U-shaped
relation between price and internal capital.
Next, we show that an increase in insurers’ asset risk, which increases their insolvency
probability, increases the insurance price and reduces the insurance coverage in equilibrium.
The intuition for the results again hinges on a subtle interplay between the eﬀects of an
increase in asset risk on insurance supply and demand. A positive shock to insurers’ asset
risk, ceteris paribus, has the direct eﬀect of increasing the competitive supply of insurance
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coverage, that is, the level of insurance supply at which insurers earn zero economic proﬁts.
Consequently, the amount of funds available to pay loss claims in distress increases, thereby
having the indirect eﬀect of increasing the demand for insurance. On the other hand, an
increase in the asset risk increases the insurers’ insolvency probability that has a negative
eﬀect on the demand for insurance. We show that, under reasonable conditions, the direct
eﬀect outweighs the indirect eﬀect. Consequently, an increase in asset risk reduces insurance
demand, but increases the competitive supply level, thereby increasing the insurance price
and decreasing the coverage level in equilibrium. Our results imply that the response to
the increased asset risk of insurance ﬁrms is the shift of insuree’s capital accumulation from
indirect investment in risky assets to direct storage in safe assets.
2.2 Related Literature
Two streams of the literature investigate the relation between insurer capital and insurance
premia. The ﬁrst branch proposes the “capacity constraint”theory, which assumes that
insurers are free from insolvency risk. The prediction of an inverse relation between insurance
price and capitalization crucially hinges on the assumption that insurers are limited by
regulations or by inﬁnitely risk averse policyholders so that they can only sell an amount
of insurance that is consistent with zero insolvency risk (e.g.,Gron, 1994; Winter, 1994).
Winter(1994) explains the variation in insurance premia over the “insurance cycle”using a
dynamic model. Empirical tests using industry-level data prior to 1980 support the predicted
inverse relation between insurance capital and price, but data from the 1980s do not support
the prediction. Gron (1994) ﬁnds support for the result using data on short-tail lines of
business. Cagle and Harrington (1995) predict that the insurance price increases by less
than the amount needed to shift the cost of the shock to capital given inelastic industry
demand with respect to price and capital.
Another signiﬁcant stream of literature—the “risky corporate debt” theory—incorporates
the possibility of insurer insolvency and predicts a positive relation between insurance price
and capitalization (e.g., Doherty and Garven, 1986; Cummins, 1988). The studies in this
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strand of the literature emphasize that, because insurers are not free of insolvency risk
in reality, the pricing of insurance should incorporate the possibility of insurers’ ﬁnancial
distress. Higher capitalization levels reduce the chance of insurer default, thereby leading
to a higher price of insurance associated with a higher amount of capital. Cummins and
Danzon (1997) show evidence that the insurance price declines in response to the loss shocks
in the mid-1980s that depleted insurer’s capital using data from 1976 to 1987. While the
“capacity constraint”theory concentrates on the supply of insurance, “the pricing of risky
debt”theory focuses on capital’s inﬂuence on the quality of insurance ﬁrms and, therefore,
the demand for insurance. The empirical studies support the mixed results for diﬀerent
periods and business lines.
We complement the above streams of the literature by integrating demand-side and
supply-side forces in an equilibrium framework. We show that there is a U-shaped rela-
tion between price and internal capital. In contrast with the literature on “risk debt pric-
ing”, which assumes an exogenous process for the asset value, we endogenize the asset value
which depends on the total invested capital including both internal capital and capital raised
through the selling of insurance policies. Insurers’ assets and total liabilities are, therefore,
simultaneously determined in equilibrium in our analysis.
Our paper is also related to the studies that examine the relation between capital hold-
ings and risk taking of insurance companies. Cummins and Sommer (1996) empirically show
that insurers hold more capital and choose higher portfolio risks to achieve their desired
overall insolvency risk using data from 1979 to 1990. It is argued that insurers response to
the adoption of RBC requirements in both property-liability and life insurance industry by
increasing capital holdings to avoid regulation costs, and by investing in riskier assets to
obtain high yields (e.g.,Baranoﬀ and Sager, 2002; Shim, 2010). Insurers are hypothesized to
choose risk levels and capitalization to achieve target solvency levels in response to buyers’
demand for safety. Filipovic, Kremslehner and Muermann (2015) show that limited liability
creates an incentive for insurers to engage in risk-shifting, thereby transferring wealth from
policy holders, and that solvency capital requirements that restrict investment and premium
policies can improve eﬃciency. Our paper ﬁts into this literature by studying the response of
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the market price to shocks to insurers’ internal capital as well as aggregate and idiosyncratic
shocks to insurers’ assets in an equilibrium framework. Our results shed light on the sol-
vency regulation of insurance ﬁrms by incorporating the liability and asset sides of insurers’
balance sheets. We show that eﬃcient allocations can be implemented through comprehen-
sive insurance policies sold by insurers that combine insurance with investment, reinsurance,
a minimum liquidity requirement, and ex post budget-neutral taxation contingent on the
aggregate state. The tradeoﬀ between holding suﬃcient capital to meet insurance liabili-
ties and diverting capital to the most productive assets implies that a liquidity requirement
should be imposed only when aggregate risk is suﬃciently high.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on capital allocation and insurance pricing.
Zanjani (2002) argues that price diﬀerences across markets are driven by diﬀerent capital
requirements to maintain solvency assuming that capital is costly to hold. Our paper endo-
genizes the cost of capital in terms of the opportunity cost of holding internal capital, which
is used to pay for loss claims when insurers default. We highight insurees’ and insurers’
responses to internal capital shocks. Consequently, insurance prices reﬂect insurees’ demand
for safety and insurers’ abilities to provide insurance with imperfect protection.
2.3 The Model
We consider a single-period economy with two dates 0 and 1. There is a single consump-
tion/capital good. There are two types of agents: a continuum of measure 1 of risk-averse
insurees or policy holders and a continuum of measure 1 of risk-neutral insurance ﬁrms.
Each insuree is endowed with 1 unit of capital at date 0 and has a logarithmic utility func-
tion. Each insurance ﬁrm is endowed with K units of “internal” capital. There is a storage
technology/safe asset that is in suﬃciently large supply that it provides a constant return of
Rf per unit of capital invested.
At date 1, an insuree i can incur a loss l ≤ 1 so that a portion of each insuree’s endowment
is at risk. Losses are independently and identically distributed across insurees. Each insuree’s
loss probability is p. At date 0, each insuree invests a portion of her capital in the safe
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asset and the remainder in buying an insurance contract, (κ,C), where κ is the premium
per unit of insurance coverage and C is the face value of insurance coverage. Similar to
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), we consider an insurance market in which insurance contracts,
Φ ≡ {(κ,C);κ > 0, C > 0} that combine the “price” of insurance and the “quantity” of
insurance are traded. Each insuree chooses a single contract from the set of traded contracts.
Insurers have internal capital K and raise external capital by selling insurance contracts.
Insurers and insurees take the set of insurance contracts Φ as given in making their supply
and demand decisions, respectively. The set Φ is such that any contract that is demanded
and expected to be proﬁtable for an insurance company is supplied.
Each insurance ﬁrm j has access to a risky technology that generates a return of RH
per unit of invested capital with probability 1 − q when it “succeeds” but RL < RH with
probability q when it “fails.” Insurance ﬁrms ﬁrst raise capital in insurance markets and
then invest it. Further, insurance ﬁrms cannot commit to their investment policy when they
raise capital. A proportion 1− τ of insurance ﬁrms are exposed to idiosyncratic technology
shocks, that is, the technology shocks are independently and identically distributed for this
group of insurance ﬁrms. The remaining proportion τ of insurers are, however, exposed to a
common shock, that is, the technology shock described above is the same for these insurers.
Although insurers know that a proportion τ of them is exposed to a common shock, an
individual insurer does not know whether it is exposed to an idiosyncratic or common shock
a priori. τ is a measure of the aggregate risk in the economy.
We assume that
(1− q)RH + qRL ≥ Rf . (2.1)
The above condition ensures that the expected return on the risky project is at least as
great as the risk-free rate. While policy holders can directly invest in the safe asset, only
insurance ﬁrms have access to the production technology. Consequently, in addition to the
provision of insurance to policy holders, insurance ﬁrms also play important roles as ﬁnancial
intermediaries who channel the capital supplied by policy holders to productive assets. In
addition to the fact that insurees do not have direct access to asset markets in the unregulated
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economy, asset markets are incomplete because there are no traded securities contingent on
the asset realizations of individual insures or the realization of the aggregate shock.
Let Cj be the total face value of insurance contracts sold by insurer j and Kj be the
external capital it raises. The insurer can invest its total capital, K + Kj in a portfolio
comprising of the risk-free storage technology and the risky project. In an autarkic economy
with no regulation, it follows from condition (2.1), and the fact that insurance ﬁrms cannot
commit to their investment policy when they raise capital by selling insurance contracts,
that it is optimal for risk-neutral insurance ﬁrms to invest their entire capital in the risky
technology.
By our earlier discussion, the total liability of the insurer j is pCj because a proportion
p of its pool of insurees incur losses. Insurers default if their total liability cannot be covered
by the total investment returns when the risky technology fails, that is when
pCj > (K +Kj)RL. (2.2)
In the event of default, the total available capital of an insurer is split up among insurees in
proportion to their respective indemnities. The internal capital plays the role of a buﬀer that
increases an insurer’s capacity to meet its liabilities and, thereby, the amount of insurance
it can sell. The cost of holding internal capital in our model is an opportunity cost, which
refers to the returns from the invested internal capital that are depleted to pay out liabilities
when insurers default.
Each individual insuree observes the total capital, K + Kj, held by each insurer j in
marking her insurance purchase decision. In making the decision on the level of insurance
coverage to purchase, insurees rationally anticipate the possibility of default, and the amount
they will be paid for a loss when insurers’ asset returns are insuﬃcient to pay out the
aggregate loss claims as shown by (2.2).
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2.3.1 The Equilibrium of the Unregulated Economy
We now derive the equilibrium of the unregulated economy by analyzing the demand and
supply of insurance by insurees and insurers, respectively. In equilibrium, the demand for
insurance equals the supply.
Insurance Demand
Each insuree chooses its portfolio, which comprises of his investment in the safe asset (self-
insurance) and his choice of insurance contract, to maximize his expected utility. Without
insurance, each insuree i’s expected utility is given by the autarkic utility level,
Autarkic Utility = p ln(Rf − l) + (1− p) ln(Rf ). (2.3)
Insurees take the set, Φ, of traded insurance contracts as given in making their purchase
decisions. Each insuree observes the total capital held by each insurer and, therefore, ra-
tionally anticipates the possibility that she may not be fully indemniﬁed in the scenario
where the insuree incurs losses, but the insurer is insolvent. Insurees also rationally incorpo-
rate insurers’ investment portfolio choices in making their insurance demand decisions. As
previously stated, insurers invest all their capital in the risky technology, thereby causing
insurers to be likely to default in the “bad” state where the technology fails. The likelihood
that insurees’ loss claims may not be fully indemniﬁed is then aﬀected by the risk in the
investment portfolio of insurance ﬁrms and the total liabilities insured by them. In general,
the loss payment obtained by each insuree is determined by three factors: the proportion
of insurees in the insurer’s pool who incur losses, the total amount of capital held by the
insurer, and the return of the insurer’s investment project.
Given that insurees and insurers are ex ante identical, we focus on symmetric equilibria
where insurees make identical portfolio choices and insurers have ex ante identical pools of
insurees. Without loss of generality, therefore, we focus on a representative insurer and a
representative insuree. Suppose that the representative insuree chooses the contract (κ,Cd).
If Cs is the total face value of the insurance contracts sold by the insurer, its total capital
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is K + κCs. The insurer’s available capital if its project fails is, therefore, (K + κCs)RL.
Consequently, the payment received by each insuree who incurs a loss when the insurer’s
project fails is min(Cd,
(K+κCs)RL
p
). It is clear from our subsequent results that it is suboptimal
for the insurer to sell so much coverage that it is unable to meet losses in the “good”
state where its project succeeds. In the following, therefore, we assume this result to avoid
unnecessarily complicating the exposition.
Among all the available contracts, (κ,Cd), where the premium per unit of coverage is κ,
the representative insuree chooses the contract that maximizes its expected utility, that is,
the insuree’s choice of coverage solves
max
Cd
insuree incurs loss in insurer’s “good” state︷ ︸︸ ︷
p(1− q) ln [(1− κCd)Rf − l + Cd]+
insuree incurs loss in insurer’s “bad” state︷ ︸︸ ︷
pq ln
[
(1− κCd)Rf − l +min(Cd, (K + κCs)RL
p
)
]
+
insuree does not incur loss︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− p) ln [(1− κCd)Rf ] (2.4)
such that
κCd ≤ 1 (2.5)
As is clear from the above, an atomistic insuree makes her insurance purchase decision
based on her probability of a loss and the probability that the insurer’s assets fail. Because
she observes the insurer’s total capital when she makes her decision, the insuree’s decision
rationally incorporates the proportion of the population of insurees that will incur losses.
The properties of the logarithmic utility function guarantee that it is suboptimal for
insurees to invest all their capital in risky insurance so that the budget constraint, (2.5)
is not binding. The necessary and suﬃcient ﬁrst order condition for the insuree’s optimal
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choice of insurance coverage, C∗d , is{
p(1− q)(1− κRf )
(1− κC∗d)Rf − l + C∗d
− pqκRf
(1− κC∗d)Rf − l + (K+κCs)RLp
− (1− p)κRf
(1− κC∗d)Rf
}
· 1{pC∗d≥(K+κCs)RL}
+
{
p(1− κRf )
(1− κC∗d)Rf − l + C∗d
− (1− p)κRf
(1− κC∗d)Rf
}
· 1{pC∗d<(K+κCs)RL} = 0 (2.6)
The solution to the above equation can be expressed as a function, C∗d(K,Cs, κ), where we
suppress the dependence of the optimal demand on the liability and asset risk parameters,
p and q, and the safe asset return, Rf , to simplify the notation.
The following lemma characterize the insuree’s optimal demand for insurance coverage for
a given insurance price, κ. The optimal demand depends on whether or not the representative
insurer defaults in the bad state where its assets fail.
Lemma 1 • If the representative insurer defaults in the “bad” state where its assets fail,
the optimal insurance demand C∗d is given by
C∗d = C
∗
d(K,Cs, κ), (2.7)
where C∗d(K,Cs, κ) satisﬁes equation
p(1− q)(1− κRf )
(1− κC∗d)Rf − l + C∗d
− pqκRf
(1− κC∗d)Rf − l + (K+κCs)RLp
− (1− p)κRf
(1− κC∗d)Rf
= 0 (2.8)
• If the representative insurer does not default in the “bad” state where its assets fail, the
optimal insurance demand C∗d is given by
C∗d = C
∗
d(κ), (2.9)
where C∗d(κ) satisﬁes
p(1− κRf )
(1− κC∗d)Rf − l + C∗d
− (1− p)κRf
(1− κC∗d)Rf
= 0 (2.10)
By (2.8) and (2.10), we note that the insurer’s internal capital, K, total supply, Cs, and
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asset risk parameter, q, inﬂuence the optimal demand for insurance coverage only when
insurees foresee insurer insolvency in the “bad” state, where its assets fail. For generality, we
allow for the case that the market insurance price might lead to over insurance, i.e., Cd > l.
The following lemma shows how the optimal demand for insurance coverage varies with
the fundamental parameters of the model that will be useful when we derive the equilibrium
of the economy.
Lemma 2 (Variation of Insurance Demand) The optimal demand for insurance, C∗d ,
(i) decreases with the insurance price, κ; (ii) decreases with the return, Rf , on the safe asset;
(iii) increases with insurers’ internal capital, K; (iv) increases with the total face value of
policies sold by the insurer, Cs; increases with the insurer’s asset return in the low state, RL;
and (v) decreases with the insurer’s expected probability of failure; q.
The optimal demand for insurance claims reﬂects the tradeoﬀ between self-insurance
through investments in the safe asset and the purchase of insurance coverage with potential
default risk for the insurer and, therefore, imperfect insurance for the insuree. Capital allo-
cated in safe assets plays an alternative role in buﬀering the losses that cannot be indemniﬁed
by insurers when their assets fail. The insurance demand decreases with the insurance price,
that is, the demand curve is downward-sloping, since the utility function of insurees satisﬁes
the properties highlighted by Hoy and Robson (1981) for insurance to be a normal good.
An increase in the risk-free return raises the autarkic utility level, thereby diminishing the
demand for insurance coverage.
In addition to functioning as a risk warehouse, which absorbs and diversiﬁes each insuree’s
idiosyncratic loss, insurance ﬁrms also serve as ﬁnancial intermediaries who channel external
capital supplied by policyholders to productive assets. In our model, the overall insolvency
risk faced by insurance ﬁrms are simultaneously determined by the asset and liability sides of
insurer’s balance sheets. An increase in the aggregate loss proportion of the insuree pool; a
decrease in the internal capital held by insurers; a decrease in the amount of external capital
raised by the insurer from selling insurance; and a decrease in the asset return in the low
state all lower the insurance coverage of an insuree when the insurer is insolvent so that the
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optimal insurance demand declines.
Insurance Supply
Each insurer chooses which contracts from the set, Φ, to supply and the number of units
of each contract to maximize its total net expected payoﬀs from providing insurance for
insurees and investing the capital it raises. As discussed earlier, in the absence of regulatory
intervention, it is optimal for each insurer to invest its entire capital in the risky project
due to its risk neutrality and the asset return condition (2.1). Recall that an insurer cannot
commit to its investment policy when it raises external capital by selling insurance contracts.
An insurer chooses to supply insurance if and only if its expected net proﬁts are at least as
great as its autarkic expected payoﬀ, that is, its expected payoﬀ from not selling insurance
and investing its internal capital. An insurer’s autarkic expected payoﬀ is
Autarkic Expected Payoﬀ = K ((1− q)RH + qRL) . (2.11)
Each insurer makes its supply decision knowing the proportion, p, of its pool of insurees
who will incur losses. In the bad state where its technology fails, if its available capital is
lower than the total loss payments to insurees, then the capital is divided equally among the
insurees. If the premium per unit of coverage is κ, the optimal supply of insurance coverage,
therefore, solves
max
Cs
{(1− q) ((K + κCs)RH − pCs)}+ {q ((K + κCs)RL − pCs)} · 1{pCs≤(K+κCs)RL} (2.12)
such that
{(1− q) ((K + κCs)RH − pCs)}+ {q ((K + κCs)RL − pCs)} · 1{pCs≤(K+κCs)RL}
≥ K ((1− q)RH + qRL) (P.C ) (2.13)
The participation constraint, (2.13), ensures that the insurer chooses to sell a nonzero
amount of coverage if and only if its expected net proﬁt exceeds its expected payoﬀ in
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autarky; that is, its expected economic proﬁt (proﬁt in excess of the autarkic level) is non-
negative. From (2.12) and (2.13), it is clear that it is optimal for the insurer to supply no
coverage if the premium rate, κ < p
RH
and inﬁnite coverage if κ > p
RL
. In equilibrium, there-
fore, we must have κ ∈ [ p
RH
, p
RL
]. It also follows from the linearity of the objective function
and the fact that any insurance contract that makes nonnegative expected economic proﬁt
for an insurer is supplied that the participation constraint, (2.13), must bind in equilibrium,
that is, insurers make zero expected economic proﬁts. Consequently, if the insurer will not
default in the “bad” state where its asset fails, the zero economic proﬁt supply of insurance
coverage will completely hinge on the demand for insurance coverages because the insurers is
always solvency and its opportunity cost of holding internal capital is zero in this scenario.
Nevertheless, if the insurer will default in the “bad” state where its asset fails, the zero
economic proﬁt supply of insurance coverage for any insurance price κ ∈ [ p
RH
, p
RL
], which we
hereafter refer to as the competitive insurance supply for expositional convenience, is
C∗s (K,κ) =
qKRL
(1− q)(κRH − p) (2.14)
Lemma 3 (Competitive Insurance Supply) For κ ∈ ( p
RH
, p
RL
), the competitive insurance
supply level, C∗s (K,κ), (i) decreases with the insurance price, κ; (ii) increases with insurers’
internal capital, K; (iii) increases with insurers’ expected default probability, q; (iv) increases
with the asset return, RL, in the bad state; and (v) increases with the loss probability of
insurees, p.
An increase in the insurance price increases the expected return from supplying insurance
and, therefore, decreases the coverage level at which each insurer’s participation constraint,
(2.13), is binding. For given κ ∈ ( p
RH
, p
RL
), an increase in the insurer’s internal capital, asset
risk, or the aggregate risk of the pool of insurees lowers the expected returns from providing
insurance and, therefore, increases the competitive insurance supply level.
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Insurance Market Equilibria
We now derive the insurance market equilibrium that is characterized by the insurance price
(per unit of coverage) κ∗. The equilibrium satisﬁes the following conditions.
1. Given the equilibrium price κ∗, the face value of coverage supplied by each insurer is
C∗s (K,κ
∗) given by (2.14) and insurers make zero expected economic proﬁts.
2. Given the equilibrium price κ∗ and the supply level C∗s (K,κ
∗), the coverage purchased
by each insuree is C∗d(K,C
∗
s (κ
∗), κ∗) given by (2.7) and (2.9).
3. The equilibrium price κ∗ clears the market, that is, C∗d(K,C
∗
s (κ
∗), κ∗) = C∗s (K,κ
∗) =
C∗.
The following proposition characterizes the equilibria of the insurance market. We begin with
some necessary deﬁnitions. Deﬁne the expected return from the insurer’s risky technology,
ER = (1− q)RH + qRL. (2.15)
Deﬁne the excess demand function
F (K,κ) = C∗d(K,C
∗
s (κ), κ)− C∗s (K,κ), (2.16)
where C∗d(K,C
∗
s (κ), κ) is the demand function described by Lemma (1) and C
∗
s (K,κ) is given
by ((2.14)).
Proposition 6 (Insurance Market Equilibria)
• Suppose K ≤ K1, where K1is given by
F (K = K1, κ =
p
ER
) = 0 (2.17)
In equilibrium, insurers default in the “bad” state when their assets fail. The equilibrium
price, κ∗, satisﬁes:
F (K,κ∗) = 0. (2.18)
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• Suppose K > K1. In equilibrium, insurers do not default in the “bad” state where their
assets fail. The equilibrium insurance price is κ∗ = p
ER
and the equilibrium coverage
level, C∗, is given by
C∗ =
p
κ∗
− (1− p)(Rf − l)
1− κ∗Rf > l.
The above proposition shows that there are two possible equilibria that are determined
by the internal capital of insurers. When the internal capital is lower than the threshold
level K1, the representative insurer defaults in the “bad” state that is rationally foreseen by
all agents. When the internal capital is higher than the threshold K1, the insurer faces no
insolvency risk and this is rationally anticipated by all agents. The equilibrium insurance
price is simply determined by the aggregate loss proportion of insurees adjusted by the
expected return from the risky technology, p
ER
, at which the insurer’s participation constraint
(2.13) is always binding. The equilibrium insurance coverage is determined by the probability
and degree of individual loss of the insuree, expected returns to risky technology as well as
the returns to risk free asset.
We now focus on the more interesting ﬁrst scenario in which the representative insurer
with insuﬃcient internal capital may default after its technology fails. Many fundamental
factors; such as the internal capital endowed by the representative insurer, the risk of the
insurer’s investment portfolio and individual losses, will play signiﬁcant roles in jointly the
determination of market equilibrium. Figure 2.1 shows this equilibrium determination. As
analyzed earlier, both the demand curve for insurance and the competitive insurance supply
curve are downward slopping, and the demand curve is stepper than the competitive supply
curve due to the risk aversion of the insuree and risk neutrality of the insurer. The crossing
point of the two curves represents the insurance contracts traded in the equilibrium. In
other words, the equilibrium price, κ∗, and coverage level, C∗, satisfy the implicit equation
(2.24). In addition, the condition (2.25) ensures that the insurer, indeed, defaults in the bad
state. It also implies the equilibrium insurance price must be less than p
ER
;2 otherwise, the
2In general, the equilibrium insurance price can not exceed p
ER
. The intuition is that,if the insurer’s internal
capital is level greater than K1, price higher than pER will make the insurer positive economic proﬁt; if insurer’s
internal capital is less than K1, price higher than pER will make the insurer still solvent in the “bad” state where its
asset fails.
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Figure 2.1: Insurance Market Equilibrium
conjecture of insurer insolvency in its “bad” state will be violated. The condition for the
existence of the conjectured equilibrium is:
F (κ)|κ→ p
ER
= lim
κ→ p
ER
C∗d(κ,C
∗
s (κ))− lim
κ→ p
ER
C∗s (κ) > 0 (2.19)
As shown in the proof of Proposition 6 in Appendix, condition (2.19) are satisﬁed when
internal capital, K, is less than K1. Since an individual insurer can deviate and supply
contracts with lower premia that still ensure nonnegative economic proﬁts, the equilibrium
price must be the smallest κ∗ at which ∂F (κ)
∂κ
|κ∗ > 0.
We next identify the eﬀects of shocks in the economy on the equilibrium insurance price,
coverage level and social welfare.
2.3.2 The Eﬀects of Capital and Risk
Internal Capital
Internal capital inﬂuences the equilibrium insurance price through the demand for and supply
of insurance. By (2.14), an increase in internal capital increases the competitive insurance
supply level. There are both direct and indirect eﬀects of an increase in internal capital on the
demand for insurance. An increase in internal capital has the direct eﬀect of increasing the
demand for insurance because of the higher available capital to meet insurance claims. The
demand for insurance coverage is further enlarged by the insurees’ anticipation of the increase
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in the competitive supply of insurance with the increase in internal capital. Consequently,
the overall eﬀect of internal capital on the demand for insurance is also positive. The net
eﬀects of an increase in internal capital on the equilibrium insurance price depend on the
relative dominance of demand-side and supply-side eﬀects.
The equilibrium price κ∗ satisﬁes ∂F (K,κ)
∂κ
|κ=κ∗ > 0. The marginal eﬀects of internal capital
on the insurance price can be understood through its eﬀects on the excess demand function.
∂F (K,κ∗)
∂K
=
∂C∗d(K,C
∗
s , κ
∗)
∂K︸ ︷︷ ︸
direct eﬀect on demand
+
∂Cd(K,C
∗
s , κ
∗)
∂C∗s
∂C∗s (K,κ
∗)
∂K︸ ︷︷ ︸
indirect eﬀect on demand
− ∂C
∗
s (K,κ
∗)
∂K
.︸ ︷︷ ︸
direct eﬀect on competitive supply
The following proposition describes the eﬀects of internal capital on the equilibrium
insurance price.
Proposition 7 (The Eﬀects of Internal Capital)
• Suppose ∂F (K,κ
∗)
∂K
|K→0 > 0. There exist a threshold K˜ such that the equilibrium insurance
price κ∗ decreases with internal capital when K < K˜, and increases when K > K˜.
• Suppose ∂F (κ
∗,K)
∂K
|K→0 < 0, the equilibrium insurance price increases with the amount
of internal capital.
where the threshold level of internal capital, K˜, and its associated equilibrium κ˜ are jointly
determined by the following two equations:
∂F (K,κ∗)
∂K
|K=K˜,κ∗=κ˜; = 0 (2.20)
C∗d
(
K˜, C∗s (κ˜, K˜), κ˜,
)
= C∗s (K˜, κ˜). (2.21)
The above proposition shows that the insurance premium decreases with insurers’ internal
capital when the internal capital level is relatively low, while it increases with insurers’ inter-
nal capital when its level is relatively high. This result reconciles the conﬂicting predictions
on the relation between insurance price and capital in previous literature. The “capacity
constraint”theory relies on the assumption that insurance ﬁrms are free of insolvency. Win-
ter (1990) argues that insurance ﬁrms can only write the volume of business consistent with
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zero insolvency due to regulation. The total capital amount determines the capacity of the
insurance market. A signiﬁcant negative shock to insurer capital shrinks the supply of insur-
ance in imperfect capital markets. It follows that the insurance price increases and insurance
coverage declines while the demand for insurance is not aﬀected in the absence of insurer
insolvency. The “pricing of risky debt”theory incorporates the insolvency risk of insurance
ﬁrms. Cummins and Sommer (1996) theoretically show both a postive and negative relation
between price and a retroactive loss shock based on an optimal endogenous capitalization
structure of insurance ﬁrms.
As mentioned earlier, an increase in internal capital increases the insurance demand and
supply so the net impact depends on which of the two eﬀects is dominant. By (2.14), the
competitive supply of insurance is linear in the internal capital level. Because insurees are
risk-averse, the demand for insurance is concave in the insurer’s internal capital. Conse-
quently, the excess demand function, F (K,κ∗), is concave in the internal capital, that is, if
∂F (κ∗,K)
∂K
|K→0 > 0, then there exists, in general, a threshold level of internal capital, K˜, at
which the marginal eﬀect of internal capital on the excess demand is zero. It follows from
the concavity of the excess demand that the marginal eﬀect of internal capital on the excess
demand is positive for K < K˜ and negative for K > K˜. In other words, the risk aversion of
insurees causes the “demand eﬀect” of an increase in internal capital on the insurance price
to dominate the “supply eﬀect” for K < K˜ and vice versa for K > K˜. Hence, the equilib-
rium insurance premium varies in a U-shaped manner with the level of internal capital. If
∂F (κ∗,K)
∂K
|K→0 ≤ 0, then the marginal eﬀect of internal capital on the excess demand is always
non-positive so that the equilibrium insurance premium increases with internal capital.
The Eﬀects of Asset Risk
We now address the impacts of the representative insurer’s asset risk on the equilibrium
insurance price and coverage. The presence of asset induced insolvency complicates the
decisions on both the demand and supply sides. The impact of asset risk on insurance
supply indirectly inﬂuences insurance demand by aﬀecting the total capital available to the
insurer to meet liabilities in insolvency. Speciﬁcally, it follows from (2.14) that an increase
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Figure 2.2: Eﬀects of Internal Capital
in asset risk increases the competitive insurance supply level. Because insurees rationally
foresee the likelihood that their losses will not be fully indemniﬁed by insurers, the direct
eﬀect of an increase in asset risk on insurance demand is negative. The increase in the
competitive supply level with asset risk, however, increases the amount each insuree is able
to recover if it incurs a loss, but the insurer is insolvent. The indirect impact of an increase
in asset risk on insurancey demand is, therefore, positive. The net impact of asset risk on
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the equilibrium insurance price is determined via its eﬀect on the excess demand function,
∂F (κ∗, q)
∂q
=
∂Cd(κ
∗, q)
∂q︸ ︷︷ ︸
direct eﬀect on demand<0
+
∂Cd(κ
∗, q)
∂C∗s
∂C∗s
∂q︸ ︷︷ ︸
indirect eﬀect on supply>0
− ∂C
∗
s (κ
∗, q)
∂q︸ ︷︷ ︸
direct eﬀect on zero-economic-proﬁt supply>0
,
(2.22)
where we explicitly indicate the dependence of the demand and supply functions on the
asset risk parameter, q. The following proposition characterizes the eﬀect of asset risk on the
equilibrium insurance price and coverage.
Proposition 8 (The Eﬀects of Asset Risk) Suppose RL
p
< Rf . The equilibrium insur-
ance price increases with the asset risk, q, while the coverage level declines. If RL
p
≥ Rf ,
then the eﬀect of asset risk on the insurance price is ambiguous.
The intuition for the condition RL
p
< Rf is as follows.
RL
p
captures the marginal con-
tribution of an increase in the supply of insurance claims to the marginal utility of each
insuree in the default state, while Rf measures the marginal contribution of an increase in
insurance demand to marginal utility of each insuree in the default state. Consequently,
the condition RL
p
< Rf implies that the marginal contribution of insurance supply to the
marginal utility is less than that of insurance demand. In other words, one unit increase in
insurance supply will induce less than one unit increase in insurance demand. It follows that
the indirect eﬀect of an increase in asset risk on insurance demand through the increase in
the competitive insurance supply level is less than the direct eﬀect on the competitive sup-
ply level. Consequently, the excess demand decreases with asset risk so that the equilibrium
price increases.
2.4 Conclusions
We develop an equilibrium model of competitive insurance markets where insurers’ assets
may expose to both idiosyncratic shocks and aggregate shocks. We reconcile the conﬂicting
predictions in previous literature and provide new insights into the relationship between
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insurance premia and internal capital that stem from the inﬂuence of both demand and
supply side forces. The insurance price varies non-monotonically in a U-shaped manner with
the level of internal capital held by insurers. We also obtain additional testable implications
for the eﬀects of insurers’ asset risks on premia and the level of insurance coverage. We then
empirically test these results in next chapter.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. We ﬁrst consider the case where the representative insurer defaults in the “bad ”state
where its assets fail; that is, Cdp ≤ (K + κCs)RL. It follows that min
(
Cd,
(K+κCs)RL
p
)
=
(K+κCs)RL
p
. The necessary and suﬃcient ﬁrst order condition for insuree’s optimal choice of
coverage, C∗d , is simpliﬁed as equation (2.8). We next consider the other case where the
representative insurer does not default in the “bad ”where its assets fail; that is, Cdp >
(K + κCs)RL. It then follows that min
(
Cd,
(K+κCs)RL
p
)
= Cd. The optimal choice of
insurance coverage, therefore, has to satisfy equation (2.10).
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. We consider the case where the representative insurer defaults in the “bad”state
where its assets fail; that is, Cdp ≤ (K + κCs)RL. From the ﬁrst section in Lemma
1, we ﬁrst deﬁne the implicit function for the optimal demand for insurance coverage
G(C∗d , κ, p, q, Rf , RL, K,Cs) as
G(C∗d , κ, p, q, Rf , RL, K,Cs) =
p(1− q)(1− κRf )
W1
− pqκRf
W2
− (1− p)κRf
W3
(2.23)
whereW1 = (1−κC∗d)Rf− l+C∗d , W2 = (1−κC∗d)Rf− l+ (K+κC
∗
s )RL
p
, W3 = (1−κC∗d)Rf .
We then show how the optimal demand for insurance coverage varies with the fundamental
parameters of the model. It is easy to derive the signs for the following two equation:
∂G(Cd)
∂Cd
= −p(1− q)(1− κRf )
2
W 21
− pqκ
2R2f
W 22
− (1− p)κ
2R2f
W 23
< 0
∂G(Cd)
∂κ
= −p(1− q)Rf (Rf − l)
W 21
− pqRf (Rf − l +
KRL
p
)
W 22
− (1− p)R
2
f
W 23
< 0
It then follows that ∂C
∗
d
∂κ
< 0. The optimal demand for insurance C∗d , therefore, decreases
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with the insurance price. Similarly, it is easy to show the following:
∂G(Cd)
∂Rf
=− p(1− q)κ
W1
− p(1− q)(1− κRf )(1− κCd)
W 21
− pqκ(l −
(K+κCs)RL
p
)
W 22
− (1− p)κRf (Rf − Cd)
W 23
< 0
∂G(Cd)
∂K
=
pqκRf
RL
p
W 22
> 0
∂G(Cd)
∂Cs
=
pqκ2Rf
RL
p
W 22
> 0
∂G(Cd)
∂RL
=
qκRf (K + κCs)
W 22
> 0
∂G(Cd)
∂q
= −p(1− κRf )
W1
− pκRf
W2
< 0
Consequently, the optimal demand for insurance coverage, Cd, decreases with the return,
Rf , on the safe asset and the default probability of insurer’s risk assets, q, while increases
with insurer’s internal capital, K, the total face value of insurance contracts sold by the
insurer, Cs, and the insurer’s asset return in the low state, RL.
Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. We show the eﬀects of fundamental parameters on the competitive insurance supply
by checking the signs for the following equations based on the competitive insurance supply
in the case where insurer’s asset may fail in “bad” state, C∗s , given by equation (2.14). It is
obvious that
∂C∗s
∂κ
= − qKRLRH
(1− q)(κRH − p)2 < 0
∂C∗s
∂K
=
qRL
(1− q)(κRH − p) > 0
∂C∗s
∂q
=
KRL
(1− q)2(κRH − p) > 0
∂C∗s
∂RL
=
qK
(1− q)(κRH − p) > 0
∂C∗s
∂p
=
qKRL
(1− q)(κRH − p)2 > 0
It follows that the competitive insurance supply level, C∗s , decreases with the insurance price,
κ, while increases with insurers’ internal capital, K, the default probability of insurer’s risky
assets, q, the risky asset return, RL, in the bad state, and the loss probability of insurees, p.
Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. The insurance market equilibria depends on the internal capital level, K, held by
insurance companies. We ﬁrst conjecture that the representative insuree rationally foresees
that the representative insurer will default in the “bad” state if the insurer’s internal capital
level is below K1 (where K1 satisﬁes equation (2.17)), whereas the representative insuree
will anticipate that the representative insurer will still be solvent in the “bad” state if its
internal capital level is above K1. We then derive the equilibrium insurance contracts, which
consists of insurance price κ∗ and the face value of insurance coverage C∗ for each case, and
later validate that the equilibrium where insurers defaults in “bad” state cannot exist given
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any level of the internal capital level above the threshold level, K1.
1. Suppose K ≤ K1, we conjecture that the insurer is expected to default in the “bad”
state. It follows that the optimal demand for insurance coverage, C∗d , has to satisfy equation
(2.8), and the competitive insurance supply level, C∗s , has to satisﬁes (2.14). The equilibrium
insurance price, therefore, have to satisfy the following equation:
F (K,κ) = 0 (2.24)
where F (K,κ) is the excess demand function deﬁned as (2.16), and C∗s and C
∗
d have to satisfy
(2.8) and (2.14) separately.
In addition, to ensure the solution, κ, to equation (2.24) to be the equilibrium insurance
price, it also needs to satisfy
pC∗ ≥ (K + κ∗C∗)RL (2.25)
where C∗ is the face value of equilibrium insurance coverage such that C∗s = C
∗
d = C
∗.
We next show that, given any K less or equal to K1, there exists an equilibrium insurance
contract which includes the equilibrium insurance price κ∗ and equilibrium face value of
insurance coverage C∗.
(2.14) implies that the equilibrium insurance price, κ∗, need to lie in the interval
(
p
RH
, p
RL
)
because the insurer would like to supply either zero or inﬁnite amount of insurance coverage
for any price outside this region. Further, from (2.25) and (2.14), it is easy to show that the
equilibrium insurance price κ∗ also has to satisfy κ∗ ≤ p
ER
, where ER = (1 − q)RH + qRL;
otherwise, the conjecture will be violated due to the violation of (2.14).
To show the existence of κ∗ that satisﬁes (2.24), we check the boundary conditions for
κ ∈
(
p
RH
, p
ER
]
.
The derivative of F (K,κ) with respect to κ for any K less or equal to K1; that is,
∂F (κ∗|K)
∂κ∗
=
∂C∗d(κ
∗, C∗s (κ
∗)|K)
∂κ∗
+
∂C∗d(κ
∗, C∗s (κ
∗)|K)
∂C∗s
∂C∗s (κ
∗|K)
∂κ∗
− ∂C
∗
s (κ
∗|K)
∂κ∗
(2.26)
According to the proof of Lemma 2, it is easy to show
∂F (κ)
∂κ
=
∂C∗d(κ,C
∗
s (κ))
∂κ︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+
∂C∗d(κ,C
∗
s (κ))
∂C∗s︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
∂C∗s (κ)
∂κ︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
− ∂C
∗
s (κ)
∂κ︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
(2.27)
Howver, the sign of ∂F (κ)
∂κ
is indeterminate.
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We then check the sign of F (κ) at the lower boundary of κ.
lim
κ→ p
RH
F (κ|K) = lim
κ→ p
RH
C∗d(κ,C
∗
s (κ)|K)− lim
κ→ p
RH
C∗s (κ|K)
It is obvious that limκ→ p
RH
C∗s (κ|K) → +∞ for any K such that 0 < K ≤ K1 because
insurers have to sell a very large ﬁnite amount so that condition (2.13)is binding. In addition,
C∗d |κ→ pRH = C
∗
d(κ→ pRH |K) <
RH
p
< +∞. It follows that limκ→ p
RH
F (κ|K) < 0
To ensure the existence of equilibrium insurance price κ∗, a necessary condition is that
F (κ|K)|κ= p
ER
= lim
κ= p
ER
C∗d(κ,C
∗
s (κ)|K)− lim
κ= p
ER
C∗s (κ|K) ≥ 0 (2.28)
We now examine that condition (2.28) is satisﬁed for any K, such that 0 < K ≤ K1.
In other words, we have to show that F (K|κ = p
ER
) is a decreasing function and K1 is the
solution to (2.17).
It is obvious that
F (K → 0|κ = p
ER
) = C∗d(K → 0|κ =
p
ER
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
− C∗s (K → 0|κ =
p
ER
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
→0
> 0 (2.29)
When κ = p
ER
, the insurance claims received by each insuree who incurs losses are equal
to the insurance claims seld by each insurer. Thus, under the reasonable conditionRf >
RL
p
∂F (K|κ = p
ER
)
∂K
=
∂C∗d(K|κ = pER)
∂C∗s
∂C∗s
∂K
− ∂C
∗
s
∂K
< 0 (2.30)
Conditions (2.29) and (2.30) imply that there exists a solution K1 to the equation (2.17).
Condition (2.30) also implies for any K ≤ K1,F (K|κ = pER) ≥ 0. Thus when K < K1,there
exists at least one equilibrium insurance price. However, since ∂EU(κ
∗)
κ∗ < 0, we focus on the
equilibrium with the smallest price κ; that is at which ∂F (κ)
∂κ
|κ∗ > 0 and social welfare are
maximized.
2. SupposeK > K1. As we shown in previous case, whenK > K1, (2.28) will be violated.
It follows that the solution to equation (2.24) will be greater than p
ER
. Consequently, the
conjecture that equilibrium where the insurer will default in its “bad” state cannot be main-
tained. We now conjecture that in equilibrium insurers will not default in its “bad” state.
According to previous argument, insuree’s demand for insurance coverage is not binding. In
this case, the insurers face no opportunity cost and earns zero proﬁt at the actuarially fair
price p
ER
, at which the insurer is indiﬀerent between selling insurance and no insurance. The
equilibrium insurance coverage is, then determined by insurance demands, which satisﬁes
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(2.10), where κ = p
ER
. It is easy to see the solution to (2.10) is C∗ =
(
p− (1−p) Rf−lER
p
−Rf
)
ER
p
.
We next check that the insurance contracts κ∗ = p
ER
and C∗ are the equilibrium contracts.
In other words, we have to check whether (2.25) holds. (2.25) implies that the insurer’s
internal capital has to satisfy K > C∗( p
RL
− p
ER
); that is,
K >
(
p− (1− p) Rf − l
ER
p
−Rf
)
ER
p
(
p
RL
− p
ER
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
let=K2
We next show that K1 = K2. According to condition(2.17), we have C∗d(K1|κ →
p
ER
) − qK1RL
(1−q)( p
ER
RH−p) = 0. Thus K1 = C
∗
d(K1|κ → pER)
(1−q)( p
ER
RH−p)
qRL
. Since the equilibrium
insurance demand C∗d(K = K1) is equal to C
∗(K > K2). In other words, C∗d(K = K1) =
C∗ =
(
p− (1− p) Rf−lER
p
−Rf
)
ER
p
. Now we have K1 =
(
p− (1− p) Rf−lER
p
−Rf
)
ER
p
(1−q)( p
ER
RH−p)
qRL
. It
is easy to show that
(1−q)( p
ER
RH−p)
qRL
= p
RL
− p
ER
; therefore, K1 = K2. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. To examine the eﬀects of internal capital of the insurer on the insurance price, we
integrate its eﬀects on both the competitive supply of insurance coverage and the demand
for insurance coverage. In other word, we need to determine the sign of ∂κ
∗
∂K
= −
∂F (κ∗,K)
∂K
F (κ∗,K)
∂κ∗
.
From (2.24), we have
∂F (κ∗)
∂K
=
∂Cd(κ
∗)
∂K︸ ︷︷ ︸
direct eﬀect on demands
+
∂Cd(κ
∗)
∂C∗s
∂C∗s (κ
∗)
∂K︸ ︷︷ ︸
indirect eﬀect on demands
− ∂Cs(κ
∗)
∂K︸ ︷︷ ︸
direct eﬀect on zero-expected-proﬁt supply
Following the results of Lemma 2 and 3, it is easy to show the following
∂Cd(κ
∗)
∂C∗s
∂C∗s
∂K
=
pqκ2Rf
RL
p
p(1−q)(1−κRf )2
W 21
W 22 + pqκ
2R2f +
(1−p)κ2R2f
W 23
W 22
qRL
(1− q)(κ∗RH − p) > 0
∂Cs(κ
∗)
∂K
=
qRL
(1− q)(κ∗RH − p) > 0
∂C∗d
∂K
= −
∂G(C∗d )
∂K
∂G(C∗d )
∂Cd
=
pqκRf
RL
p
W 22
p(1−q)(1−κRf )2
W 21
+
pqκ2R2f
W 22
+
(1−p)κ2R2f
W 23
> 0
Thus we have
∂F (κ∗, K)
∂K
=
∂Cd(κ
∗, K)
∂K︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+
∂Cd(κ
∗, K)
∂C∗s
∂C∗s (κ
∗, K)
∂K︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
− ∂Cs(κ
∗, K)
∂K︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
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Further, we know ∂F (κ
∗,K)
∂κ∗ > 0. Thus the sign of
∂F (κ∗,K)
∂K
is indeterminate, and the eﬀects
of internal capital on the equilibrium price is non-monotonic. However, the excess insurance
demand function is concave because
∂2F (κ∗, K)
∂K2
=
∂2Cd(κ
∗, K)
∂K2
+
∂
(
∂Cd(κ
∗,K)
∂C∗s
∂C∗s
∂K
)
∂K
=−
2W2pqκ
∗Rf RLp
[(
p(1−q)(1−κ∗Rf )2
W 21
+
(1−p)κ∗2R2f
W 23
)
∂W2
∂K
]
[
p(1−q)(1−κ∗Rf )2
W 21
W 22 + pqκ
∗2R2f +
(1−p)κ∗2R2f
W 23
W 22
]2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
direct eﬀect part<0
−
2W2pqκ
∗2Rf RLp
[(
p(1−q)(1−κ∗Rf )2
W 21
+
(1−p)κ∗2R2f
W 23
)
∂W2
∂K
]
∂C∗s
∂K[
p(1−q)(1−κ∗Rf )2
W 21
W 22 + pqκ
∗2R2f +
(1−p)κ∗2R2f
W 23
W 22
]2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
indirect eﬀect part<0
< 0
Thus the marginal eﬀect of internal capital K on insurance demand Cd is decreasing,
while the marginal eﬀect on competitive insurance supply is constant. Consequently, the
overall eﬀects are decreasing.
Therefore, suppose ∂F (κ
∗,K)
∂K
|K→0 > 0, there may exist a threshold level of K˜ and the
corresponding insurance price κ˜ such that the equilibrium price κ∗ decrease with the amount
of internal capital when K < K˜, while increase with an increase in the amount of internal
capital when K > K˜; suppose ∂F (κ
∗,K)
∂K
|K→0 < 0, the equilibrium price increases with the
amount of internal capital, where K˜ and κ˜ are jointly determined by the following two
equations
∂F (κ∗, K)
∂K
(
κ∗ = κ˜;K = K˜
)
= 0
C∗d
(
κ˜, K˜, C∗s (κ˜, K˜)
)
= C∗s (κ˜, K˜)
Proof of Proposition 8
Proof. To examine the eﬀects of default risk of insurer’s risky assets on the equilibrium
insurance price, we integrate its eﬀects on both the competitive supply of insurance coverage
and the demand for insurance coverage. In other word, we need to determine the sign of
We check the sign of ∂κ
∗
∂q
= −
∂F (κ∗)
∂q
F (κ∗)
∂κ∗
. According to the proof of Lemma 2 and 3, it is easy to
show the following:
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∂F (κ∗)
∂q
=
∂Cd(κ
∗)
∂q
+
∂Cd(κ
∗)
∂C∗s
∂C∗s
∂q
− ∂C
∗
s (κ
∗)
∂q
=−
p(1−κRf )
W1
+
pκRf
W2
p(1−q)(1−κRf )2
W 21
+
pqκ2R2f
W 22
+
(1−p)κ2R2f
W 23
+
pqκ2Rf
RL
p
− pqκ2R2f
p(1−q)(1−κRf )2
W 21
W 22 + pqκ
2R2f +
(1−p)κ2R2f
W 23
W 22︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0 if
RL
p
<Rf
JRL
(1− q)2(κRH − p)
−
p(1−q)(1−κRf )2
W 21
W 22 +
(1−p)κ2R2f
W 23
W 22
p(1−q)(1−κRf )2
W 21
W 22 + pqκ
2R2f +
(1−p)κ2R2f
W 23
W 22
JRL
(1− q)2(κRH − p)
Given condition that RL
p
< Rf , we have
∂F (κ∗)
∂q
< 0. It follows that ∂κ
∗
∂q
> 0. The equilibrium
insurance price, thus, increases with an increase in the asset risk. In other words, when
RL
p
< Rf , the indirect eﬀects of asset risk on insurance demand is oﬀset by the direct eﬀects
on competitive insurance supply. Consequently, the demand eﬀects dominates so that the
equilibrium price goes up and the equilibrium coverage shrinks.
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Chapter 3
Empirical Evidence of Internal
Capital, Asset Risk and Insurance
Prices
3.1 Introduction
The traditional theories of the determination of insurance prices (Myers and Cohn, 1986)
suggest that insurance premia are given by the discounted value of the expected costs of
providing coverage given perfect capital markets. However, insurance prices ﬂuctuate in
diﬀerent phases of the insurance underwriting cycle, which suggests that capital market im-
perfections may make it diﬃcult for insurance ﬁrms to adjust their capital holdings freely and
immediately after a large negative shock that depletes their total capital. Financial capital
is the major determinant of insurance output capacity. Moreover, insurers are required by
regulation, such as “Risk Based Capital” or “Solvency II” regime, to hold suﬃcient equity
capital. Equity capital can serve as a buﬀer against the risk of insurer insolvency, especially
when their loss portfolios are imperfectly diversiﬁed and/or returns on their assets shrink
dramatically. The amount of equity capital held by insurers, thus, crucially aﬀects insurance
prices and reﬂects insurers’ ability of meeting its loss payments.
A signiﬁcant stream of the literature examines how insurer capital aﬀects insurance prices,
but generates contrasting predictions regarding the relationship both theoretically and em-
pirically. The “capacity constraints” theory focuses on the supply of insurance and predicts
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a negative relationship between insurance price and capital(Gron, 1994; Winter, 1994). The
“capacity constraints” theory assume insurers are free of insolvency risk because insurance
ﬁrms are constrained by either inﬁnite risk averse policy holders or regulator. Insurance
ﬁrms, thus can only supply the amount of insurance that is consistent with zero insolvency
risk. Equity capital, therefore, plays a signiﬁcant role in determining the insurance capacity.
Large negative shocks signiﬁcantly reduce insurer capital, thereby pushing up the insurance
price and reducing the insurance coverage, and vice versa. The empirical studies supporting
this negative relation use pre 1980s industry data or short-tail insurance line data. The “ca-
pacity constraint” theories can explain the underwriting cycle, where “hard market” periods
following portfolio losses that are characterized by rising prices and reduced coverage alter-
nate with “soft market” periods where there is excess capital that results in falling insurance
prices and increased availability of insurance.
However, individual insurance ﬁrms are exposed to signiﬁcant insolvency risk. Insur-
ance prices should, therefore, also reﬂect the ﬁnancial quality of insurers that is signiﬁcantly
aﬀected by available equity capital held by insurance ﬁrms. The “risky debt” theories in-
corporate the default risk of insurers, but predict a positive relationship between insurance
price and capital (Doherty and Garven, 1986; Cummins, 1998; Cummins and Danzon, 1997).
Insurers with suﬃciently higher amount of capital may be less likely to default after loss
portfolio shocks or asset shocks, thereby leading to a relatively higher insurance price. The
positive relation is also supported by long-tail lines of insurance data (Gron, 1994).
Extant studies primarily examine the relation between capital and price by focusing on
either the supply or demand side. Insurance prices, are, however, endogenously determined
in the equilibrium that reﬂects both the demand and supply of insurance. Recall that in
Chapter 2, we derive a uniﬁed equilibrium model of competitive insurance markets incor-
porating both demand side and supply side factors aﬀecting insurance market, as well as
the asset and liability sides of insurance ﬁrm’s balance sheets. We predict a non monotonic
U-shaped relationship between insurance prices and the level of internal capital held by in-
surance ﬁrms. Speciﬁcally, the equilibrium insurance price decreases with a positive shock
to internal capital when the internal capital is below a threshold, but increases when the
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internal capital is above the threshold. The results are driven by equilibrium eﬀects, and
could potentially reconcile the conﬂicting results predicted by the previous studies. The in-
surance demand is concave in the internal capital due to the risk aversion of insurees, while
the insurance supply is linear in the level of internal capital due to the risk neutrality of
insurance ﬁrms. Therefore, there exists a threshold level of internal capital, at which the
eﬀects of internal capital on insurance demand is equal to that on insurance supply. When
the internal capital is below the threshold level, the demand eﬀects dominate the supply
eﬀects, thereby leading to a negative relationship between insurance price and internal cap-
ital. When the internal capital is above the threshold level, the supply eﬀects dominate the
demand eﬀects, thereby causing a positive relationship between insurance price and internal
capital.
The U-shaped relation between the insurance price and internal capital could potentially
reconcile the conﬂicting results predicted by previous theories. In this chapter, our empirical
analysis, using industry-level data including all lines of property and casualty insurance
for the period 1992-2012, supports the hypothesis that the relationship between insurance
price and internal capital is U-shaped. The results in this chapter are consistent with the
theoretical predictions of the equilibrium model in Chapter 2.
The results of Chapter 2 also predict that an increase in the asset investment risk increases
the insurance price. An increase in the asset default risk increases the opportunity costs of
insurance ﬁrms’ internal capital, and also increases the chance that the policyholders do not
receive full insurance protection. The equilibrium price is expected to rise by integrating the
eﬀects of asset risk on both insurers and policyholders.
Section 2 discusses the related literature. Section 3 introduces the data we use in this
study, explains the main variables estimation, and discuss the main testable hypotheses
and regression speciﬁcation. Section 4 shows the results that support the hypothesis of the
relation between insurance price and internal capital as well as the relation between insurance
price and asset risk, using aggregate level data for all lines of property and casualty insurance
during the period 1992-2012. Section 5 concludes this chapter.
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3.2 Related Literature
Our paper is related to two lines of literature that investigate the relation between capital and
price. The ﬁrst branch proposes the “capacity constraint”theory, which assumes that insurers
are free from insolvency risk. The prediction of an inverse relation between insurance price
and capitalization crucially hinges on the assumption that insurers are limited by regulations
or by inﬁnite risk averse policyholders so that they can only sell an amount of insurance
that is consistent with zero insolvency risk (e.g.,Gron, 1994; Winter, 1994). Winter(1994)
explains the variation in insurance premia over the “insurance cycle”using a dynamic model.
Empirical tests using industry-level data prior to 1980 support the predicted inverse relation
between insurance capital and price, but data from the 1980s do not support the prediction.
Gron (1994) ﬁnds support for the result using data on short-tail lines of business. Cagle and
Harrington (1995) predict that the insurance price increases by less than the amount needed
to shift the cost of the shock to capital given inelastic industry demand with respect to price
and capital.
Another signiﬁcant stream of literature—the “risky corporate debt” theory—incorporates
the possibility of insurer insolvency and predicts a positive relation between insurance price
and capitalization (e.g., Doherty and Garven, 1986; Cummins, 1988). The studies in this
strand of the literature emphasize that, because insurers are not free of insolvency risk
in reality, the pricing of insurance should incorporate the possibility of insurers’ ﬁnancial
distress. Higher capitalization levels reduce the chance of insurer default, thereby leading
to a higher price of insurance associated with a higher amount of capital. Cummins and
Danzon (1997) show evidence that the insurance price declines in response to the loss shocks
in the mid-1980s that depleted insurer’s capital using data from 1976 to 1987. While the
“capacity constraint” theory concentrates on the supply of insurance, “the pricing of risky
debt” theory focuses on capital’s inﬂuence on the quality of insurance ﬁrms and, therefore,
the demand for insurance. The empirical studies support the mixed results for diﬀerent
periods and business lines.
We complement the above streams of the literature by showing that the insurance price
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is negatively related to internal capital when internal capital is relatively low, but positively
related with internal capital is relatively high.
Our paper is also related to the studies that examine the relation between capital holdings
and risk taking of insurance companies. Cummins and Sommer (1996) empirically show
that insurers hold more capital and choose higher portfolio risks to achieve their desired
overall insolvency risk using data from 1979 to 1990. It is argued that insurers respond to
the adoption of RBC requirements in both property-liability and life insurance industry by
increasing capital holdings to avoid regulation costs, and by investing in riskier assets to
obtain high yields (e.g.,Baranoﬀ and Sager, 2002; Shim, 2010). Insurers are hypothesized to
choose risk levels and capitalization to achieve target solvency levels in response to buyers’
demands for safety. Our paper ﬁts into the literature by studying the relationship between
assets risk and insurance price. Higher default risk assets may potentially increase insurance
price driven by the eﬀects on both competitive insurance supply and policy holder’s demand
decisions. Our empirical results support this positive relation.
3.3 Data and Variable Construction
3.3.1 Data
The primary data source for the study is taken from the regulatory annual statements ﬁled by
property and casualty insurers with the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
(NAIC) from 1992 to 2012. The main analysis is based on the aggregate level data for
insurance lines. The NAIC data includes detailed information on the net premium written,
net losses incurred and expenses for each line of insurance. We can simple add up those
variables across all individual insurance ﬁrms (including stock, mutual and other types of
ﬁrms) to get the aggregated market level data for these variables. Other aggregated market
level variables, such as dividends paid to the policy holder, assets and so on, however, are
calculated in two steps since NAIC data provide no information on those variables for each
insurance line. In general, we ﬁrst divide the value of those variables into each insurance line
for each insurer relying on the corresponding weights, which will be discussed later in detail.
76
We then generate the aggregated market level data for each line by integrating all insurance
ﬁrms for that line, respectively. The market level variables generated by the above two steps
include the premiums, losses, expenses, surplus, dividends paid to policy holders and each
type of assets.
To calculate the variance covariance matrix of insurer’s asset portfolios, we use the index
data including S&P 500, Moody’s corporate bond total return, National Association of
Real Estate Investment Trusts total return(NAREIT), the Merrill Lynch mortgage backed
securities total return, and 30 days US Treasury bill rate from bloomberg terminal database.
The key variables we need to construct for this analysis are the price of insurance, capital
and asset allocated into each line, and the measure of asset risk.
3.3.2 Estimating the Price of Insurance
The standard price measure in the insurance literature (e.g., Winter, 1994; Cummins and
Danzon, 1997; Cummins, Lin and Phillips, 2006) is the economic premium ratio (EPR).
The EPR for a line of insurance is deﬁned as the ratio of the premiums for each line to the
expected losses discounted at risk-free rate associated for that line, that is:
EPRit =
NPWit −DIVit − Eit∑T
t=1(NLIit + LAEit)/(1 + rt)
t
(3.1)
where
EPRit =the economic premium-to-liability ratio for line i at time t,
NPWit =net premiums written for line i at time t,
DIVit =dividends paid to policyholders for line i at time t,
Eit =underwriting expenses incurred for line i at time t,
NLIit =net loss cash ﬂow for line i at time t after the policy is issued,
LAEit =net loss adjustment expense cash ﬂow for line i at time t,
rt =US Treasury spot-rate of interest for maturity of t,
T =the number of periods in the loss cash ﬂow stream.
In our analysis, we assume the loss cash ﬂow tail and the loss adjustment expense cash
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ﬂow tail are constantly distributed over the sample period. We, then use the incurred loss for
line i at year t to measure the expected losses for the policy issued at year t. Thus the ERLi
is calculated separately for each line and for year over the sample period. The net premium
written NPWit and net loss incurred NLIit for line i of insurance at time t are calculated by
summing NPWijt and NLIijt across all the insurers j, respectively. However, as mentioned
earlier, the NAIC annual statements do not have detailed information of dividends paid to
policy holders, underwriting expenses incurred and net loss adjustment expense for each
line. We adopt the two steps to generate the market level data for these variables. First,
for each insurance company each year, the dividends paid to policy holders, underwriting
expenses incurred and net loss adjustment expense incurred are divided into each insurance
line based on the corresponding allocation weight, that is, the proportion of premiums written
for each line over the total premium written by that company. We then aggregate each of
those variables over all insurance ﬁrms each year. We apply all the aggregated market level
variables into equation (3.1); and therefore construct the measure of insurance price for each
insurance line at each year over the sample period.
3.3.3 Estimating the Capital Allocations by Line
We measure the amount of internal capital held by insurers using the amount of surplus from
the annual statement page of “liabilities, surplus and other funds” at the end of previous
ﬁling year. We need to calculate capital allocations by lines of business for each insurance
ﬁrm since we only have the information of total ﬁrm surplus. There are several capital
allocation methodology.
We ﬁrst use “the weighted liability” method. We divide the total ﬁrm surplus into
diﬀerent business lines weighted by the ratio of the net losses incurred of each line to the
total net losses incurred of the ﬁrm. Speciﬁcally, the capital held for line i of insurance ﬁrm
j at the statement ﬁling year t is
Cijt = Cjt
NLIijt∑I
i NLIijt
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Figure 3.1: Asset Returns Index
Asset Class Indices
Stocks S&P 500 Total Return Index
Bonds Moody’s Corporate Bond Total Return Index
Real Estate National Association of Real Estate
Investment Trusts Total Return(NAREIT)
Mortgage Merrill Lynch Mortgage Backed Securities Total Return
Cash or Equivalence 30 days US Treasury Bill Rate
where
Cjt =total surplus of insurance ﬁrm j at ﬁrm at ﬁling year t
NLIijt =net loss incurred of line i of insurance ﬁrm j at ﬁling year t
We then add up the capital of each line i across all the insurance ﬁrms who provide the
line i; that is, Cit =
∑J
j Cijt
3.3.4 Estimating the Asset Risk
Insurance companies invest their funds including internal capital and collected premiums
to a variety of asset classes. An insurance ﬁrm’s asset portfolio can be well captured by
the combination of bonds, stocks, real estates, mortgages, cash and other cash equivalent
investments. The existing literature has two alternative proxies for asset risk of insurance
ﬁrms (Baranoﬀ e.t. al, 2007; Eling and Marek, 2013).
One measure is opportunity asset risk (OAR), which is based on the volatility of as-
set returns to calibrate investment risk in portfolio theory. OAR measures the gains or
losses presented by the insurer’s allocation choices among diﬀerent asset categories in its
investment portfolios. We assume each insurance ﬁrm could invest its actual investment
portfolio in the corresponding investment indices as summertime in Table 3.1. We calculate
the variance-covriance matrix Σt for the hypothetical index investment portfolio using the
monthly returns of each investment index during the period from 1992 to 2012.
We then assume each line of insurance is operated as a single representative ﬁrm, and
derive the asset portfolios held by the single representative ﬁrm. Similar to the calculation
of capital allocation by line of insurance business, we also apply the two steps to the asset
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allocation for each of the ﬁve major types of assets. We ﬁrst divide the total asset values into
diﬀerent lines of insurance for each insurance company. This allocation is weighted by the
ratio of the net loss incurred of each insurance line to the total net incurred losses of that
company. For each line of insurance, we next add up assets allocated to that line over all the
insurance ﬁrms that supply that line. We, therefore, have constructed the asset portfolios
for each representative line of insurance.
For each insurance line i, portfolio weights are assumed to be constant through-
out the year. We can calculate the assets portfolio weight vector in year t,
(αstocks, αbonds, αreal estates, αmortgages, αcash)it, where each component represents the ratio of
each type of asset value over the total portfolio value. The volatility of returns to the asset
portfolios for each line of insurance, then can be calculated by:
(αstocks, αbonds, αreal estates, αmortgages, αcash)it ∗ Σ ∗ (αstocks, αbonds, αreal estates, αmortgages, αcash)′it
The OAR is then calculated as the logarithm of the annualized standard deviation for each
insurance line at each year over the sample period.
Another measure is regulatory asset risk (RAR), which is related to the C-1 component
of risk-based capital from the regulatory tradition of concern with solvency, minimize the
risk of failure or ruin from investment activities. Speciﬁcally,
RAR = log(
C-1 measure of risk-based capital
total invested assets
)
where
C-1 measure of risk-based capital
= bond ∗ 0.065 + stocks ∗ 0.3 + realestate ∗ 0.1 +mortgage ∗ 0.03 + cash ∗ 0.003
3.3.5 Regression Analysis
We test the following two hypotheses in this chapter.
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Hypothesis 1 Insurance price is positively related to the level of internal capital when
internal capital is relatively low, while insurance price is negatively related to the level of
internal capital when internal capital is relatively high.
Hypothesis 2 Insurance price is positively related to the asset risk of insurance ﬁrms’
investment portfolios.
To test the above two hypotheses, the basic regression speciﬁcation is as follows:
Pit = β0 + β1Cit + β2C
2
it + β3Rit + γ
′Xi + νt + ηi + it
where Pit = proxy for insurance price for line i of business in year t
Cit = proxy for the internal capital which is the surplus allocated in line i in year t− 1
C2it = square term of the proxy for internal capital which is the surplus allocated in line
i in year t− 1
Rit = proxy for the asset risk allocated in line i in year t
Xi = vector of control variables for the line i
νt = line ﬁxed eﬀect for year t over the sample periods.
ηi = year ﬁxed eﬀect for line i
We control line ﬁxed eﬀects and time ﬁxed eﬀects in our regression analysis. Cit is
calculated as the logarithm of insurance surplus allocated in line i at the end of year t− 1.
C2it is the square term of Cit. We thus expect that the coeﬃcient of Cit is negative while the
coeﬃcient of C2it is positive. Moreover, we anticipate the coeﬃcient of Rit is positive.
For the robustness check of Hypothesis 1, we divide our sample into two groups: one
group where the capital allocated to lines of insurance is above the threshold level 85 trillion
dollars1, and the other group where capital allocated to lines of insurance is below the
threshold. The regression speciﬁcation for both groups is as follows:
Pit = β0 + β1Cit + β3Rit + γ
′Xi + νt + ηi + it
1The threshold level is determined by the coeﬃcient of the ﬁrst regression equation
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We expect the sign of the β1 is positive for the ﬁrst group with higher level of internal
capital, while negative for the second group with lower level of internal capital.
3.4 Empirical Results
Summary statistics for the variables included in the regression analysis are shown in Table
3.1 based on the aggregated line level data.
The regression results based on the lines of property and liability insurance are presented
in table 2. Several speciﬁcations are presented. The results in table 2 provide strong support
for both hypotheses. Without adding both the proxy for internal capital and the square term,
the coeﬃcients are not signiﬁcant. Both the simple OLS and Fixed Eﬀects models predict
signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcient of the proxy for internal capital and positive coeﬃcient of
the square term. It supports the non-monotonic relationship between insurance price and
internal capital. It shows that the insurance price is negatively correlated with internal
capital at ﬁrst, and then positively correlated with internal capital as the level of internal
capital is above certain threshold.
Besides, the results presented in table 2 also support the Hypothesis 2. The coeﬃcient
of asset investment portfolio risk is signiﬁcantly positive, which suggests that the insurance
price is positively related with asset investment portfolio risk. It supports our theoretical
predictions in Charter 2
The results based on subgroup robustness test for hypothesis 1 are presented in table
3. We divide the total sample into two subgroups: one with internal capital level below
8.5 billion, and the other one with capital level above 8.5 billion. For the low internal
capital group, the sign of the coeﬃcient of internal capital is signiﬁcantly negative. In
contrast, for the high internal capital group, the sign of the coeﬃcient of internal capital is
signiﬁcantly positive. The results in table 3 show further support for the hypothesis about
the relationship between insurance price and internal capital in the U-shaped manner. It
could potential reconcile the conﬂicting results predicted by the previous empirical studies
either focusing on line level or ﬁrm level analysis.
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3.5 Conclusion
The unsolved “puzzle” of the relationship between insurance price and internal capital are
supported by either supply driven theory or demand driven theory. The existing empirical
studies also show mixed support. The non monotonic relationship predicted by the equilib-
rium eﬀects, however could potentially reconcile the controversial results theoretically. We
study all the property and casualty industry lines in periods from 1992 to 2012. We show
that the internal capital decrease with an increase in the surplus of insurance ﬁrms at the
end of the previous year when the surplus is lower than 8.5 billion, and then increase when
the surplus is higher than 8.5 billion. Our results provide support for the hypothesis of a
U-shaped relationship between internal capital and insurance price. Our results also provide
evidence for the positive relationship between asset portfolio risk and insurance price.
3.6 Appendix
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics for Line Level Data: 1992-2012
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Net Premium Written 588 24,186,545,526 43,054,623,809 89,298,769 236,284,657,645
Loss Adjustment Expenses 588 4,218,219,734 7,838,413,599 −3,978,015 71,068,656,869
Underwriting Expenses 588 5,238,684,419 10,292,170,313 −3,331,025 62,159,308,812
Asset Risk 588 −1.630 0.454 −2.787 −0.669
Insurance Price 588 1.406 1.714 0.045 21.857
Internal Capital 560 22.706 1.773 17.706 27.431
Assets 588 7.776 14.277 0.018 207.864
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Table 3.2: Regression Results at Aggregate Line Level: 1993 - 2012
Dependent variable:
Insurance Price
OLS Panel
Fixed Eﬀect Fixed Eﬀect Fixed Eﬀect
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Internal Capital −3.899∗∗∗ −0.202 −3.619∗∗
(0.906) (0.147) (1.467)
Internal Capital Square 0.082∗∗∗ −0.004 0.078∗∗
(0.021) (0.003) (0.033)
Asset Size −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Asset Risk (OAR) 1.354∗∗∗ 1.296∗∗ 1.300∗∗ 1.374∗∗
(0.479) (0.536) (0.536) (0.535)
Constant 49.939∗∗∗
(10.047)
Observations 560 560 560 560
R2 0.139 0.057 0.055 0.067
Adjusted R2 0.102 0.051 0.050 0.061
Residual Std. Error 1.641 (df = 536)
F Statistic 3.758∗∗∗ (df = 23; 536) 1.389 (df = 22; 510) 1.360 (df = 22; 510) 1.579∗∗ (df = 23; 509)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 3.3: Regression Results for Two Subgroups with Diﬀerent Levels of Internal Capital
Dependent variable:
Insurance Price by Line
Low Internal Capital High Internal Capital
OLS Panel FE OLS Panel FE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Internal Capital −0.562∗∗∗ −0.602∗∗∗ 0.028 0.536∗∗
(0.131) (0.208) (0.121) (0.243)
Asset Size −0.000 −0.000∗ −0.000 −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Asset Risk (OAR) 0.676 1.053 1.714∗∗∗ 0.713
(0.780) (0.805) (0.567) (0.619)
Constant 15.218∗∗∗ 3.678
(2.901) (2.832)
Observations 302 302 258 258
R2 0.182 0.143 0.120 0.119
Adjusted R2 0.118 0.122 0.038 0.100
Residual Std. Error 1.874 (df = 279) 1.306 (df = 235)
F Statistic 2.827∗∗∗ (df = 22; 279) 1.957∗∗∗ (df = 22; 259) 1.458∗ (df = 22; 235) 1.329 (df = 22; 217)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Chapter 4
Insurance Solvency Regulation
4.1 Introduction
There are three sources of ineﬃciencies in the unregulated economy as analyzed in the
previous section that stem from the fact that markets are incomplete. First, each insurer
makes its insurance supply decisions and investment decisions incorporating its individual
asset return distribution without fully internalizing the potential correlation of asset returns
across insurers arising from the fact that a proportion τ of insurers is exposed to a common
shock. Without considering aggregate risk, insurers may hold insuﬃcient liquidity reserves
and over-invest their capital in risky assets. Second, insurees’ idiosyncratic losses may not
be fully insured by insurers when insurers’ internal capital is relatively low. Insurees bear
insurers’ default risk driven by the asset side of their balance sheets when there are no
eﬀective risk sharing mechanisms among insurers to share their asset risk because there are
no traded Arrow-Debreu securities contingent on insurers’ individual asset realizations or
the realization of the aggregate shock. Third, insurees do not have direct access to the risky
assets with insurance ﬁrms also serving as intermediaries that channels the insurees’ capital
into more productive risky assets. Insurers, however, cannot eﬀectively share the investment
risk with insurees through the insurance policies that only protect insurees’ losses without
combining investment returns to insurees.
The equilibrium price and insurance coverage level in the unregulated economy, therefore,
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do not internalize the externalities created by aggregate risk of insurers’ assets and the lack of
instruments that achieve full risk-sharing. Consequently, we potentially have a misallocation
of insuree capital to the purchase of insurance and misallocation of insurer capital to safe and
risky assets. Regulatory intervention could improve allocative eﬃciency by internalizing the
externalities created by aggregate risk, imposing necessary liquidity reserve requirements to
inﬂuence insurers’ investment decisions, and also providing risk sharing mechanisms through
ex post taxation transfers among insurers.
In this chapter, we ﬁrst proceed to analyze the implications of our framework for the
solvency regulation of insurers by analyzing the benchmark “ﬁrst best” economy in which
aggregate risk is fully internalized and there is perfect risk-sharing among insurees and
insurers. We derive the Pareto optimal allocation of insurer capital between the safe asset
(liquidity reserves) and risky assets as well as the sharing of risk between insurers and
insurees. When the aggregate risk is low, there is suﬃcient aggregate capital in the economy
to provide full insurance to insurees so that insurers bear all the aggregat risk. Further,
because the expected return from risky assets exceeds the risk-free return, it is optimal to
allocate all capital to risky assets so that neither insurers nor insurees have holdings in the
risk-free asset. When aggregate risk takes intermediate values, insurees cannot be provided
with full insurance because of the limited liability of insurers in the bad aggregate state.
Consequently, insurers and insurees share aggregate risk, but it is still optimal to exploit the
higher expected surplus generated by the risky assets so that all the capital in the economy is
invested in the risky assets. When aggregate risk is very high, however, risk-averse insurees
would bear excessively high losses in the bad aggregate state if all capital were invested in
risky assets. Consequently, both insurees and insurers hold positive liquidity reserves, and
share aggregate risk.
We also demonstrate that a regulator/social planner can implement the ﬁrst-best alloca-
tion policies through a combination of comprehensive insurance policies sold by insurers that
combine insurance with investment, reinsurance, a minimum liquidity requirement, and ex
post budget-neutral taxation that is contingent on the aggregate state. The comprehensive
insurance policies provide direct access to the risky assets for insurees. Reinsurance achieves
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risk-sharing among insurers, while ex post taxation transfers funds from solvent to insolvent
insurers. The minimum liquidity requrement, which is only imposed when aggregate risk
exceeds a threshold, forces insurers to maintain the ﬁrst best level of liquidity reserves.
4.2 Benchmark First Best Scenario
We begin by studying a hypothetical benchmark scenario that full internalizes the ineﬃcien-
cies in the unregulated economy due to aggregate risk and imperfect risk sharing mechanisms
among insurees and insurers. In this benchmark economy, there is perfect sharing of the id-
iosyncratic risk of insuree losses among insurees and idiosyncratic risks of asset returns among
insurers. Consequently, insurers and insurees are only exposed to the aggregate shock. With-
out loss of generality, we can assume that there is a single representative risk averse insuree
with 1 unit of the capital good and a single representative risk neutral insurer with K units
of the capital good. Both the insuree and the insurer have access to risky assets that may
be subject to aggregate shocks.
We examine eﬃcient (Pareto optimal) allocations in the benchmark economy. Pareto
optimal allocations must only be contingent on the aggregate state of the economy. With
probability q, the economy is in the “bad” aggregate state where a proportion τ of risky
investments earn a low return RL. In the bad aggregate state, the return per unit of capital
invested isML, whereML = (1−q)(1−τ)RH+q(1−τ)RL+τRL. With probability 1−q , the
economy is in the “good” aggregate state where a proportion τ of the risky investments earn
a high rate of return RH . In the good aggregate state, the return per unit capital invested
is MH , where MH = (1− q)(1− τ)RH + q(1− τ)RL + τRH . The insurer provides insurance
to cover the insuree’s loss, but also shares the aggregate risk associated with investments in
the risky assets.
Let CH and CL be the representative insurer’s combined returns from investing capital in
the risky technology and selling insurance in the good and bad aggregate states, respectively.
The representative insurer invests a proportion α of its capital in the safe asset and the
remaining proportion 1 − α in the risky asset. The insuree invests a proportion β of its
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capital in safe assets and the rest in purchasing risky insurance. Let DH and DL be the net
payoﬀs received by the representative insuree in the good and bad state, respectively, which
includes individual losses and returns from risky assets and/or insurance. We focus on the
Pareto optimal allocation in which the representative insurer receives its autarkic payoﬀ.
Consequently, the planning problem is
max
β,α,DL,DH
q ln(βRf +D
L)︸ ︷︷ ︸
bad aggregate state
+ (1− q) ln(βRf +DH)︸ ︷︷ ︸
good aggregate state
(4.1)
subject to
αKRf + [(1− q)CH + qCL] = K[(1− q)RH + qRL] (4.2)
DL + CL = [(1− β) + (1− α)K]ML − pl (4.3)
DH + CH = [(1− β) + (1− α)K]MH − pl (4.4)
αKRf + C
L ≥ 0 (4.5)
αKRf + C
H ≥ 0 (4.6)
Equations (4.3) and (4.4) capture the fact that the total payoﬀs to the representative insuree
and insurer in the two aggregate states must equal the aggregate payoﬀ from the investments
net of the loss incurred by the insuree. Because there is perfect sharing of insuree loss risks,
the total loss incurred by the representative insuree is pl. Equations (4.5) and (4.6) are
limited liability constraints for the representative insurer in the two aggregate states.
The following proposition shows the optimal asset allocation between risky and safe assets,
and the optimal risk allocation among the representative insuree and insurer.
Proposition 9 (Benchmark Asset allocation and Risk Sharing among Insurees
and Insurers)
1. Suppose K ≥ ER−RL
RL
. Regardless of the value of τ , β∗ = 0, α∗ = 0, that is, both the
insuree and insurer invest nothing in the safe asset. The representative insuree is fully
insured against losses and investment returns, that is, the returns to the insuree per
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unit of capital invested in the good and bad aggregate states are equal.
DH = DL = D∗ = ER− pl (4.7)
2. Suppose
(a) (i.) either q < 0.5, and K < min
(
ER−RL
RL
,
(ER−pl)(ER−Rf )
ER·Rf
1−q
1−2q
)
, or (ii.) q > 0.5
and K < ER−RL
RL
(b) (ER +Rf −RH −RL)Rf + pl(ER−Rf ) < 0
• When τ ≤ τ1, where τ1 = K·ER(1+K)(ER−RL) , β∗ = 0, α∗ = 0 , that is, both the
insuree and insurer invest nothing in the safe asset. The representative insuree
is fully insured against losses and investment returns, that is, the returns to the
insuree per unit of capital invested in the good and bad aggregate states are equal,
same as (4.7)
• When τ1 < τ < τ2, where
τ2 =
(1− q)(1 +K)(RH +RL − 2ER)ER + q · ER ·K(ER−RL)
2(1− q)(1 +K)(RH − ER)(ER−RL)
+
√√√√√√√√√√√
(
(1− q)(1 +K)(RH +RL − 2ER)ER + q · ER ·K(ER−RL)
)2
−4
(
(1− q)(1 +K)(RH − ER)(ER−RL)
)((
qK
−(1− q)(1 +K)) · ER + pl(1− q))(ER−Rf )
2(1− q)(1 +K)(RH − ER)(ER−RL) ,
β∗ = 0, and α∗ = 0, that is, the insuree and insure continue to invest nothing
in the safe asset. Insurees are imperfectly insured; the returns per unit of capital
invested in the good and bad aggregate states are, respectively
DH = (1 +K)MH − pl − ER
1− qK, D
L = (1 +K)ML − pl
The insurer’s limited liability constraint 4.5 binds, and its returns per unit of capital
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of invested in the in good and bad aggregate states are, respectively
CH =
ER
1− qK C
L = 0
• when τ > τ2, there is nonzero investment in the safe asset with
β∗ + α∗K =
(1 +K)(ER ·Rf −MHML) + pl(ER−Rf )− qER·K·(Rf−M
L)
1−q
(MH −Rf )(Rf −ML)
The insuree is imperfectly insured, and its returns per unit of capital invested in
the good and bad aggregate states are, respectively
DH =
(
1 +K − (β∗ + α∗K))MH − pl − ER
1− qK + α
∗KRf
DL =
(
1 +K − (β∗ + α∗K))ML − pl + α∗KRf
The insurer’s limited liability constraint 4.5 binds, and its returns per unit of capital
of investing in the good and bad aggregate states are, respectively
CH =
ER
1− qK − α
∗K ·Rf CL = −α∗K ·Rf
The above proposition shows the eﬀects of aggregate risk on the optimal asset allocation
and risk sharing among insurees and insurers. When the internal capital, K, is greater than
the threshold level ER−RL
RL
1, insurers always have adequate capital to insure its promised
payments to insurees even in the “bad” state where aggregate shocks to the asset occur.
Thus it is optimal to invest all social capital in risky assets to produce the highest expected
returns from investments. Insurees are fully insured by insurers, and the aggregate shocks
are completely borne by insurers.
However, suppose the internal capital, K, is below the threshold level, there are three
subcases relying on the measurement of aggregate shocks, τ . When the aggregate risk τ is
1 ER−RL
RL
≥ K1. When insurers sell comprehensive insurance contracts, the minimum level of internal capital to
keep insurer solvency in “bad” state is higher than that in the unregulated economy
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relatively low, insuree’s idiosyncratic losses and returns from investment in risky assets can
be fully insured by insurers. Thus it is optimal to invest all social capital in risky assets
to produce the highest expected returns from investments as the situation where insurers
are endowed with suﬃcient capital. When the aggregate risk measure τ takes intermediate
values, there may not be enough capital in the bad aggregate state to cover insuree losses.
The representative insurer, therefore, defaults and its limited liability constraint in that
state is binding. It is, however, still optimal for all capital to be invested in risky assets.2
When the aggregate risk τ is above a high threshold, however, the marginal increase in the
expected return from investments in the risky assets is insuﬃcient to compensate for the
disutility to the representative insuree arising from the imperfect insurance payoﬀs due to
aggregate shocks. It is, therefore, optimal to hold a certain amount in safe assets, that
is, to maintain a nonzero liquidity buﬀer. Figure 4.1 summarizes the relationship between
aggregate risk measure τ and the optimal investment in safe assets. It reﬂects the tradeoﬀs
between total allocative returns from investments and the risk sharing among insurees and
insurers. When the aggregate risk is low, the total allocative capital reaches the maximum
level, and insurees are fully insured, and insurers take all aggregate risk. When the aggregate
risk is in the intermediate level, the total allocative capital also reaches the highest level, and
insurees are imperfectly insured, and insurees and insurers share the aggregate asset risk.
When the aggregate risk is high, the marginal decrease in the total allocative capital due
to some investment in safe assets trades oﬀ the wedge between insurance claims received by
insurees in good and bad aggregate states.
We next analyze how the benchmark level of investment portfolios and risk sharing can
be implemented through regulatory intervention.
2When asset default probability is suﬃciently high and insurer’s internal capital is relatively low, the marginal
increase in total expected allocative capital returns from risky assets may be insuﬃcient to compensate the disutility
arising from the imperfect insurance payoﬀs due to aggregate shocks. It, thus may be optimal to hold some safe
assets as in the third case.
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Figure 4.1: Aggregate Risk and Liquidity Reserves Buﬀer
4.3 Regulatory Intervention
As discussed earlier, the ineﬃcient investment allocation and imperfect risk-sharing in the
unregulated economy relative to the ﬁrst-best benchmark arises from three factors: the
imperfect sharing of idiosyncratic loss risk among insurees, imperfect asset risk sharing among
insurees and insurers, and the incomplete internalization of the eﬀects of aggregate risk on
insurers’ investment portfolios and the provision of insurance. The above three factors
provide regulators the room to reduce the market ineﬃciency using comprehensive tools.
4.3.1 Taxation and Idiosyncratic Risk
In the unregulated economy, there is no eﬀective idiosyncratic risk sharing mechanism among
insurers. It follows that insurees bear the default risk driven by the idiosyncratic component
of an insurer’s asset risk when the insurer’s internal capital is suﬃciently low. In the regulated
economy, the regulators can serve as a “reinsurer” by taxing the insurers whose risky assets
succeed and reinsuring the insurers whose risky assets fail. This ex post taxation contingent
on the aggregate state is very similar to “insurance guarantee funds” run by state regulators.
This mechanism can fully insure insurer’s idiosyncratic asset risk, but not the aggregate risk.
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Taxation and reinsurance, therefore, depend on the aggregate state of the economy. Let THS
and THF be the taxation transfers from successful and failed insurers, respectively in the
good aggregate state. Also, let THS and T
H
F be the taxation transfers from successful and
failed insurers, respectively in the bad aggregate state. A positive transfer means receiving
a subsidy, while a negative transfer means a tax payout. Thus the tax balance condition in
both good and bad aggregate state are:
(
(1− q)(1− τ) + τ)THS + q(1− τ)THF = 0
(1− q)(1− τ)TLS +
(
q(1− τ) + τ)TLF = 0
4.3.2 Comprehensive Insurance and Optimal Risk Sharing
In the unregulated economy, insurers provide insurance to cover individual insuree losses,
and also serve as ﬁnancial intermediaries to channel insuree capital to more productive
assets. Because asset markets are incomplete, there is imperfect sharing of aggregate asset
risk among insurees and insurers. In the regulated economy, we can implement the ﬁrst best
allocation if insurers sell comprehensive insurance policies that combine loss protection and
investment returns. Let dHl /d
H
nl be the returns per unit of capital invested in comprehensive
insurance policies in the good aggregate state where insurees incur idiosyncratic loss/no loss,
and dLl /d
L
nl be the returns per unit of capital invested in comprehensive insurance policies in
the bad aggregate state where insurees incur idiosyncratic loss/no loss.
4.3.3 Liquidity Requirement and Aggregate Risk
Proposition 9 and Figure 4.1 show the optimality of investing a nonzero amount of the total
capital in the safe asset when the measure of aggregate shocks is above the threshold, τ2.
The regulator can enforce this asset allocation by imposing a minimum liquidity requirement
when aggregate risk is high enough. It is worth emphasizing here that what matters for the
allocation of capital is the total amount, β∗ + α∗K, in the safe asset. The regulator can also
implement this outcome through ex ante taxation. Speciﬁcally, the regulator can tax insuree
capital at the rate β∗, insurer internal capital at the rate α∗, and invest the proceeds in the
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safe asset. The regulator can then use the proceeds from this investment to make transfers
to insurers and insurees and, thereby, implement the eﬃcient allocation.
4.3.4 Comprehensive Regulatory Intervention
The following proposition describes how the above comprehensive tools can be used to achieve
the ﬁrst best benchmark level of investment allocation and aggregate risk sharing among
insurees and insurers.
Proposition 10 (Regulatory Intervention) Suppose
1. (i.) either q < 0.5, and K < min
(
ER−RL
RL
,
(ER−pl)(ER−Rf )
ER·Rf
1−q
1−2q
)
, or (ii.) q > 0.5 and
K < ER−RL
RL
2. (ER +Rf −RH −RL)Rf + pl(ER−Rf ) < 0
• When τ ≤ τ1, the regulator imposes no liquidity requirement. Insurees and insurers
invest everything in risky assets so that
β∗ = 0, α∗ = 0
The optimal returns per unit of capital invested in the comprehensive insurance policy
in the good and bad aggregate states are the same, that is
dHnl = d
L
nl = ER− pl dHl = dLl = ER + (1− p)l
Insurees are fully insured against idiosyncratic losses and asset risk. Insurers bear
idiosyncratic and aggregate asset risk through the following taxation scheme
TLS = (1 +K)(M
L −RH)
TLF = (1 +K)(M
L −RL)
THS = (1 +K)(M
H −RH)
THF = (1 +K)(M
H −RL)
(4.8)
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• When τ1 < τ ≤ τ2, the regulator imposes no liquidity requirement. Insurees and insurers
invest everything in risky assets so that
β∗ = 0, α∗ = 0
The optimal returns per unit of capital invested in the comprehensive insurance policy
in the good and bad aggregate states are unequal and are given by
dHnl = (1 +K)M
H − ER
1− qK − pl d
L
nl = (1 +K)M
L − pl (4.9)
dHl = (1 +K)M
H − ER
1− qK + (1− p)l d
L
l = (1 +K)M
L + (1− p)l (4.10)
Insurers bear the idiosyncratic loss risk of insurees as well as idiosyncratic asset risk
through the taxation scheme as 4.8. Aggregate risk is, however, shared among insurees
and insurers through the comprehensive insurance policy 4.9.
• When τ > τ2, the regulator imposes a liquidity requirement on insurers and insurees
that is given by
α∗ ∈
(
max
{
(1 +K)(ER ·Rf −MHML) + pl(ER−Rf )− qER·K·(Rf−M
L)
1−q
K(MH −Rf )(Rf −ML) −
1
K
, 0
}
, 1
)
β∗ =
(1 +K)(ER ·Rf −MHML) + pl(ER−Rf )− qER·K·(Rf−M
L)
1−q
(MH −Rf )(Rf −ML) − α
∗K,
Alternately, the regulator can levy ex ante taxes at the rate α∗for insurers and β∗for
insurees and invest the proceeds in the safe asset.
• The optimal return per unit of capital invested in the comprehensive insurance policy
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in the good and bad aggregate states are unequal and given by
dHnl =
(1 +K)MH + (β + αK)(Rf −MH)− ER1−qK − β∗Rf − pl
1− β∗
dLnl =
(1 +K)ML + (β∗ + α∗K)(Rf −ML)− β∗Rf − pl
1− β∗ (4.11)
dHl =
(1 +K)MH + (β + αK)(Rf −MH)− ER1−qK − β∗Rf + (1− p)l
1− β∗
dLl =
(1 +K)ML + (β∗ + α∗K)(Rf −ML)− β∗Rf + (1− p)l
1− β∗ (4.12)
Insuree’ idiosyncratic losses and idiosyncratic asset risk are fully taken by insurers
through the taxation scheme as follows:
TLS = (1 +K − (β∗ + α∗K))(ML −RH)
TLF = (1 +K − (β∗ + α∗K))(ML −RL)
THS =
(
1 +K − (β∗ + α∗K))(MH −RH)
THF =
(
1 +K − (β∗ + α∗K))(MH −RL)
(4.13)
aggregate risk is shared by insurees and insurers through the comprehensive insurance
policy as 4.12.
The above proposition implies that the comprehensive tools can be used by regulators
to reduce the ineﬃciencies of unregulated economy. Ex post taxation contingent on the
aggregate state, plays the role of “insurance guarantee funds”, which induces insurers to
fully absorb insurees’ idiosyncratic loss risk when their internal capital is relatively low.
Comprehensive insurance policies combining insurance with investment, together with ex
post taxation, enhance aggregate risk sharing between insurees and insurers. The liquidity
requirement adjusts ineﬃciencies arising from insurer’s misallocation of their assets and the
optimal aggregate risk sharing among insurees and insurers. Thus, when aggregate risk is
high enough, the optimal investment allocation reﬂects the tradeoﬀ between the growth of
total assets and insurees’ aversion to aggregate risk.
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4.4 Conclusions
We derive insights into the solvency regulation of insurers by deriving the Pareto optimal
allocation of insurer capital to liquidity reserves and risky assets as well as risk sharing among
insurees and insurers. We show that, when aggregate risk is below a threshold, it is Pareto
optimal for insurers and insurees to hold zero liquidity reserves, insurees are fully insured,
and insurers bear all aggregate risk. When aggregate risk takes intermediate values, both
insurees and insurers still hold no liquidity reserves, but insurees partially share aggregate
risk with insurers. When the aggregate risk is high, however, both insurees and insurers
hold nonzero liquidity reserves, and insurees partially share aggregate risk with insurers. We
demonstrate that the eﬃcient allocation can be implemented through regulatory intervention
that comprises of comprehensive insurance policies that combine insurance and investment,
reinsurance, a minimum liquidity requirement when aggregate risk is high, and ex post
budget-neutral taxation and subsidies contingent on the realized aggregate state.
In future research, it would be interesting to develop a dynamic structural model of
insurance markets. The analysis of such a model that is suitably calibrated to data could
generate quantitative insights into the optimal regulation of insurance markets.
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4.5 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 9
Proof. We show the Pareto optimal allocation planning problem is maximizing (4.1) subject
to (4.2),(4.3),(4.4),(4.5) and (4.6).
We substitute DL and DH with CH and CH using the relationships implied by(4.3) and
(4.4). (4.6) can be omitted if CH ≥ CL. Let λ and µ are the Lagrangian multiplier associate
with (4.2) and (4.5), respectively. Thus
L = q ln(βRf +WL − CL) + (1− q) ln(βRf +WH − CH)
+ λ{αKRf + [(1− q)CH + qCL]−K[(1− q)RH + qRL]}+ µ{αKRf + CL}
The ﬁrst order condition with respect to CH and CL are, respectively:
∂CL :− q
βRf +WL − CL + λq + µ = 0
∂CH :− 1− q
βRf +WH − CH + λ(1− q) = 0
(4.14)
We ﬁrst suppose µ = 0. Equations (4.14) imply WH −CH = WL−CL, and the relationship
between CH and CL is
CH = CL + [(1− β) + (1− α)K]τ(RH −RL)
Plugging above relation into equation (4.2), we have
CL∗ = K
(
ER− αRf
)− (1− q)[(1− β) + (1− α)K]τ(RH −RL)
CH∗ = K
(
ER− αRf
)
+ q[(1− β) + (1− α)K]τ(RH −RL)
D∗ = DH∗ = DL∗ = (1− β)ER− αK(ER−Rf)− pl
where ER = (1− q)RH + qRL as deﬁned in Section 2.3.1. The insuree is fully insured, and
its utility is:
EUinsuree = ln
(
βRf +D
∗)
= ln
(− β(ER−Rf )− αK(ER−Rf ) + ER− pl)
We now derive the optimal level of investment in safe assets.
max
α,β
ln
(− (β + αK)(ER−Rf ) + ER− pl) (4.15)
subject to
αKRf + C
L∗ ≥ 0
0 ≤ β + αK ≤ 1 +K
Since the objective function, (4.15), is a decreasing function of (β+αK), thus β∗+α∗K = 0.
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The above constraint (4.16) can be simpliﬁed as follows:
β + αK ≤ KER
(ER−RL)τ − (1 +K)
Suppose K ≥ ER−RL
RL
, KER
(ER−RL)τ − (1 +K) ≤ 0 for any value of τ . In other words, (4.16)
can be omitted, and the optimal level of investment in safe assets is zero. The Part 1 of
Proposition 9, thus holds.
Suppose K < ER−RL
RL
, KER
(ER−RL)τ − (1+K) ≤ 0 still holds for any τ such that τ ≤ τ1 where
τ1 =
K·ER
(1+K)(ER−RL) . Similarly, (4.16) can also be omitted, and the optimal level of investment
in safe assets is zero. The ﬁrst case of Part 2 of Proposition 9 holds.
However, if τ > τ1, then the optimal level of investment in safe assets is determined by
(4.16) when it binds. which contradicts with µ = 0. Consequently, there does not exist the
case where insurees are fully when τ > τ1.
Now we suppose µ > 0, and limited liability constraint of insurers in “bad” aggregate
state, (4.5), binds; that is αKRf + CL = 0. Thus CL = −αKRf and CH = ER−(1−q)αRf1−q K.
It is easy to show
DL = WL − CL = [1 +K − (β + αK)]ML − pl + αKRf
DH = WH − CH = [1 +K − (β + αK)]MH − pl − ER
1− qK + αKRf
Thus insurees’ total capital in “good” and “bad” aggregate states, receptively, are
NL = βRf +D
L = (1 +K)ML + (β + αK)(Rf −ML)− pl
NH = βRf +D
H = (1 +K)MH + (β + αK)(Rf −MH)− pl − ER
1− qK
We now solve for the optimal level of investment in safe assets
maxα,β q ln
(
(1 +K)ML + (β + αK)(Rf −ML)− pl
)
+ (1− q) ln((1 +K)MH
+(β + αK)(Rf −MH)− pl − ER1−qK)
subject to
0 ≤ β + αK ≤ 1 +K
The Lagrangian function is
L = q ln ((1 +K)ML + (β + αK)(Rf −ML)− pl)+ (1− q) ln((1 +K)MH
+ (β + αK)(Rf −MH)− pl − ER
1− qK)− λ1(1 +K − (β + αK))− λ2(β + αK)
The ﬁrst order condition with respect to (β + αK) that is
q(Rf −ML)
NL
− (1− q)(M
H −Rf )
NH
+ λ1 − λ2 = 0
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Suppose λ1 = λ2 = 0, then
q(Rf−ML)
NL
=
(1−q)(MH−Rf )
NH
That is
q(Rf −ML)
(
(1 +K)MH + (β + αK)(Rf −MH)− pl − ER
1− qK
)
= (1− q)(MH −Rf )
(
(1 +K)ML + (β + αK)(Rf −ML)− pl
)
Rearrange the above equations, we have
β + αK =
(1 +K)(ER ·Rf −MHML) + pl(ER−Rf )− qER·K·(Rf−M
L)
1−q
(MH −Rf )(Rf −ML)
Now we have to check 0 < β + αK < 1 +K.
We ﬁrst whether β + αK > 0 holds, that is
(1− q)(1 +K)(RH − ER)(ER−RL)τ 2 −
(
(1− q)(1 +K)(RH +RL − 2ER)ER
+q · ER ·K(ER−RL)
)
τ +
((
qK − (1− q)(1 +K)) · ER + pl(1− q))(ER−Rf ) > 0
We need τ ≤ τ ′2 or τ ≥ τ2 to make above inequality hold, where
τ ′2 =
(1− q)(1 +K)(RH +RL − 2ER)ER + q · ER ·K(ER−RL)
2(1− q)(1 +K)(RH − ER)(ER−RL)
−
√√√√√√√√√√√
(
(1− q)(1 +K)(RH +RL − 2ER)ER + q · ER ·K(ER−RL)
)2
−4
(
(1− q)(1 +K)(RH − ER)(ER−RL)
)((
qK
−(1− q)(1 +K)) · ER + pl(1− q))(ER−Rf )
2(1− q)(1 +K)(RH − ER)(ER−RL)
τ2 =
(1− q)(1 +K)(RH +RL − 2ER)ER + q · ER ·K(ER−RL)
2(1− q)(1 +K)(RH − ER)(ER−RL)
+
√√√√√√√√√√√
(
(1− q)(1 +K)(RH +RL − 2ER)ER + q · ER ·K(ER−RL)
)2
−4
(
(1− q)(1 +K)(RH − ER)(ER−RL)
)((
qK
−(1− q)(1 +K)) · ER + pl(1− q))(ER−Rf )
2(1− q)(1 +K)(RH − ER)(ER−RL)
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We now compare τ1 and τ ′2. When τ = τ1, we check the value of β + αK|τ=τ1 , that is,
β + αK|τ=τ1 =
(1 +K)(ER ·Rf −MHML) + pl(ER−Rf )− qER·K·(Rf−M
L)
1−q
(MH −Rf )(Rf −ML)
that is whether
(1 +K)(ER ·Rf −MHML) + pl(ER−Rf )− qER ·K · (Rf −M
L)
1− q < 0
The above inequality is equivalent to(
1 +K
1− 2q
1− q
) · ER ·Rf < ER2 − pl(ER−Rf )
Therefore, when q < 0.5, and K < min
(
ER−RL
RL
,
(ER−pl)(ER−Rf )
ER·Rf
1−q
1−2q
)
, or when q > 0.5, and
K < ER−RL
RL
, we have β + αK|
τ=
(
K
1+K
)(
ER
ER−RL
) < 0. In other words, τ ′2 < τ1.
We next check when τ = 1, whether β + αK < 1 +K.
When τ = 1, we have ML = RL, and MH = RH .
β + αK − (1 +K) = (1 +K)(ER ·Rf −RHRL) + pl(ER−Rf )−
qER·K·(Rf−RL)
1−q
(RH −Rf )(Rf −RL) − (1 +K)
=
(1 +K)(ER ·Rf −RHRL) + pl(ER−Rf )
− qER·K·(Rf−RL)
1−q + (1 +K)(Rf −RH)(Rf −RL)
(RH −Rf )(Rf −RL)
To show β + αK − (1 +K) > 0 which is equivalent to show
(1+K)(ER·Rf−RHRL)+pl(ER−Rf )−qER ·K · (Rf −RL)
1− q +(1+K)(Rf−RH)(Rf−RL) < 0
that is,
pl(ER−Rf )+
(
(ER+Rf−RH−RL)Rf
)
< K
( q
1− qER(Rf−RL)−(ER+Rf−RH−RL)Rf
)
Suppose
(ER +Rf −RH −RL)Rf + pl(ER−Rf ) < 0
β+αK−(1+K)|τ=1 > 0 holds. In other words, τ2 < 1. Therefore, when τ > τ2, the optimal
level of investment in safe assets is
β∗ + α∗K =
(1 +K)(ER ·Rf −MHML) + pl(ER−Rf )− qER·K·(Rf−ML)1−q
(MH −Rf )(Rf −ML)
Insuree and insurer both hold positive amount of safe assets, insuree and insurer share the
aggregate shocks. However, when τ1 ≤ τ ≤ τ2, it is optimal that insurees and insurers still
invest nothing in safe assets, that is, β∗ + α∗K = 0, but they share the aggregate asset
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shocks.
Proof of Proposition 10
Proof. We ﬁrst consider the case when τ < τ1, the representative insuree is fully insured,
we have the following system of equations for each state:
βRf + d
H
nl(1− β) = ER− (β + αK)(ER−Rf )− pl
βRf + d
L
nl(1− β) = ER− (β + αK)(ER−Rf )− pl
βRf + d
H
l (1− β)− l = ER− (β + αK)(ER−Rf )− pl
βRf + d
L
l (1− β)− l = ER− (β + αK)(ER−Rf )− pl
Thus
dHnl = d
L
nl =
(1− β)ER− (β + αK)(ER−Rf )− pl
1− β d
H
l = d
L
l =
(1− β)ER− (β + αK)(ER−Rf ) + (1− p)l
1− β
So insuree’s utility is
max
β
ln
(
ER− (β + αK)(ER−Rf )− pl
)
subject to
0 ≤ β ≤ 1
Thus
β∗ = 0
Regulator’s problem is
max
α
ln
(
ER− αK(ER−Rf )− pl
)
subject to
0 ≤ α ≤ 1
Thus
α∗ = 0
Therefore, the optimal insurance contract is
dL∗nl = d
H∗
nl = ER− pl dL∗nl = dH∗nl = ER + (1− p)l
Now we solve for the optimal tax/subsidy depends on the realized aggregate states. In bad
aggregate state, the successful insurer’s payoﬀ is
(
1+K
)
RH+T
L
S −DL, while failed insurer’s
payoﬀ is
(
1 +K
)
RL + T
L
F −DL
each insurer does not bear idiosyncratic risk(
1 +K
)
RH + T
L
S −DL =
(
1 +K
)
RL + T
L
F −DL
= CL∗ = K · ER− (1− q)(MH −ML)(1 +K)
⇒
{
TLS = C
L∗ + dL − (1 +K) ·RH = (1 +K)(ML −RH) < 0
TLF = C
L∗ + dL − (1 +K) ·RL = (1 +K)(ML −RL) > 0
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Thus the tax/subsidy for insurers whose assets success or fail, respectively, are:{
TLS = (1 +K)(M
L −RH)
TLF = (1 +K)(M
L −RL)
The tax budget is balance neutral because
(
q(1 − τ) + τ) · TLF + (1 − q)(1 − τ) · TLS =
(1 +K)(ML −ML) = 0.
Similarly, if in the good aggregate state, successful insurer’s payoﬀ is
(
1+K
)
RH+T
H
S −dH ,
while failed insurer’s payoﬀ is
(
1+K
)
RL+T
H
F −dH . each insurer does not bear idiosyncratic
shocks, and the following equation holds.(
(1 +K − t ·K)RH + THS − dH = (1 +K − t ·K)RL + THF − dH
= CH∗ = K · ER + q(MH −ML)(1 +K)
⇒
{
THS = C
H∗ + dH − (1 +K) ·RH = (1 +K)(MH −RH) < 0
THF = C
∗
H + d
H − (1 +K) ·RL = (1 +K)(MH −RL) > 0
The taxes/subsidies for insurers whose assets succeed or fail are{
THS = (1 +K)(M
H −RH)
THF = (1 +K)(M
H −RL)
In good aggregate state, the taxation is also budget neutral since
(
(1− q)(1− τ)+ τ) ·THS +
q(1− τ) · THF = (1 +K)(MH −MH) = 0 Therefore, the taxation schem is
TLS = (1 +K)(M
L −RH)
TLF = (1 +K)(M
L −RL)
THS = (1 +K)(M
H −RH)
THF = (1 +K)(M
H −RL)
We now consider the second case where τ1 ≤ τ ≤ τ2, insurees cannot be perfectly insured,
the insuree’s payoﬀs in the two aggregate states are:
βRf + d
L(1− β)− pl = (1 +K)ML + (β + αK)(Rf −ML)− pl
βRf + d
H(1− β)− pl = (1 +K)MH + (β + αK)(Rf −MH)− pl − ER
1− qK
The insuree’s problem is:
max
β
(1− q) ln ((1 +K)MH + (β + αK)(Rf −MH)− pl − ER
1− qK
)
+ q ln
(
(1 +K)ML + (β + αK)(Rf −ML)− pl
)
subject to
0 ≤ β ≤ 1
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Thus
L = (1− q) ln ((1 +K)MH + (β + αK)(Rf −MH)− pl − ER
1− qK
)
+q ln
(
(1 +K)ML + (β + αK)(Rf −ML)− pl
)
+ λ1β + λ2(1− β)
It follow that the ﬁrst order condition is:
(1− q)(Rf −MH)
(1 +K)MH + (β + αK)(Rf −MH)− pl − ER1−qK
+
q(Rf −ML)
(1 +K)ML + (β + αK)(Rf −ML)− pl + λ1 − λ2 = 0
that is Suppose λ2 = λ1 = 0, that is 0 < β < 1, However, we can solve the solution to
function
q(Rf −ML)
(1 +K)ML + (β + αK)(Rf −ML)− pl =
(1− q)(MH −Rf )
(1 +K)MH + (β + αK)(Rf −MH)− pl − ER1−qK
such that β∗ < 0, which violates 0 < β < 1.
Since q(Rf−M
L)
(1+K)ML+(β+αK)(Rf−ML)−pl −
(1−q)(MH−Rf )
(1+K)MH+(β+αK)(Rf−MH)−pl− ER1−qK
is a decreasing func-
tion of β, thus we need λ2 = 0, and λ1 > 0, that is
β∗ = 0
Similarly, the optimal investment of insurer in safe asset is as follows:
max
α
(1−q) ln ((1+K)MH+αK(Rf−MH)−pl− ER
1− qK
)
+q ln
(
(1+K)ML+αK(Rf−ML)−pl
)
subject to
0 ≤ α ≤ 1
In the similar way, we can solve the optimal α∗, that is α∗ = 0.
Therefore the optimal insurance contracts are:
dLnl = (1 +K)M
L − pl dHnl = (1 +K)MH −
ER
1− qK − pl
dLl = (1 +K)M
L + (1− p)l dHl = (1 +K)MH −
ER
1− qK + (1− p)l
dL = (1 +K)ML
Now we derive the optimal taxation scheme: In the bad aggregate state, the payoﬀ of
the insurer whose assets succeed is
(
1 +K
)
RH + T
L
S − dL = (1+K)(RH −ML) + TLS , while
the payoﬀ of the insurer whose assets fail is
(
1+K
)
RL+T
L
F −dL = (1+K)(RL−ML)+TLF .
Since regulator can reinsure the idiosyncratic shocks to insuerers through tax, each insurer
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does not bear idiosyncratic risk. In other words,
(1 +K)RH + T
L
S − dL = (1 +K)RL + TLF − dL = CL∗ = 0
Thus the taxation/subsidy among insurees are:{
TLS = d
L − (1 +K)RH = (1 +K)(ML −RH) < 0
TLF = (1 +K)M
L − (1 +K)RL = (1 +K)(ML −RL) > 0
In bad aggregate state, the tax transfers satisfy the following budge neutral constraint:(
q(1− τ) + τ) · TLS + (1− q)(1− τ) · TLF = (1 +K)(ML −ML) = 0
Similarly, if in the good aggregate state, the payoﬀ of insurers whose assets succeed is
(
(1 +
K
)
RH+T
H
S −dH , while the payoﬀ of the insurers whose assets fail is
(
1+K
)
RL+T
H
F −dH .Each
insurer do not bear idiosyncratic risk, then(
(1 +K
)
RH + T
H
S − dH =
(
1 +K
)
RL + T
H
F − dH = CH∗ =
ER ·K
1− q
{
THS = d
H + ER·K
1−q − (1 +K)RH = (1 +K)(MH −RH) < 0
THF = d
H + ER·K
1−q − (1 +K)RL = (1 +K)(MH −RL) > 0
In good aggregate state, the taxation is budget budget neutral since(
(1− q)(1− τ) + τ) · THS + q(1− τ) · THF = (1 +K)(MH −MH) = 0
Therefore, the optimal tax scheme is:
TLS = (1 +K)(M
L −RH)
TLF = (1 +K)(M
L −RL)
THS = (1 +K)(M
H −RH)
THF = (1 +K)(M
H −RL)
In this case,it is still optimal for insurees invest all their capital in buying risky insurance
contracts, insurers invest all their capital in risky assets, and regulators’s taxes transfers are
given as above.
We now proceed to the third case when τ > τ2, insurees cannot be perfectly insured, thus
the insurees’ payoﬀ in two states are: βRf + dL(1− β)− pl = (1+K)ML + (β + αK)(Rf −
ML)−pl in the bad aggregate state and βRf+dH(1−β)−pl = (1+K)MH+(β+αK)(Rf−
MH)− pl − ER
1−qK in good aggregate state, respectively. Thus insuree’s problem is
max
β
(1− q) ln ((1 +K)MH + (β + αK)(Rf −MH)− pl − ER
1− qK
)
+ q ln
(
(1 +K)ML + (β + αK)(Rf −ML)− pl
)
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subject to
0 ≤ β ≤ 1
Thus
L = (1− q) ln ((1 +K)MH + (β + αK)(Rf −MH)− pl − ER
1− qK
)
+q ln
(
(1 +K)ML + (β + αK)(Rf −ML)− pl
)
+ λ1β + λ2(1− β)
The ﬁrst order condition is
(1− q)(Rf −MH)
(1 +K)MH + (β + αK)(Rf −MH)− pl − ER1−qK
+
q(Rf −ML)
(1 +K)ML + (β + αK)(Rf −ML)− pl + λ1 − λ2 = 0
Suppose λ2 = λ1 = 0, that is 0 < β < 1 Thus the opitmal β∗is
β∗ =
(1 +K)(ER ·Rf −MHML) + pl(ER−Rf )− qER·K·(Rf−M
L)
1−q
(MH −Rf )(Rf −ML) − αK
Thus insuree’ utility is given by
(1− q) ln
(
(1 +K)MH − (1 +K)(ER ·Rf −M
HML) + pl(ER−Rf )− qER·K·(Rf−M
L)
1−q
(Rf −ML)
−pl − ER
1− qK
)
+ q ln
(
(1 +K)ML
+
(1 +K)(ER ·Rf −MHML) + pl(ER−Rf )− qER·K·(Rf−M
L)
1−q
(MH −Rf ) − pl
)
for any α, β = β∗(α) such that insuree’s welfare will not change. Thus we need
β∗ =
(1 +K)(ER ·Rf −MHML) + pl(ER−Rf )− qER·K·(Rf−M
L)
1−q
(MH −Rf )(Rf −ML) − αK < 1
If
(1+K)(ER·Rf−MHML)+pl(ER−Rf )−
qER·K·(Rf−ML)
1−q
(MH−Rf )(Rf−ML) ≤ 1, α∗can be any number between 0 and 1.
If 1 <
(1+K)(ER·Rf−MHML)+pl(ER−Rf )−
qER·K·(Rf−ML)
1−q
(MH−Rf )(Rf−ML) < 1+K, then α
∗has to be greater than
(1+K)(ER·Rf−MHML)+pl(ER−Rf )−
qER·K·(Rf−ML)
1−q
K(MH−Rf )(Rf−ML) − 1K .
Regulator impose the minimum requirement of liquidity buﬀer α∗ such that any
α∗ ∈
(
max
{
(1 +K)(ER ·Rf −MHML) + pl(ER−Rf )− qER·K·(Rf−M
L)
1−q
K(MH −Rf )(Rf −ML) −
1
K
, 0
}
, 1
)
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, in safe assets, and insurees invest β∗where
β∗ =
(1 +K)(ER ·Rf −MHML) + pl(ER−Rf )− qER·K·(Rf−M
L)
1−q
(MH −Rf )(Rf −ML) − α
∗K
and the opitmal insurance contracts are
dLnl =
(1 +K)ML + (β∗ + α∗K)(Rf −ML)− β∗Rf − pl
1− β∗
dHnl =
(1 +K)MH + (β + αK)(Rf −MH)− ER1−qK − β∗Rf + (1− p)l
1− β∗
dLl =
(1 +K)ML + (β∗ + α∗K)(Rf −ML)− β∗Rf − pl
1− β∗
dHl =
(1 +K)MH + (β + αK)(Rf −MH)− ER1−qK − β∗Rf + (1− p)l
1− β∗
Now we derive the optimal taxation scheme. In the bad aggregate state, the payoﬀ of insurers
whose assets success is
(
1+K−(β∗+α∗K))RH+TLS −dL(1−β∗), while the payoﬀ of insurers
whose assets fail is
(
1 +K − (β∗ + α∗K))RL + TLF − dL(1− β∗) Since each insurer does not
bear idiosyncratic risk: (
1 +K − (β∗ + α∗K))RH + TLS − dL(1− β∗)
=
(
1 +K − (β∗ + α∗K))RL + TLF − dL(1− β∗)
= CL∗ = −α∗KRf
Thus the tax schemes are:
TLS = dL(1− β∗)− α∗KRf −
(
1 +K − (β∗ + α∗K))RH
= (1 +K − (β∗ + α∗K))(ML −RH) < 0
TLF = dL(1− β∗)− α∗KRf −
(
1 +K − (β∗ + α∗K))RL
= (1 +K − (β∗ + α∗K))(ML −RL) > 0
Similarly, in good aggregate state, the payoﬀ of insurers whose assets succeed is
(
1 +
K − (β∗ + α∗K))RH + THS − dH(1 − β∗), while the payoﬀ of insurers whose assets fail is(
1 +K − (β∗ + α∗K))RL + THF − dH(1− β∗) Since each insurer does not bear idiosyncratic
risk: (
1 +K − (β∗ + α∗K))RH + THS − dH(1− β∗)
=
(
1 +K − (β∗ + α∗K))RL + THF − dH(1− β∗)
= CH
∗
= ER·K
1−q − αK ·Rf
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Therefore, the optimal tax schemes are:
THS = d
H(1− β∗) + ER·K
1−q − αK ·Rf −
(
1 +K − (β∗ + α∗K))RH
=
(
1 +K − (β∗ + α∗K))(MH −RH) < 0
THF = d
H(1− β∗) + ER·K
1−q − αK ·Rf −
(
1 +K − (β∗ + α∗K))RL
=
(
1 +K − (β∗ + α∗K))(MH −RL) > 0
The tax budget neutral constraints are also satisﬁed in good and bad aggregate states,
respectively:
q(1− τ) · THF +
(
(1− q)(1− τ) + τ) · THS = (1 +K − (β∗ + α∗K))(MH −MH) = 0
(1− q)(1− τ) · TLS +
(
q(1− τ) + τ) · TLF = (1 +K − (β∗ + α∗K))(ML −ML) = 0
Thus we have: 
TLS = (1 +K − (β∗ + α∗K))(ML −RH)
TLF = (1 +K − (β∗ + α∗K))(ML −RL)
THS =
(
1 +K − (β∗ + α∗K))(MH −RH)
THF =
(
1 +K − (β∗ + α∗K))(MH −RL)
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